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Abstract
Following economic stagnation and deindustrialisation in 1970s and 1980s Britain, the shift toward
neoliberalism and entrepreneurial urbanism has had profound effects on the ways in which cities are
experienced by different socio-cultural groups. As many urban commentators have noted, in the
pursuit of maintaining a spatial capital fix, some groups have found themselves increasingly
marginalised through various image-related redevelopment processes. The working classes, the
homeless and, increasingly, young people continue to be faced with a number of curtailments which
restrict access and spatial freedoms. Taking Newcastle upon Tyne and its night-time economy as a
case in point, this thesis examines the roles of class identity, delinquency, and exclusion in
contemporary nightlife, and how current representations of troublesome youth such as the ‘chav’ are
used to articulate exclusionary practices. This thesis, though, also illustrates that exclusion is
ultimately driven by commercially-defined imperatives commensurate with extant urban
entrepreneurialism. However, whilst it was initially speculated that the young ‘lower’ classes were
excluded from city centre nightlife outright, it was actually found that the night-time economy
functions through a number of channelling and redistributive processes. The ‘chav element’, whilst
being rejected from many venues, is not wholly excluded from the city centre, but segregated and
contained in certain locales. Pointing to a more nuanced idea of exclusion as a spatial restructuring
process, this thesis suggests that urban cultural geography should pay closer attention to a temporal,
fluid, and fragmentary notion of exclusion that is constantly shifting and transforming alongside other
changes in production and consumption.
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1Chapter 1
2Post-Industrial Urbanism and Troublesome Youth: An Introduction
1.1 Urban Transformations and the Exclusion of Troublesome Youth
Over the past thirty years or so, Britain’s cities have been experiencing rapid transformations
in their political-economic function, their built form, and their socio-spatial composition
(Harvey, 1989a). Once operating predominantly as Fordist manufacturing hubs – whose
managerialist governments were mainly concerned with extending the “provision of public
services and decommodified components of welfare” (Macleod, 2002: 604) – they are now
largely constituted by globalized service, finance and leisure economies, laboured by and
catering for a predominantly consumption-oriented middle class (Lash and Urry, 1994; Thrift,
1987), and governed by a post-industrial ‘public-private’ state (Hubbard and Hall, 1998). As
many urban commentators have illustrated, these changes are the result of a shift towards a
neoliberal economy and what has become known as ‘entrepreneurial urbanism’.
In the 1970s and 1980s, manufacturing flight and a host of other economic transformations
instigated a period of catastrophic deindustrialization in Britain and indeed elsewhere in the
western world. Growing fiscal austerities and structural unemployment became politically
entrenched in a “rising tide of neoconservatism” and mounting sympathies to “market
rationality and privatisation” (Harvey, 1989a: 5). Commensurate with accelerating processes
of globalization (Harvey, 1995), a newly elected Thatcher government sought to roll back the
frontiers of the state (Peck and Tickell, 2002), promoting a neoliberalized economy devoid of
municipal intervention whilst advancing superior social control through conservative moralist
ideologies (Smith, 1994). Encapsulated in this neoliberal schema, city administrations,
through ‘public-private’ partnerships and comprehensive place marketing strategies, sought
external funding, new investments and new sources of labour, actively attempting to
recapitalize on urban space in an effort to offset the deindustrialization, unemployment and
deprivation that pervaded city landscapes at the time (Harvey, 1989b).
Also key to this entrepreneurial agenda was the physical reconstruction and re-
aestheticization of urban space. As Don Mitchell notes, in the post-industrial era image
“becomes everything. When capital is seen to have no need for any particular place, then
cities do what they can to make themselves so attractive that capital – in the form of new
businesses, more tourists, or a greater percentage of suburban spending – will want to locate
there” (Mitchell, 1997: 304). As a result – and variously depicted over the years as ‘renewal’,
‘regeneration’, ‘redevelopment’, and currently under New Labour ‘renaissance’ (see Lees,
32003) – the obsolete manufacturing infrastructures and enclaves of industrial wastelands have
largely been “scrubbed clean and dramatically reinvented as glittering office and hotel
atriums, themed leisure zones, upscale shopping districts, gentrified housing, and aesthetically
enchanting cultural districts” (Macleod, 2002: 605).
However, these economic, political and spatial transformations which characterise
entrepreneurial urbanism and the neoliberalized regime have had profound effects on the
ways in which western cities are experienced by different social groups. Whilst some
commentators have alluded to increasing empowerment, opportunity and thus an
“emancipatory city” (see the collection edited by Loretta Lees, 2004), others have raised
significant questions about exactly which members of the citizenry actually have universal
and unfettered access to urban ‘public’ space in recent times (see the collection edited by
Michael Sorkin, 1992 for example).
Neil Smith (1996a; 1996b) for instance, suggests that the repoliticization of the city
concomitant with entrepreneurial urbanism has given rise to an era of urban ‘revanchism’,
where, in the pursuit of maintaining a spatial capital fix, some groups have found themselves
increasingly marginalized through various image-related redevelopment processes.
Examining the gentrification discourses purveyed by the successive Koch, Dinkins and
Giuliani mayoral administrations in the 1980s and 1990s, Smith argues that the New York
City entrepreneurial regime developed a vernacular through which those already
disenfranchised by economic restructuring became criminalized. The working classes, urban
poor and groups of ‘street people’ were argued to have stolen space from gentrifiers and the
wider public and became subject to further duress through rapid gentrification (itself
legitimated through the normalization of the ‘frontier’ ideology (see Smith, 1992)) and
increasingly punitive sanctions in the form of zero-tolerance policing (ZTP). A term which
can be loosely understood as a ‘revenge on public space’ (Atkinson, 2003), revanchism thus
encapsulates the urban processes where inner-city neighbourhoods, streets, parks and other
municipal / public spaces are being ‘reclaimed’ by dominant urban powers from the
delinquent urban poor through gentrification as a “global urban strategy” (Smith, 2002),
increasingly intense ZTP, and their punitive corollaries (Coleman, 2005; Fyfe, 2004; Smith
1996b; also Hackworth and Smith, 2001).
Drawing on Smith’s ideas of revanchism, Don Mitchell (1997) has pointed to more legislative
means through which the urban poor become displaced for the sake of increased capital
accumulation. The anti-homeless laws in many US cities operate to cleanse urban space to
4make way for capital, but in doing so ultimately seek “simply to annihilate homeless people
themselves” (Mitchell, 1997: 305). In Mitchell’s words:
“In city after city concerned with “liveability”, with, in other words, making urban centres
attractive to both footloose capital and to the footloose middle classes, politicians and
managers of the new economy in the 1980s and early 1990s have turned to what could be
called “the annihilation of space by law”. That is, they have turned to a legal remedy that
seeks to cleanse the streets of those left behind by globalisation and other secular changes in
the economy by simply erasing the spaces in which they must live – by creating a legal fiction
in which the rights of the wealthy, of the successful in the global economy, are sufficient for
all the rest” (Mitchell, 1997: 305).
Although the use of legislation seems to be more relevant in the American context, the
foundations for criminalizing the homeless remain similar in the UK – their path into poverty
being irrelevant when “placed alongside more pressing concerns to do with the
‘contamination’ of city space that homeless people symbolize” (Coleman, 2005: 137).
In addition to ZTP, gentrification and anti-homeless laws which aim to rid cities of specific
‘undesirables’, the capacity to seek out and remove urban delinquents through intensive
surveillance mechanisms has also become central to recent entrepreneurial strategies. The use
of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) for example has become widespread throughout the UK
(in shopping precincts, high streets and city centres etc.). Yet whilst such infrastructure has
been intimated as a tool used in the prevention and control of crime by government and media
rhetoric, it is actually better understood as a means through which to boost the ‘feel good
factor’ of city downtowns, thereby attracting more consumers to the city centre, and
ultimately increasing the profitability of urban space (Atkinson, 2003; Coleman, 2004, 2005;
Coleman et al, 2005; Fyfe and Bannister, 1996, 1998). Working in a similar way to the
image-enhancement practices of ZTP, gentrification and anti-homeless legislation, CCTV
surveillance reinforces “particular urban subjectivities around who has the right to inhabit,
(re)define and utilise aspects of contemporary urban spatiality” (Coleman, 2005: 135), and
criminalizes groups perceived to threaten the putative success of neoliberal urban space. As
Rowland Atkinson notes, “exhortations that if you are doing nothing wrong you have nothing
to fear have been met with a realisation that this really depends on who is defining what is
wrong” (Atkinson, 2003: 1833):
“CCTV control rooms are ridden with racism and sexism, and certain types of young people
are targeted with socially constructed suspicion and are labelled as ‘toerags’, ‘scumbags’,
‘yobs’, ‘scrapheads’, ‘Big Issue scum’ … and are scrutinised, followed, and harassed. Thus
5operators are already imposing a ‘normative time-space ecology’ on the city by stipulating
who ‘belongs’ where and when, and treating everything else as a suspicious ‘other’ to be
disciplined, scrutinised, controlled” (Graham, 1998: 491 quoted in Atkinson, 2003: 1833).
CCTV is thus less to do with the spatial control / deletion of crime than the control / deletion
of specific groups in urban space under entrepreneurial governance – its proliferation
therefore “less the outcome of a careful evaluation of different crime reduction strategies and
more ... a recognition that CCTV ‘fits’ with a wider economic and political agenda to do with
the contemporary restructuring of urban public space” (Fyfe and Bannister, 1998: 257).
In the post-industrial era, then, the working classes are finding themselves increasingly
displaced as their neighbourhoods become gentrified; the urban poor are becoming ever more
subject to ZTP and direct expulsions; the homeless are being legislated against, effectively
annihilating the ‘public’ spaces in which they must live; and some groups are being
beleaguered by mounting CCTV and other control agencies who are redefining ‘appropriate’
uses of city space. And so, under this new urbanism, “any conception of “publicness” we
ascribe to the new renaissance sites is highly selective and discriminating” (Macleod, 2002:
605) as a vast array of spaces are becoming more and more controlled, exacerbating an
“idealized class-based performative rationale for citified behaviour” (Coleman, 2005: 133).
Certain groups of young people are similarly understood as problematic to post-industrial
urbanism. Whilst young people as a social group have been separated, regulated and
subordinated for centuries, and have sometimes been understood as deviant or delinquent
(especially urban working-class youth – see Valentine et al, 1998), contemporary
understandings of troublesome youth are being reworked alongside recent political,
economic, and social urban transformations so that along with the urban poor, they too are
becoming increasingly subject to castigation, curtailment and exclusion in the entrepreneurial
city.
The idea of troublesome youth is, of course, not new. As Geoff Pearson has shown in his
seminal text Hooligan (1983), the young working classes have been thought of as socially
problematic since the unruly apprentices of Merrie England, to the cads and roughs of the
Victorian period, the hooligans tackled by Baden Powell through the scouting movement,
right up to the more recent phenomenon of the teds (McDowell, 2002). Similarly, the moral
panic that emerged from the mods and rockers’ Clacton disturbances in the 1960s reinforced
particular beliefs that working-class youth were out of control (S. Cohen, 1972), and similar
panic episodes emanating from the ‘mugging crisis’ were subsequently engaged to strengthen
6law and order proposals in the 1970s (although these anxieties were not necessarily exclusive
to young people in particular – see Hall et al, 1978). Even more recently, concerns about
young people, their morality and their behaviour have surfaced from tragic events such as the
murder of Jamie Bulger and the Columbine High School Massacre in the 1990s (Aitken,
2001; Davis and Bourhill, 1997), where again in the form of moral panic, a generation of
parents began to limit their children’s spatiality outside the home and school (Valentine,
1996; 1997). With fears being articulated through notions of danger, abuse and abduction,
and a common consensus that childhood as the ‘age of innocence’ was over, the subordination
of young people as social members both dangerous and in danger helped assemble a range of
restrictions limiting their access to public space. As Gill Valentine puts it:
“The moral panic of the 1990s about the ‘end of innocence’ appears therefore to be mobilising
a popular consensus that children, particularly though not exclusively teenagers, are
uncontrollable and are a threat to adult hegemony in everyday spaces … It is a consensus
which is being used to justify further attempts to police the crisis of childhood by restricting
young people’s access to, and freedoms in, so-called ‘public space’” (Valentine, 1996: 593).
In addition to cultural frameworks of curtailment, other recent systems for controlling young
people’s behaviour and regulating their spatialities originate from the state level, where
supplementary legislation is utilised in the forms of the Anti Social Behaviour Order (Asbo),
by-laws, and curfews. The Asbo has the legal capacity to confine an individual both to a
particular locality, and restrict them from others (despite the individual perhaps not being
convicted of an actual crime – see McDowell, 2007). By-laws – for example banning
skateboarding at particular places within contemporary urban settings – implicitly prevents
the presence of young people from congregating at commercial locales (see Rogers, 2006).
And curfews give police the discretionary power to disperse groups of young people from
public spaces such as streets and parks at certain times if their presence is seen as threatening
or intrusive (Collins and Kearns, 2001). Youth groups are also subject to spatial curtailment
implemented by various private-sector institutions. CCTV and private security assemblages
enable shopping malls and other festival marketplaces to be policed against non-consuming
youth who are perceived as intimidating or threatening to the middle-class adults who
consume such spaces in the ‘correct’, appropriately-defined ways (Sibley, 1995; Valentine,
2004).
But whilst the development of neoliberalism, entrepreneurial urbanism and increased urban
spending has influenced a number of direct spatial exclusionary mechanisms, a number of
working-class youth groups have found themselves marginalised in other, more lateral ways.
7As a Post-Fordist neoliberalism pervades the current economic landscape, many jobs are now
located in either high-skilled managerial spheres or low-skilled, feminised service sectors,
which has indirectly socially excluded countless young working-class men from post-
industrial employment, despite their alliance to a traditional working-class labour masculinity
based on craft, graft, and pride in the job (see McDowell, 2002, 2003; also Nayak, 2003a,
2003b, 2003c). As Linda McDowell observes:
“Those older forms of acceptable ‘macho’ behaviour among working-class men that used to
be a key feature of male manual employment are now a positive disadvantage in the labour
market, where self-presentation, punctuality, attitude, and demeanour to customers and
superiors are increasingly important attributes” (McDowell, 2002: 104).
Furthermore, those who have become disenfranchised by economic restructuring have often
been reconstituted in policy and media debates as ‘yobs’ – a violent generation of young
working-class men who disrupt the moral hegemony of the classroom, the street, and the city
centre, increasingly captured under the banner of the New Labour idiom ‘anti-social
behaviour’, and subject to its ever more punitive corollaries. Perhaps signalling a ‘crisis of
masculinity’ (see McDowell, 2002; 2003), young working-class men continue to be defined
by their pseudo-criminalities and their lack of educational achievement compared to young
women, reinforcing contemporaneous sensibilities to punish, control, and exclude.
This disparagement of working-class youth, though, has shifted even more recently,
emblematizing new forms of class politics and condescension (McDowell, 2006, 2007). The
rise of the ‘chav’ in 2004 highlighted the more visual, aesthetic and embodied characteristics
of troublesome youth that have come to serve as overt “symbols of deviance” (Hayward and
Yar, 2004). In a rather disdainful account, Neil Tweedie of the Daily Telegraph explains:
“When you see a stunted teenager, apparently jobless, hanging around outside McDonald’s
dressed in a Burberry baseball cap, Ben Sherman shirt, ultra-white Reebok trainers and
dripping in bling (cheap, tasteless and usually gold-coloured jewellery), he will almost
certainly be a chav ... Very short hair and souped-up Vauxhall Novas are chav, as is functional
illiteracy, a burgeoning career in petty crime and the wearing of one’s mobile telephone
around the neck. Chavs are most at home in run-down, small-town shopping precincts,
smoking and shouting at their mates” (Tweedie, Daily Telegraph: 13 December 2004).
These cultural symbols make young people’s extant class status seemingly verifiable, and
have come to play major parts in recent exclusions in the post-industrial city. Their socially
constructed relationship with notions of crime and deviance influenced bans on baseball caps
8and hoodies at a number of shopping centres nationwide, including Bluewater in Kent and the
Elephant and Castle in South London (Hayward and Yar, 2006). Anoop Nayak (2006) for
example, also found that many bars and clubs in Newcastle upon Tyne’s city centre expressed
and advertised themselves as “charver free zones” (the ‘charver’ being the north-east’s
personification of the nationally recognised ‘chav’), pointing toward a similar set of
regulatory processes that seek to filter access according to contemporary cultural, class-based
politics. It is the place of these representations in Newcastle’s night-time economy that are
the major focus of this study.
1.2 Newcastle and the Night-Time Economy: Research Context and Objectives
As cities have turned to more flexible modes of accumulation following deindustrialization,
nightlife has been repositioned as a viable supplement to urban economic growth. Newcastle
upon Tyne stands out as a frequently cited example of this, becoming famous for its night-
time economy and ‘friendly locals’, but also through its new image as an urban centre for arts
and culture in the north of England. Where the city-region once relied on manufacturing and
heavy engineering industries, it is now characterised, like many other UK cities, by its post-
industrial economic practices. Coal mining, shipbuilding, munitions production etc – which
heavily contributed to the region’s popular historic identity of cloth caps, Brown Ale, dog-
racing, ‘fog-on-the-Tyne’, Geordie, white, masculine, working-class culture – has given way
to the cultural industries and branch-plant economies following deindustrialisation in the
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s (Nayak, 2003c; Tomaney et al, 1999). And where local industry in
the past had a major bearing upon Newcastle’s built form, nowadays only relics are left. A
brief glimpse around the city at the present juncture reveals a transformed landscape, and
what were the emblems of a resilient heavy-industrial region have become the symbols and
landmarks of Newcastle’s new globalized, post-industrial cultural identity. For example, the
Newcastle-Gateshead quayside – once the centre of Newcastle’s industrial prowess – is now
home to upmarket office and living spaces, leisure facilities, numerous bars, a new
entertainment centre, and of course the Millennium Bridge. Additionally, the building which
housed the Baltic Flour Mills is now a contemporary arts centre, and the old Fish Market has
since become a major nightclub.
Other recent developments include the promotion of science and technology-based industries,
retail infrastructure, the renovation / rebuilding of the city library, a multitude of office
buildings, and a number of gentrified housing vestibules (see NCC, 1999; 2006), and most, if
not all of these developments are characterised by the public-private nexus pertaining
exclusively to entrepreneurial urban governance. Newcastle City Council, both Newcastle
9and Northumbria Universities, numerous other businesses, private developers / gentrifiers,
and Regional Development Agencies ((RDAs) themselves comprised of representatives from
local authorities, trade unions, the voluntary sector and the private sector) are all collaborative
stakeholders in Newcastle’s contemporary plans for economic growth and re-aestheticization.
The night-time economy in particular has played a major part in recent cultural and economic
transformations of the city. Wedded to the entrepreneurial agenda, it has recently been
recognised that many cities now position nightlife as an intrinsic constituent of urban
development strategy, much of the time being employed as a counterbalance to the loss of a
manufacturing base (Chatterton and Hollands, 2002, 2003). And it seems that Newcastle, like
other British cities, has followed suit. As Nayak observes:
“From its monochrome representation as a bleak post-industrial outpost, the North East, and in
particular its principal city Newcastle Upon Tyne, is today portrayed in the media as a ‘Party
City’: a site for excessive drinking and wild stag and hen nights ... At the same time there has
been major investment in tourism, waterfront developments, the arts and new cultural
industries ... As the traditional ‘masculine’ infrastructure has been depleted, it has been
replaced, then, by new cultural industries, nightclubs, restaurants and café bars in what
amounts to the creation of a vibrant, if much mythologized, night-time economy” (2006: 816).
However, the recent production of nightlife can be seen as symptomatic of wider urban
redevelopment and gentrification processes; that is, urban economic development through
evening and night-time economies at the current juncture seems to be heavily reliant on large
corporate firms that provide themed, branded or highly stylised environments specifically for
the more affluent of urban consumers. Premium products and services, along with higher
drinks and entry prices, and cultural codes that filter access and define belonging have
prompted a “displacement of lower-order activities and working-class communities by
higher-order activities aimed at cash-rich groups” (Chatterton and Hollands, 2003: 10). Some
groups of young people, not seen as lucrative enough consumers, are becoming increasingly
disenfranchised from contemporary nightlife leisure spaces – excluded by price, dress, and
style – and subsequently marginalised to peripheral community pubs, social clubs and estates
(Chatterton and Hollands, 2002, 2003; Nayak, 2006). These processes are helping to
segregate different forms of nightlife, enacting a kind of gentrification that privileges only
those who can afford access and conform to contemporary night-time aesthetics. As Paul
Chatterton and Robert Hollands suggest, “within such urban transformations, it is important
to note who gains and who loses, who is guiding urban nightscapes and to what ends, and
who, literally, has been invited to the ‘party’” (Chatterton and Hollands, 2003: 10).
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Research Objectives
It is these exclusions, systems of filtering, methods of controlling access, and redistributing
groups of young people that are the focus of this study. Aiming to bring together notions of
the entrepreneurial city, nightlife and its consumers with the contemporary cultural politics of
troublesome youth, this study pursues two lines of questioning: how are groups of young
people being reconstituted as the new delinquent in the current urban night-time economy;
and what effects do these new configurations have on young people’s access to the spaces of
urban nightlife?
The objectives are four-fold: first, to show that contemporary urban nightscapes are unequal
in their admission to all youth groups, with many venues exclusive to the more cash-rich,
middle-class consumers; second, to show that this inequality helps construct and perpetuate
class-based representations of troublesome youth in the social imaginary. The third aim is to
illustrate that exclusions are the result of capital obligations to maximise profit through the
most lucrative markets; and fourth, to exemplify that the consequential spatial ordering of
contemporary nightlife reflects the increasingly fragmented and segregated arrangement of
the post-industrial city. The result is a thesis which posits exclusion as a channelling, filtering
and redistributive process which divides class-based groups, rather than a blanket spatial
sanction denying participation completely. Significant in relation to debates in contemporary
human geography, this study also calls geographers to investigate further the intricacies of
exclusion, the role of embodiment, and how they interrelate with the construction and
perpetuation of deviant social identities in the twenty-first century.
1.3 The Thesis
Chapter 2 contextualises the study in the relevant academic literature, examining theories of
the post-industrial city, deviance, and the geographies of troublesome youth. I begin by
outlining how urban space in the developed west has changed in recent years due to economic
restructuring and related shifts in political systems. I illustrate how after economic austerities
and deindustrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s, neoliberalization, characterised at the urban
scale through entrepreneurial governance, obligated urban administrations to recapitalize on
city space through public-private partnerships, flexible modes of accumulation and
gentrification in order to attract capital and labour. I also illustrate, as many commentators
have suggested before, that entrepreneurial urbanism has produced multiple landscapes of
exclusion, where gentrification, zero-tolerance policing, and an increased capacity to regulate
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space through surveillance infrastructure have marginalised and even eradicated certain social
groups from specific urban spaces.
I then go on to examine some of the conceptions of deviance formulated in academia over the
years. I begin by illustrating how some social groups were theorised as pathologically deviant
in the early 20th century, before moving on to a cultural explanation put forward by scholars
working out of the Chicago School of Sociology in the 1920s. I then explore theories of
delinquency, which aimed primarily to uncover the deviant sensibilities of young men, and
how this influenced later theories of deviance – via ‘subculture’ – by the Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham in the 1970s and
1980s. Whilst these accounts allude to deviance as an intrinsic characteristic of the individual
and / or group, subsequent theories I explore are suggestive of a more constructed nature,
where deviance is a label attached to certain groups through representation (particularly by
the mass news media, but also by the citizenry and state). Borrowing from this
understanding, I then illustrate how specific conceptions of deviance operate in conjunction
with certain spatial processes. Work coming from cultural geography and the geographies of
young people shows how a common understanding of young people as troublesome prompts a
number of marginalising and excluding practices. I conclude the chapter with a brief
summary outlining how these literatures inform the study, arguing that contemporary
representations of troublesome youth are a perpetuation of older deviancy discourses
reworked alongside current urban entrepreneurial performances.
Chapter 3 builds upon the research context by surveying recent popular conceptualizations of
troublesome youth. I begin by suggesting that contemporary cultural politics developing
alongside the inception of New Labour in 1997 point to a continual reconstitution of deviant
identities commensurate with structural transformations in the political-economy. Those who
have become socially excluded – largely working-class young men – remain castigated by the
media, where conceptions of violence, class and youth converge as defining characteristics of
a purportedly new and pervasive national problem, threatening the prospects of middle-class
life in neoliberalized late-capitalism. I then go on to show that this popular understanding has
led to the construction by the state of a new, or perhaps more accurately, enlarged range of
regulatory measures that aim to instil new forms of respect and civility in those labelled ‘anti-
social’ whilst increasingly aiming to curtail and control their spatialities. Representations of
troublesome youth also spill over into debates concerning violence and disorder in the night-
time economy where the yob once again takes centre stage. These discourses suggest that
representations of the yob maintain the long-standing fears attached to various ‘youthful’
figures such as the hooligan, the teds, the mods and rockers.
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I then go on to outline another instance where youth and class have been reconfigured
alongside contemporaneous socio-economic politics. The rise of the ‘chav’ phenomenon in
the early 2000s succeeded concerns in the 1990s of a growing violent ‘underclass’ dependant
on state benefits. This succession has also entailed a shift from the locus of production to
consumption, where specific consumer practices have come to signify this new underclass in
more significant ways than in the past. Those at the bottom of the social ladder, along with
idleness, fecklessness and promiscuity, are now identified and categorised through a vast
array of consumer symbols, which have, in turn, become symbols of deviance. A
contemptuous signifier of contemporary class relations, I also illustrate how the chav has
come to symbolise an increased social, cultural and spatial separation of the classes, where a
multitude of exclusions now occur to keep the classes geographically divided. I conclude the
chapter by showing how contemporary representations of troublesome youth are reconstituted
and entangled in the political-economic practices which characterise post-industrial Britain;
how governance and representational apparatuses have promoted specific socio-economic
dynamics; and how they have also constructed deviant cultures, where young people are
becoming increasingly criminalised through economic transformations and their concomitant
regulatory functions.
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to illustrate the geographical context of the study, showing how
Newcastle upon Tyne has been culturally and economically transformed in recent years.
First, I examine Newcastle’s economic history, and how the city has shifted in its economic
practice from heavy engineering to post-manufacturing practices. I also look at how recent
political-economic agendas in the city reflect the wider transformations in British urban
governance where the city aims to re-attract investment, capital, and labour through aesthetic
redevelopments and the public-private partnership. Second, with nightlife being a major
element of Newcastle’s contemporary imagining, I discuss the academic literature addressing
the production and regulation of current night-time economies, examining the ways in which
nightlife functions to help revitalise cities, and how night-time leisure is implicated in a
number of marginalising practices. I conclude the chapter with a brief summary and
examination of Newcastle’s night-time economy, suggesting that with the gradual domination
of corporatism and its consequential regulatory mechanisms, the future for diversity and equal
access within Newcastle’s nightlife looks uncertain.
In Chapter 5 I explicate the methodology, outlining the process of the research. I discuss how
I observed the admittance practices at a number of bars and nightclubs, and how I interviewed
licensed premise operators to provide the data required to understand and illustrate the extant
regulatory practices, rejections and exclusions that permeate urban nightlife, how they are
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articulated through current representations of troublesome youth, and how contemporary
Newcastle nightscapes can be seen to reflect the wider exclusionary landscapes of post-
industrial urban space. Beginning with the principle tenets of ethnographic work, I discuss
issues of positionality and situated knowledges, and I also illustrate how this particular thesis
takes on a case study form, where processes uncovered by the research are reflective of more
general economic, cultural and socio-spatial processes operating in a variety of contexts.
Subsequently I explain the interview procedure, explicating the justification of participants
and sites, the position of the participants within knowledge relations, and the method of
questioning. I also discuss some of my experiences, and the limits I faced. I follow with a
brief overview of the observation work, outlining its advantages, the particular knowledges it
would yield, its methodological procedure, and again, its limits.
In chapter 6 I begin to present the research findings. In section 6.2 I set off to give a brief
overview of nightlife in Newcastle, presenting the four main locales in which the majority of
mainstream nightlife takes place. I argue that the Quayside and the Gate complex serve to
accommodate the mass market, whilst the Bigg Market caters for the lower markets, offering
cheap discounted drinks, and the area around Collingwood Street which has become known
as the ‘Diamond Strip’, is an archetype of recent gentrification practices in contemporary
night-time economies, marked by premium services and highly stylised environments. In
section 6.3 I go on to illustrate how current representations of delinquent youth, such as the
chav and charver, become operative in Newcastle’s night-time economy. I discuss first, the
continued role of consumer aesthetics in the identification of deviance and the ‘wrong
consumer’, where a range of clothing labels and other commodities are sought out in practices
of exclusion, and second, the increasing role of embodiment in the same exclusionary
processes. I illustrate that whilst the tangible symbols of deviance play an essential part in
nightlife regulation, they are ineffective on their own, and thus become reinforced with a
method of visualising lower class status through demeanour, comportment, speech and
behaviour. In doing so, the research revealed a distinct masculine bias throughout, indicating
that whilst the chav phenomenon encompasses delinquency by both young men and young
women, in the night-time economy young men seem to be ever more visible and prone to
exclusion, reinforcing contemporary perceptions that young men lower in the social structure
are increasingly problematic in a number of spatial contexts. Subsequently, I go on to show
how processes of exclusion are strengthened: first, through a process of ‘self-regulation’,
whereby certain groups come to know and understand their position in the spatially
inequitable night-time economy, refraining from attempts to gain access to the more upgraded
and stylised venues; and second, through extended networks of surveillance and regulation,
where communications between venues and police are increased to ensure rejection across
14
multiple premises. Section 6.4 concludes the chapter by presenting four main arguments
concerning the reconstitution of delinquent youth: that consumerist aesthetics continue to play
a fundamental part in visualising and contextualising deviance; that embodiment vis-à-vis
extant class relations is becoming ever more significant in marking out the ‘other’; that lower-
class masculinity continues to be defined as increasingly problematic compared to its
feminine counterpart; and that the entanglement of contemporary representations of
troublesome youth with exclusion is suggestive of a ‘normative landscape’ at work in the
night-time economy.
In chapter 7, I expand on the research findings. First, I illustrate the rationale for exclusion,
arguing that image has become ever more important for the gentrified and upgraded venues in
attracting and maintaining the most lucrative markets. The research revealed that operators
and bouncers, whilst having some concerns for crime and disorder, utilised representations of
delinquent youth to articulate the idea that exclusion is predicated on commercially defined
imperatives. Impervious to contemporary media rhetoric on youth deviance, nightlife
architects of the upmarket establishments thus practice exclusion to preserve the reputations
and images intrinsic to the maximisation of capital. However, as I go on to show in section
7.3, exclusion in Newcastle’s night-time economy, whilst being widely practiced by a number
of differing venues, is far from a systemic embargo which completely prevents participation
by those enveloped by the chav representation. Instead, the research suggests a more subtle,
nuanced form of filtering and redistribution, which, alongside the normalisation of many
other nightlife cultures, keeps particular class-based groups in their respective place. I
conclude the chapter by arguing that despite this variegated and nuanced process of exclusion,
Newcastle’s night-time economy remains an inequitable landscape which restricts access to
particular groups in various ways.
In Chapter 8 I conclude this thesis by summarizing the main arguments and the ramifications
for human geographical enquiry. In outlining the political implications of this thesis, I raise
four matters of interest for contemporary urban and cultural geographers: first, the perpetual
dependence of corporeal identities, whether through consumerist aesthetics, embodied
discourses of deviance, or both, in representing and contextualising deviance; two, the
complex and variegated nature of exclusion in the entrepreneurial city; three, an increasing
social and spatial separation between the classes as neoliberalism becomes ever more
ingrained into the everyday urban fabric; and four, the various multi-scalar relationships made
evident in this thesis by the down-link from the city to the street and body.
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Chapter 2
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Theoretical Contexts: Entrepreneurial Cities, Deviance, and the
Geographies of Youth
2.1 Introduction
This chapter illustrates the study’s theoretical foundations. I begin in section 2.2 by outlining
how urban space in the developed west, with a particular focus on Britain and the US, has
changed in recent years. I first examine economic restructuring processes before illustrating
related changes in urban governance. I then look at some of the more concrete spatial
changes – particularly the re-aestheticization and gentrification of urban space – that have
taken (and continue to take) place alongside political-economic adjustment. Finally, I
examine the consequences of these changes, showing how the shift into post-industrial
urbanism has produced multifarious landscapes of exclusion.
In section 2.3, I explore how ideas of troublesome youth have been understood in academia
over the years. I begin by outlining how notions of deviance and delinquency came to be
central analytical tools in sociology, criminology, and cultural studies, before introducing the
concept of subculture used by those working out of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural
Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham in the 1970s. Subsequently, I examine the
‘transactional’ or ‘labelling’ approach to deviance, which recognises the constructed nature of
deviant social identities.
In section 2.4, I explore some of the work on deviance in cultural geography and the
geographies of young people, showing how young people’s deviance is often predicated on
certain spatialities. Borrowing from the transactional approach to deviance, I also examine
work on contemporary representations of troublesome youth, illustrating the most recent
discursive practices through which young people come to be defined as criminal, deviant, and
problematic to British society. I then explore the implications of this, outlining a ‘crisis of
masculinity’ that affects the experiences of young men in Britain, and demonstrate the roles
of gender and class in the popular construction of troublesome youth.
Finally, in section 2.5 I conclude this chapter with a brief summary, explicating the relevance
of these literatures, and begin to show how groups of young people, through contemporary
representations of troublesome youth, are being reconstituted as the new delinquent in the
current entrepreneurial urban economy; and what effects these new configurations have on
young people’s access to urban space(s).
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2.2 Urban Transformations and their Socio-Spatial Consequences: The Post-
Industrial City
“[I]t seems worthwhile to enquire what role the urban process might be playing in the quite
radical restructuring going on in geographical distributions of human activity and in the
political-economic dynamics of uneven development in most recent times” (Harvey, 1989a:
4).
As David Harvey has suggested, urban processes and transformations are inextricably linked
to wider social, economic and political changes (e.g. 1985, 1989a, 1989b, 1990, 1995). It is
for this reason that tracing the contours of urban change in late capitalism needs to be
contextualised in accordance with more general economic adjustment and wider shifts in
political activity. Here, I begin tracing these contours by outlining the economic transition
from Fordism to Post-Fordism in developed capitalist cities (concentrating on the UK and
US), the associated political change widely known in urban studies as the shift from ‘urban
managerialism’ to ‘urban entrepreneurialism’, and the more concrete spatial transformations
which have altered the look and feel of many urban spaces.
Subsequently, I outline some of the consequences of these shifts. Changes in urban policy
and the practices which constitute entrepreneurial urbanism have profound effects on how
people experience urban space, and occasionally, how some are excluded from this
experience. As I illustrate in the following sections, many have observed how groups
disenfranchised by changes in the global economy have become even more marginalised at
the local level, pushed out of public places due to new legislative measures (Mitchell, 1997),
more punitive policing measures (MacLeod, 2002; Smith, 1996b; Atkinson, 2003), forced out
of neighbourhoods through gentrification (Smith, 1992; also Mitchell, 1995), and excluded
from many of the new ‘festival marketplaces’ and surrogate private spaces that pervade much
of the contemporary urban landscape in the developed west (Coleman, 2004, 2005; Fyfe,
2004; Fyfe and Bannister, 1996, 1998; Jackson, 1998).
Changing Economics, Changing Politics, Changing Space: Towards a Post-Industrial City
Prior to the 1970s, western urban economies, particularly those of the US and UK, were
characterised by a Fordist regime of accumulation. This highly organized and stiffly
structured economic practice pioneered by Henry Ford in the early 1900s, was characterised
by a specific reproduction of labour power, modes of labour control, and labour management.
Coupled with Keynesian politics, state regulation helped maintain a highly productive and
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profitable Fordist economy in the west, booming in the post-war period before settling in the
late 1950s (Harvey, 1989b). However, during the 1960s, as recession in the US and UK
began to take hold, the Fordist regime began to suffer. A host of factors problematized the
capability of Fordism as a regime that could provide stable economic growth in the developed
world. There were problems with investments in mass-production systems that “precluded
much flexibility of design and presumed stable growth in invariant consumer markets”
(Harvey, 1989b: 142). Multinational corporations fled abroad seeking labour in developing
countries “where the social contract with labour was either weakly enforced or non-existent”
(Harvey, 1989b: 141).
In what was a “troubled period of economic restructuring and social and political
readjustment” (Harvey, 1989b: 145), the relocation of the manufacturing infrastructure in the
1970s and 1980s left enclaves of dereliction and unemployed skilled labour in cities across
the UK and US, where social problems, deprivation and poverty became rife. But in
recognising the problems posed by Fordism in the face of economic recession and global
transformations, “a series of novel experiments in the realms of industrial organization as well
as in political and social life [began] to take shape” (Harvey, 1989b: 145). As opposed to the
structural rigidities of Fordism, which became increasingly problematic in a changing global
economy, ‘flexible accumulation’ as Harvey calls it (see Harvey 1989b; 1990), or what has
also been termed ‘Post-Fordism’ elsewhere (see the collection by Amin, 1995 for example),
rests on:
“flexibility with respect to labour processes, labour markets, products, and patterns of
consumption. It is characterized by the emergence of entirely new sectors of production, new
ways of providing financial services, new markets, and, above all, greatly intensified rates of
commercial, technological, and organizational innovation” (Harvey, 1989b: 147).
As the manufacturing sectors declined, they were replaced by burgeoning service and
financial sectors. Greater emphases were placed on urban consumption rather than
production, and were complimented by the growth of new cultural industries. The rise of this
new regime was also predicated around distinct political shifts. The newly inaugurated
conservative governments in 1970s USA and Britain, headed by Ronald Reagan and Margaret
Thatcher respectively, set out to free the markets of state intervention through a neoliberalized
economic policy – by ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002; see also
Peck and Tickell, 2007) – whilst advancing stricter social control through increasingly
authoritarian and moralist ideologies (Smith, 1994). Referred to by Brenner and Theodore
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(2002) and Harvey (2006) as a process of ‘creative destruction’1, urban administrations under
this neoliberal political agenda sought to recapitalize on city space by attracting new kinds of
capital in new ways. Rather than acting as providers of social services and welfare, local
states began acting as mediators of inward investment, collaborating with the private sector in
bringing jobs and labour back into the abandoned Fordist city. Even the most stubborn of
socialist councils employed similar measures, as Harvey suggests:
“Deindustrialisation, widespread and seemingly ‘structural’ unemployment, fiscal austerity at
both the national and local levels, all coupled with a rising tide of neoconservatism and much
stronger appeal (though often more in theory than practice) to market rationality and
privatisation, provide a backdrop to understanding why so many urban governments, often of
quite different political persuasions and armed with very different legal and political powers,
have all taken a broadly similar direction” (Harvey, 1989a: 5).
Indeed, as While et al (2004: 555) exemplify, “deciding that resistance to the Thatcher
government was self-defeating ... by the early 1990s the solidly Labour city councils of
Manchester and Leeds rejected earlier tentative experiments with ‘municipal socialism’ in
favour of strategies to reorient the city and attract inward investment”. In contemporary
urban studies, this political-economic change has been interpreted as a shift from urban
managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism, where city administrations began to function in a
more business-like manner (Hubbard and Hall, 1998). As a result, urban governance is now
largely characterised by the taking of risks, inventiveness, and being motivated predominantly
by capital growth (Hubbard and Hall, 1998).
David Harvey (1989a) suggests three principle characteristics of this entrepreneurial
urbanism. First, local states are seen to work together with the private sector to increase the
profitability of urban economies, prioritizing economic growth over the redistribution of
welfare and services. Known as the ‘public-private partnership’, “traditional local boosterism
is integrated with the use of local government powers to try and attract external sources of
funding, new direct investments, or new employment sources” (Harvey, 1989a: 7). Second,
the planning and execution of activities by this partnership is speculative rather than rationally
planned and coordinated, often meaning that the local state assumes most of the risk whilst
1 Borrowing the Marxian concept creative destruction, ‘destruction’ here refers to deregulation, liberalization and state
retrenchment; or the destruction of “extant institutional arrangements and political compromises through market-oriented reform
initiatives” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 362). ‘Creation’ here refers to the variety of neoliberal initiatives through which
capital is attracted back to the city: the creation of “a new infrastructure for market-oriented economic growth, commodification,
and the rule of capital” (ibid.). This has also been articulated through the ideas of ‘roll back’ and ‘roll out’ neoliberalism
respectively (see Peck and Tickell, 2002).
20
private sector institutions reap the benefits of any success. Third, Harvey suggests that
entrepreneurialism is driven by the political economy of place rather than territory. Where
previous urban political agendas were primarily driven by the redistribution of welfare and
provision of services in a particular jurisdiction (i.e. a political territory), the new
entrepreneurial urbanism is largely concerned with livening-up the imageability of cities (i.e.
as places in a global economic network) in the pursuit of footloose capital and labour, through
the development of ‘flagship projects’ like convention centres and festival marketplaces –
developments experienced more by those living outside the immediate area (Harvey, 1989a).
Thus, in order for capital to invest and relocate, for labour to return and settle in the post-
industrial city, and for tourists to visit and spend, urban spatial aesthetics are viewed by
municipal powers as a necessary prerequisite for economic development; that is, urban space
has to be seen to be profitable, safe, and conducive to the relocation of capital and labour. In
line with the construction of new places, flagship projects and festival marketplaces,
“environmental enhancement, property development and cultural boosterism” also became
intrinsic features of the entrepreneurial urban condition (Hubbard and Hall, 1998: 6).
Entangled within the processes of urban entrepreneurialism is the increasing importance of
consumption in the post-industrial city. Once places of Fordist mass production, “many
towns and cities are being reconstructed not primarily as centres of production but
consumption” (Lash and Urry, 1994: 216), where along with increasing service sectors, “a
more generalized post-Fordist attention to urban ‘lifestyle’ has helped precipitate a range of
alluring consumption spaces – nouvelle cuisine restaurants, boutiques and art galleries –
alongside instantly recognisable coffee bars (Starbucks being emblematic)” (MacLeod and
Ward, 2002: 155 original emphasis). Bespeaking an emerging ‘experience economy’, these
trends have helped to “‘aestheticize’ the visual consumption of public space” (ibid.). Urban
spaces, then, with their new festival marketplaces and retail cathedrals, are now to be
consumed en masse.
The role of gentrification has also been essential in the shift toward a post-industrial
entrepreneurialism, and is now used as an additional strategy through which to attract capital,
labour, and tourists. However, the role of gentrification in urban development has changed in
recent years. As Neil Smith notes (2002; also see Hackworth and Smith, 2001), rather than
gentrification processes being undertaken by a small portion of the private sector in run-down
working-class neighbourhoods, gentrification is now much more a generalised global strategy
for the regeneration of urban space under entrepreneurial conditions:
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“The scale of ambitions for urban rebuilding has expanded dramatically. Whereas state-
sponsored post-war urban renewal in Western cities helped to encourage scattered private-
market gentrification, that gentrification and the intensified privatization of inner-city land and
housing markets since the 1980s has, in turn, provided the platform on which large-scale
multifaceted urban regeneration plans, far outstripping 1960s urban renewal, are established.
The current language of urban regeneration, particularly in Europe, is not one-dimensional,
but it bespeaks, among other things, a generalization of gentrification in the urban landscape”
(Smith, 2002: 438-439).
It is evident, then, that the new entrepreneurial urbanism is constituted by a distinct neoliberal
political culture concerned primarily with improving the prosperity of the city through
attracting jobs and investment. After the crisis of Fordism, urban governments were “forced
to engage in a demunicipalized and more ‘entrepreneurial’ approach ... to revive the
competitive position of their local economies” (MacLeod and Ward, 2002: 155). This
implied a shift from urban government to urban governance, where urban states no longer act
as the primary providers of welfare and services, and instead, act as mediators of inward
investment through the public-private partnership. This inward investment is itself argued to
generate societal benefits through ‘trickle-down’ economics (MacLeod, 2002), and bring once
deprived urban populations up to speed with an accelerating global economic culture
(Hubbard and Hall, 1998). This in turn has fuelled further transformations in the image of the
city, both materially, in that many cities have been renovated, re-built and redeveloped, and
immaterially, where place marketing through promotion and advertising has changed urban
place identities (Hall, 1998; Lash and Urry, 1994; Short and Kim, 1998). As I show in
chapter 4, Newcastle upon Tyne has undergone a series of parallel transformations, now
marketed as a cultural and retail leisure hub, and famed for its nightlife.
The post-industrial city is thus one of industrial and economic transformation: from Fordist to
Post-Fordist, characterised by flexible modes of accumulation, entrepreneurial governance
and neoliberalization, and subject to re-aestheticization and gentrification, place promotion
and marketing. It is also, however, a city that has belied even spatial development2. Only
certain locales within cities are transformed and rejuvenated, with many others remaining or
becoming dilapidated. Furthermore, the prioritisation of inward investment over the
redistribution of welfare and state-provided services works to “entrench and deepen social
inequalities” (Herbert and Brown, 2006: 756). And space, as I show in the coming section, is
2 See Harvey (1973; 1985; 1989a, 1989b; 1990; 2000) and Smith (1982; 1987) for early observations of uneven development at
the urban and inter-urban scale; and Smith’s continued work on the relationships between gentrification, economic restructuring,
and neoliberalization (e.g. Smith and Defilippis, 1999; Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Smith 2002, 2005).
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pivotal in this process. Despite some arguing of an increasingly ‘flatter world’ (Amin and
Thrift, 2005 for example) in which “distance and geography no longer matter” (Herod and
Aguiar, 2006: 435), space remains fundamental to the neoliberal regime. As Herod and
Aguiar suggest, “neoliberalism is a spatial project that is spatially projected” in that “the sway
of place still shapes how political praxis is imagined and articulated in these neoliberal times”
(ibid.). Indeed, in a response to Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift’s call to perceive a flatter world
(Amin and Thrift, 2005), Neil Smith (2005) argues against the notion that neoliberalism has
evened the playing field, created equality and done away with social hierarchy. For Smith,
the world remains reflective of uneven spatial development, fraught with inequality at
multifarious scales:
“The world may be flat for those who can afford a business class ticket to fly around it, gazing
down on a seemingly flat surface, while for those gazing up at passing airplanes in Sub-
Saharan Africa or the Indian countryside, the opportunity represented by London or Bombay
or New York is an impossible climb to a destination visible only as mediated television or
movie fantasy, if even that. For those in Bombay’s shanties, or for that matter in New York’s
Harlem or London’s East End, the price of the same business class ticket to see the world as
flat is just as prohibitive” (Smith, 2005: 894).
Inequality, injustice and spatial curtailments engendered by neoliberalism and entrepreneurial
urbanism have become a significant focus for human geographers in recent years. As
MacLeod and Ward (2002: 154) observe, a growing body of work warns of “a ‘fortified’,
‘authoritarian’ or ‘revanchist’ urban landscape, characterized by mounting social and political
unrest and pockmarked with marginal interstices: derelict industrial sites, concentrated
hyperghettos and peripheral shanty towns where the poor, the ‘socially excluded’ and the
homeless are shunted increasingly so as to facilitate the new architectures of renaissance”. It
is this body of literature to which I turn next.
Experiencing Post-Industrial Urbanism: Landscapes of Exclusion
Neil Smith’s (1996a; 1996b) account of the ‘revanchist city’, developed from his previous
work on gentrification in New York City (for example Smith, 1992), illustrates a particularly
cruel and excessive process through which the poorest and most vulnerable in society are
becoming increasingly marginalised at the urban level (Lees, 2000; Murphy, 2009)3. Similar
3 There are a number of other urban commentators who address similar marginalisation / segregation / exclusion processes
engendered by late-capitalism and its (predominantly spatial) transformations. Of particular note is Mike Davis (1990; 1992)
who describes recent Los Angeles governance practice as the ‘militarization’ of urban space (see also Dear, 2000).
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to the main tenets explored above, Smith argues that the recent shift to Post-Fordist neoliberal
and entrepreneurial urbanism involves a “trenchant repoliticization of the city”, where urban
politics function solely to create a space conducive to the occupation of footloose capital and
labour (Smith, 1996a: 117). However, this repoliticization also involves the reconstitution of
social identities – particularly those of the ‘urban poor’ – in the justification of marginalising,
segregating and exclusionary practices:
“The revanchist city is a city of occasionally vicious revenge wrought against many of the
city’s most dependent – unemployed and homeless people, racial and ethnic minorities,
women and immigrants, gays and lesbians, the working class. It has everything to do with a
defence and reconstruction of the lines of identity privilege (which came under attack in the
1960s) in the context of rising economic insecurity” (Smith, 1996a: 129).
Smith argues that in the late 1980s, a riot in Tompkins Square Park (situated in New York
City’s Lower East Side) became emblematic of the rise of this revanchist urbanism. It
involved a number of anti-gentrification protestors on one side and the police on the other.
The police were mandated to protect a curfew imposed on the park, purportedly aimed to
clean out drug dealers and the homeless. The riot ensued as a number of the area’s
inhabitants saw the curfew as a method through which to claim space for the already rampant
gentrification ongoing in the Lower East Side, but despite their limited success4, the city
powers eventually succeeded in reinstating the curfew. They also implemented new
regulations governing the use of the park, demolished a number of buildings used by squatters
adjacent to the park, and later, destroyed the tents, shanties and belongings of those – often
permanently homeless – residing in the park. The homeless were forced to leave, yet
provided with no other space in which to live; an eight-foot fence was erected around the
park; and a reconstruction programme began almost immediately. These actions were
justified by then Mayor Edward Koch, who claimed to be ridding the park of “social
parasites, druggies, skinheads and communists” (ibid.). Further attacks on those who
depended upon the park were defended by Koch’s successor Mayor Dinkins, who alleged that
the park had “been stolen from the community by the homeless” (ibid.)5.
The reclamation of other locales within New York City through gentrification worked in a
similar way and were often legitimated through discourses of the ‘urban frontier’ and the
‘wild wild west’. As Smith argues though, whilst these particular discourses may seem
4 Tompkins Square Park is described by Smith as a temporary “liberated space” through the anti-gentrification protests (Smith,
1992: 62).
5 See also Mitchell (1995) for a similar account of how public parks are re-appropriated by dominant urban powers.
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‘playfully innocent’, they are actually re-enactments of older ideologies which also served
unjust marginalisation through an imperialist apprehension of space6. In Smith’s words:
“The frontier imagery is neither merely decorative nor innocent, but carries considerable
ideological weight. The frontier motif makes the new city explicable in terms of old
ideologies. Insofar as gentrification obliterates working-class communities, displaces poor
households, and converts whole neighbourhoods into bourgeois enclaves, the frontier ideology
rationalizes social differentiation and exclusion as natural and inevitable. Defining the poor
and working class as “uncivil”, on the wrong side of a heroic dividing line, as savages and
communists, the frontier ideology justifies a monstrous incivility in the heart of the city.
Disparaged in words, the working class is banished in practice to the edges or even deeper into
the wilderness” (Smith, 1992: 75).
Thus, gentrification in this instance – a process through which urban forces reclaim space in
accordance to the principles of neoliberalism and entrepreneurial urbanism – displaces,
marginalises, and excludes. It is an enactment of a revanchist politics that seeks to rid the city
of those already marginalised by economic restructuring and globalized capital flows. Smith
argues that the Tompkins Park riot “has become a trenchant symbol of the new urbanism that
threatens to reconstruct not just the Lower East Side but neighbourhoods in cities throughout
the developed capitalist world”, where “inner-city working-class neighbourhoods [are being]
transformed into middle-class and upper-middle-class havens devoted to boutique retailing,
elite consumption, and upscale housing” (Smith, 1992: 64). It points to an erosion of urban
tolerance (see Hancock, 2007: 69), a disintegration of urban spatial justice, and the
sanitisation of cities for the footloose middle classes at the expense of the working class and
the urban poor.
However, revanchism reaches far beyond gentrification. When Rudy Giuliani succeeded
Dinkins as Mayor of New York City, the revanchist ethos intensified. With the instatement of
zero-tolerance policing (ZTP), revanchism became much more direct, actively targeting those
seen detrimental to the city’s image and who were argued to foster “an ecology of fear among
those [Giuliani] considered decent, honest New Yorkers” (MacLeod, 2002: 608). Again,
those subject to revanchism through ZTP were the urban poor (the homeless, panhandlers,
prostitutes, and squeegee cleaners), sought out and eradicated in the repossession of
neoliberalized urban ‘public’ space.
6 Other discussions surrounding the role of discourse in the stigmatization of places for demolition and redevelopment can be
found in Weber (2002).
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Other commentators have applied the concept of revanchism to British cities (e.g. MacLeod,
2002; Atkinson, 2003). Gordon MacLeod (2002) for example considers Glasgow and how “a
punitive, revanchist vernacular might now form part and parcel of a mandatory political
response intended to discipline the deleterious social consequences and the escalating
sociospatial contradictions that continue to be generated by a neoliberalizing political
economic agenda” (MacLeod, 2002: 603). Glasgow, like many other cities in Britain, gained
wealth from traditional manufacturing industries, shipbuilding and other heavy engineering.
However, like other British cities, it also experienced rapid socio-economic decline
subsequent to deindustrialization in the 1970s and 1980s. The city soon acquired a reputation
for unemployment, poverty, deprivation, hard-drinking, slum housing, and gang violence.
But then in 1980, as the Glasgow Labour group returned to power, the city became subject to
a new and quite comprehensive marketing strategy. Private-sector participation also
dramatically increased, and with this came retail developments, the promotion of
gentrification and café culture, as well as arts developments and the attraction of events such
as the European City of Culture, which Glasgow accomplished in 1990 (MacLeod, 2002; see
also Lash and Urry, 1994: 216).
However, whilst these developments have no doubt attracted tourists and new cultural events,
contributing to a new wealth through entrepreneurial strategy, it is evident that the wealth
generated only seems to benefit a few. As the ‘downtown monster is being fed’, “there is no
hiding the fact that, with one-third of Glasgow’s population reliant on state benefits, any
purported renaissance is failing to “trickle down” to the wider urban conurbation” (MacLeod,
2002: 613). Geographies of inequality do not stop there. As MacLeod also notes:
“Glasgow’s new civic spaces appear to be concealing more active geographies of
displacement and marginality – ones that might just imply the onset of a revanchist urban
politics. Immediately opposite the Buchanan galleries lies the George Hotel. For years this
building served as a cheap hostel for homeless people, particularly middle-aged men. With
the opening of the Galleries, the George Hotel and its clients presumably assumed a role as
part of Buchanan Street’s “clutter” and were cleared from the civic gaze. Any “sympathy”
inscribed into the architecture of the Buchanan Galleries was to appease the pleasures and
fantasies of consumerist citizenship, and was not to be extended to those without a permanent
home” (MacLeod, 2002: 613).
Other accounts of homelessness also build on ideas of revanchism, attributing the
marginalisation and exclusion of the city’s poorest to neoliberalism and urban
entrepreneurialism. As Stacey Murphy suggests, modern homelessness as a phenomenon
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emerged “directly from a neoliberal policy regime that has been forged at the Federal level
but whose effects are most pronounced at the urban scale” (Murphy, 2009: 309). In some US
cities, combating homelessness has not revolved around the municipal provision of homes, or
jobs, or anything else ameliorative for that matter. Rather, the problem of homelessness
constructed as an urban pollutant has been resolved through the use of legislation. Don
Mitchell (1997) examines how anti-homeless laws in several US cities are predicated on a
specific urban spatial aesthetic – an entrepreneurial prerequisite for the relocation of capital
and labour. As Mitchell suggests:
“The anti-homeless laws being passed in city after city in the United States work in a
pernicious way: by redefining what is acceptable behaviour in public space, by in effect
annihilating the spaces in which homeless people must live, these laws seek simply to
annihilate homeless people themselves, all in the name of recreating the city as a playground
for a seemingly global capital which is ever ready to do an even better job of the annihilation
of space” (Mitchell, 1997: 305 emphasis in original).
But what is most disturbing is the way in which the anti-homeless laws symbolise a new kind
of social being in late modernity, where they both “reflect and reinforce a highly exclusionary
sense of modern citizenship, one that explicitly understands that excluding some people from
their rights not only as citizens, but also as thinking, acting persons, is both good and just”
(Mitchell, 1997: 306). This conception of citizenship, argues Mitchell (1997), is far removed
from those of the past – such as the civil rights and women’s movements – which sought to
establish inclusion as part of a modern and just democratic citizenship.
The proliferation of regulatory and surveillance practices commensurate with entrepreneurial
governance also points to discriminatory and uneven conceptions of citizenship. CCTV in
particular – as a method through which to administer greater social control (Fyfe, 2004) – is
argued to be “reinforcing particular urban subjectivities around who has the right to inhabit,
(re)define and utilise aspects of contemporary urban spatiality” (Coleman, 2005: 135). CCTV
is now a fundamental urban infrastructure in Britain (Fyfe and Bannister, 1996). Following
the success of CCTV in privately owned shopping malls in seeking out criminal behaviour
such as shoplifting and thus ‘protecting’ spaces of consumption from crime (and implicitly
protecting profit), the use of CCTV has expanded dramatically, with urban administrations
installing CCTV in city centres in the hope of improving economic appeal. Wedded to the
entrepreneurial agenda, CCTV helps defend against those who may threaten the economic
potential of city downtowns. However, CCTV and other regulatory mechanisms are
reconstructing “particular cultural sensibilities around crime, deviance and incivility”, and
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instead of seeking out, protecting against, and eradicating crime and deviance, CCTV and
contemporary control measures can actually be seen to construct crime and deviance
(Coleman, 2005: 132). This does not mean that more crime occurs under the gaze of the
cameras (although rises in crime figures can be attributed to a wider surveillance scope and
increases in the efficiency of surveillance infrastructure) but that more and more people are
becoming criminalised and sought out through CCTV regulation. As Fyfe and Bannister
argue:
“Those perceived not to belong in commercial spaces now risk being ‘monitored and
harassed, losing rights as citizens just because they aren’t seen to be lucrative enough as
consumers’ … The result is a subtle privatisation of public space … as commercial
imperatives define acceptable behaviour, excluding those who detract from the consumption
experience” (Fyfe and Bannister, 1998: 263 citing Graham et al, 1996: 19).
Again, processes fostered through entrepreneurial urbanism, in this case the proliferation of
surveillance, can be seen to be eroding spatial justice in the post-industrial city. CCTV,
however, is but one of the methods through which such an exclusion is attained. As Rowland
Atkinson (2003) has observed, something as seemingly benign as street furniture can also
play a putative role in the regulation of public space:
“Street ‘furniture’ increasingly allows only a codified use through design. Climb-proof paint
and vandal-proof lights are logical and useful developments, whereas other changes in the
style of chairs and benches actively prevent resting … Other changes can be seen in ‘bum-
proof’ park benches … which have become segmented by armrests in order that people cannot
lie on them to prevent people (i.e. the homeless) sleeping on them – thus ‘designing-out’ the
already socially excluded” (Atkinson, 2003: 1834).
The result is a ‘purification of space’ (Sibley, 1995) – an assault on the freedoms of what is
usually thought a democratic urban public space – where numerous ‘undesirables’ are
excluded on premises engendered by entrepreneurial urbanism and all that goes with it.
Surveillance and the increased capacity of social control measures in the city are thus intrinsic
to the exclusion of groups seen as deviant, non-conformist, or who threaten the consumption
experience of the middle classes (Fyfe, 2004).
Review
Whilst I am not dealing directly with issues of gentrification, urban renaissance, revanchism,
ZTP, homelessness or CCTV in this study, these issues help to illustrate how transformations
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in the urban political-economy influence people’s experiences of urban space, and how they
have created multiple landscapes of exclusion. In Smith’s terms, neoliberalism and
entrepreneurial urbanism, in their myriad guises, have fostered a revanchist urban politics
where gentrification and ZTP are used to reclaim neighbourhoods and streets for the citified
middle classes (Smith, 1996a). The homeless in particular, seem to be continually displaced
in the entrepreneurial city. Despite its long history as an urban phenomenon, emerging in the
US shortly after the 1930s New Deal programme, homelessness “is as much the result ... of a
vindictive reaction from the right in the 1980s”, when conservative governments reinstated
class privileges pertaining only to certain social groups (Smith, 1996a: 127). More recently,
the homeless are argued to have been ‘annihilated’ by being legislated against using public
space in a number of US cities, in what amounts to the creation of a city conducive to the
relocation of capital. As Mitchell (1997) notes, the attraction of new business, more tourists
and more spending, is predicated on the removal of undesirables.
Whether the governance of Newcastle displays elements of revanchism toward its most
vulnerable inhabitants is the concern of another study. However, this literature helps
foreground the kind of processes which may be ongoing in Newcastle’s night-time economy,
explaining how marginalised social groups have been excluded by entrepreneurial processes
engendered by both public and private bodies. This literature exemplifies how groups who do
not fit in to contemporary capitalist culture are constructed in opposition to, and out of place
within its spaces, seemingly legitimating increasing measures to marginalise, segregate, and
exclude. The point here is that there seems to be a political agenda which seeks to eradicate
any threat to urban economic development, and as I show in chapter 7, this is of fundamental
concern in this study.
The exclusion of other social groups can be interpreted in similar ways. Young people are
also often denied access to some city spaces at certain times, particularly shopping malls
where they are seen as “out of place” as non-consumers (Cresswell, 1996; Sibley, 1995).
Where their access to urban space is granted, they are often under heavy surveillance,
scrutinised on premises of deviance and anti-social behaviour (Coleman, 2005). But before I
discuss the place of young people in contemporary urban space, the next section looks more
closely at the multifaceted concept of ‘deviance’, tracing its theoretical history and how it is
understood for the purposes of this study.
29
2.3 Constructing Troublesome Youth 1: Deviance, Subcultures, Folk Devils
Whilst most modern sociological and criminological interpretations view deviance as a
socially constructed phenomenon, in early twentieth-century sociology it was taken as a
legitimate social reality which existed in and through the individual / social group. I begin
this section by examining the pathological conceptions of Cesare Lombroso before looking at
the cultural explanations put forward by the Chicago School of Sociology. I then turn to the
work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham,
introducing the concept of ‘subculture’.
I then illustrate a very different understanding of deviance. Known as the ‘transactional’ or
‘labelling’ approach, deviance here is understood as a social category pinned to specific
individuals and / or groups who are deemed deviant by certain social audiences (Becker,
1963). Of key interest at this point is the mass media who often construct deviant identities
through this labelling process. The media, through the construction of ‘folk devils’, create
‘moral panics’ – episodes where social groups deemed deviant are used to highlight the
normative boundaries of social life – and subsequently justify increasing social control
(Cohen, 1972; Hall et al, 1978).
Proto-Criminologies and the Chicago School of Sociology
In the early twentieth century, proto-criminologist7 Cesare Lombroso (1918) claimed that
deviance and criminality were inherent features of the individual. Studying in prisons, mental
asylums and from post-mortem examinations, Lombroso argued that certain minority groups
were either born with a criminal disposition or became so through mental disorder.
Ultimately he saw crime as “an inherited and atavistic propensity towards behaviour which
humanity as a species has outgrown” (Sapsford, 1980: 262) and the criminal as a “morally
inferior human species, one characterised by physical traits reminiscent of apes, lower
primates, and savage tribes” (Platt, 1969: 21). His arguments gained a wide currency in
certain cliques due to his application of a ‘scientific’, albeit limited, method. However, his
bio-pathological conception of deviance, where specific groups were born into certain social
positions, also had a pragmatic dimension. As David Sibley suggests, “this kind of scientism
lent itself to racist theory and practice in Nazi Germany where Jews, defined in terms of
7 I use the term ‘proto-criminology’ here following observations in Downes and Rock (2007) that crime and deviance were
documented and reported prior to the inception of its sociological study in, perhaps, ‘formal-scientific’ institutions such as
universities. Other examples of proto-criminological work would include Henry Mayhew’s descriptions of impoverished
Victorian London (Mayhew, 1862) amongst others.
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physical difference or imperfection, became dangerous, like the mentally disabled, because of
the threat they posed to the Aryan race” (Sibley, 1995: 25). Many did come to critique
Lombroso’s theories, however, and rejected such deterministic ‘science’. As Sapsford points
out:
“[T]his kind of theory assumes that such complex and essentially social behaviours as the
commission of crimes can be explained at the level of the individual ... it assumes that the
explanation can relevantly be cast in terms of the individual’s biology or experiences, without
reference to ‘mind’ or ‘meaning’ or how social reality is constructed by the individual”
(Sapsford, 2005: 263).
Later theories of deviance were explained on quite different foundations. The scholars
working out of the Chicago School of Sociology, set up in the late nineteenth century, argued
that deviant behaviour was the product of an individual’s socio-cultural environment rather
than a feature inherent in the individual. People were not born deviant / criminal, but resorted
to crime and deviance if their surrounding socio-cultural terrain (i.e. locality and population)
provoked such behaviours and ways of life. Whilst it was not the initial objective of the
Chicagoans to study crime and deviance, funding opportunities and the sheer abundance of
social problems in Chicago at the time (1920s) influenced much of their research. The ‘zone
in transition’ – the area known more commonly now as the inner city – became the major
geographical focus, being the area where social problems, deprivation and poverty were most
profuse. For the Chicago School, crime and deviance in the zone in transition were
“explained principally by the effects of the isolation of certain natural areas. They became a
kind of surrogate social order, an alternative pattern, which replaced the workings of
conventional institutions. Their forms were themselves explained as a functional response to
deprivation, to the social and moral structures imported by immigrants and to the experience
of growing up in the inner city” (Downes and Rock, 2007: 59).
Deviance was thus seen as learnt social behaviour, a product of the surrounding environment
and the surrounding people, often in areas of high unemployment, poverty, low education,
and family breakdown. It was a social feature passed down from generation to generation, or
a method of coping with the often harsh reality of living in the zone in transition. Anderson
(1923) for example, undertook ethnographic work on the hobo, and Thrasher (1927) on the
gang, and these, amongst other works, initiated a plethora of theories of deviance which have
become, as I illustrate below, major facets of sociological theory ever since.
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Delinquency, Subculture, and the CCCS
Developing the Chicago School’s ideas, later theories of deviance paid much more attention
to young people, and it was here where the first studies of juvenile delinquency became
prominent in cultural studies. One of the most renowned of these is Albert Cohen’s
Delinquent Boys (1956), which developed Robert Merton’s (1938, 1957) theory of anomie
(an account of deviance sensitive to the emerging social structure in the post-depression years
of the Unites States) to explain the occurrence of crime and delinquency in young men.
Merton, reflecting much of what the Chicago sociologists had argued, understood deviance as
a conflict between culture and structure – a ‘strain’ between the promises offered by
American culture and the restraints of its prevalent social structure. In Merton’s view,
individuals, restricted by the organization of American society, resorted to deviance in pursuit
of the ‘infinite aspirations’ imbued in the doctrine of the ‘American dream’. Cohen (1956)
saw deviance in a similar manner, although he speaks of a much more insulated nature of
deviance. For Cohen, delinquent individuals rarely compared themselves to the upper social
structure – that is, the confines of class, law, governance in the organization of society etc. –
and instead related to the people immediately around them. Cohen argued that delinquency
came about much more through the micro-scale of locality rather than as a reaction to the
macro-scale of social class internment. He also argued that delinquents share common group
values, but values entirely different from the wider dominant culture. These delinquent
‘subcultures’ took material form as a ‘gang’, and were characterised as non-utilitarian,
malicious and negativistic. They were said to be versatile, not wanting to specialize in any
specific criminal activity. Stealing, for example, would go “hand-in-hand with “other
property offences”, “malicious mischief”, “vandalism”, “trespass”, and truancy” (Cohen,
1956: 29). Members of delinquent subcultures were also described as purveyors of “short-run
hedonism”, there being “little interest in long-run goals, in planning activities and budgeting
time” (ibid. p. 30), and defined by their group autonomy, where the gang came first and
relations with other groups were “indifferent, hostile or rebellious” (ibid. p. 31).
Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin (1961) put forward a similar account of delinquency,
suggesting three distinct types of subculture. They state that “the criminal subculture
prescribes disciplined and utilitarian forms of theft; the conflict subculture prescribes the
instrumental use of violence; and the retreatist subculture prescribes participation in illicit
consummatory experiences, such as drug use” (Cloward and Ohlin, 1961: 14). But whilst
these theories of delinquency rooted its cause in ‘strain’ and emphasized the tightly bound
characteristics of a subculture, other conceptions of delinquency, especially the work of
David Matza (for example 1964), argued against such an ‘over-prediction’. For Matza,
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delinquent behaviour is sporadic and mundane, and ultimately willed behaviour. It is not a
result of a deeply held oppositional set of beliefs that go against dominant cultural norms, but
a process that gradually occurs through a state of ‘drift’ – a loosening of social controls from
which delinquency could be only one outcome.
However, the idea of deviant or delinquent subcultures had academic purchase and became a
central concept for a group of British scholars following the work done in the US by the likes
of Albert Cohen, Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin. Whereas previous studies of deviance
and delinquency “employed the concept of subculture to investigate non-normative, non-
mainstream, deviant, marginalized, minority, class, racial, criminal, unemployed, ‘underdog’
groups within their social milieu, for the Birmingham people ... white, male, working-class
youth set their parameters” (Jenks, 2005: 121). For the Gramsci-influenced Marxian CCCS at
the University of Birmingham, this youth group were used to highlight increasing class-based
social injustices engendered by structural changes in the British post-war political-economy.
Akin to the US delinquency theories, the initial studies by the CCCS focussed on the deviant
norms and sensibilities of gangs in specific localities, such as Phil Cohen’s (1972) work in
East London. But over the subsequent decade this focus shifted from locality and community
to style-based groups such as the teds, mods, and rockers etc – therefore shifting from the
analysis of the local scale toward a subcultural mode of explanation, i.e. from the micro-scale
of locality to the macro-scale of class (Bennett and Kahn-Harris, 2004). The CCCS’s work
ended up seeking to exemplify how working-class youth became disenfranchised by
deindustrialisation, stagnation, unemployment and the erosion of working-class culture, and
thus how they ‘resisted through rituals’ (Hall and Jefferson, 1976) – by demarcating their own
meaningful social and cultural existence through the formation of subcultures. As Phil Cohen
(1972) suggests, working-class adults were becoming increasingly pressured in the early
1970s:
“Their bargaining power in the labour market was threatened by the introduction of new
automated techniques, which eliminated many middle-range, semi-skilled jobs. Their
economic position excluded them from entering the artificial paradise of the new consumer
society; at the same time changes in the production process itself have made the traditional
work ethic, the pride in the job, impossible to uphold” (P. Cohen, 1972: 21).
But Cohen argues that young people experienced and registered these changes more deeply
than their parents, and as a result aimed to “express and resolve, albeit “magically”, the
contradictions which remain hidden or unresolved in the parent culture” (P. Cohen, 1972: 23).
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Many working-class young people thus set out to form the kind of cultural alliances that
distinguished them from others, adopting specific styles and appearances. These subcultures,
such as the teds, mods, skinheads, and rockers, then, “all represent, in their different ways, an
attempt to retrieve some of the socially cohesive elements destroyed in their parent culture”
(ibid.).
According to Dick Hebdige, the teds, defined by the Edwardian style suits they wore, “had
been almost universally vilified by press and parents alike as symptomatic of Britain’s
impending decline” (Hebdige, 1979: 82), and “swiftly gained a terrible reputation for gang
fights, vandalism, street robberies, rock and roll cinema riots, and attacks on café owners and
late-night bus crews” (Pearson, 1983: 18). However, in his ethnography, Tony Jefferson
(1976) found that the teds were extremely group-minded and ‘touchy’ to insults, a possible
reason, or at least explanation for such disorderly behaviour. Jefferson states:
“My contention is that to lads traditionally lacking in status, and being further deprived of
what little they possessed … there remained only the self, the cultural extension of the self
(dress, personal appearance) and the social extension of the self (the group). Once threats
were perceived in those areas, the only ‘reality’ or ‘space’ on which they had any hold, then
the fights, in defence of this space become explicable and meaningful phenomena” (Jefferson,
1976: 82, original emphases).
Other subcultures examined by the CCCS are interpreted in much the same way: John Clarke
suggested that the skinhead subculture represented “an attempt to re-create through the ‘mob’
the traditional working class community, as a substitution for the real decline of the latter”
(Clarke, 1976: 99, original emphasis); and Dick Hebdige (1976) argued that mod style “was a
reaction to the mundane predictability of the working week, and that a mod attempted to
compensate for this ‘by exercising complete domination over his private estate – his
appearance and choice of leisure pursuits’” (Bennett and Kahn-Harris, 2004: 6 citing
Hebdige, 1976: 91).
But despite its prominence in cultural studies, there are many criticisms of the CCCS’s work.
Angela McRobbie (1980) warns of the dominance of male youth in the study of subculture,
and indeed the only accounts of female subcultures are McRobbie and Garber’s (1976) work
on ‘teeny bopper’ girls (see Valentine et al, 1998 for discussion). Many have also come to
question the authenticity of the relationship between subcultural resistance and class i.e. were
all subcultural members exclusively working class (Muggleton, 2000)? The CCCS’s
conception of class is also thought to be over simplistic, overlooking variations in class
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sensibilities. It is argued that the CCCS failed to account for others in the working classes
who did not choose to adopt a particular subcultural lifestyle (ibid.). In addition, the political
consciousness of resistance has been questioned. Whilst the CCCS gave youth subcultures
“‘grown-up’ political purposes” it is hard to tell how far it corresponded “to the lived reality
of those groups of adolescents” (Jenks, 2005: 130; see also Cohen, 2002: lviii). Related to
this, Stan Cohen (2002) is concerned with the CCCS’s dependence on externally ‘reading’ the
symbolic attributes of subcultural style from an academic perspective. As he states: “This
[CCCS subcultural analysis] is to be sure, an imaginative way of reading the style; but how
can we be sure it is also not imaginary” (Cohen, 2002: lix, emphasis added). There is, then,
as Muggleton suggests, “an academic ‘elitism’ implicit in this method” (Muggleton, 2000:
13).
The shift from the micro scale of locales to the macro scale of class claimed a universality of
subculture, which consequently failed to account for regional variations. It has also been
noted that the CCCS’s conception of subculture is an essentially British concept, as the
intricacies of their subcultural theory are unable to traverse to other Western-bloc countries
(Bennett and Kahn-Harris, 2004). In addition, the CCCS failed to acknowledge the media’s
role in the construction of subcultural identities. According to Thornton, “rather than
emerging as fully-formed, grass-roots expressions of youth solidarity, subcultures are the
product of youth’s dynamic and highly reflexive relationship with the mass media” (1995,
cited in Bennett and Kahn-Harris, 2004: 10).
Despite these criticisms, the CCCS’s work illustrates some of the impacts that economic and
related social transformations had on young people in Britain at that specific juncture. In this
way, youth subcultures “were interrelated as spectacular indicators of the ongoing class
struggle in British society”, with economic restructuring and changes in the reproduction of
labour having the most profound impacts on the working classes, and especially on working-
class youth (Bennett and Kahn-Harris, 2004: 5). According to Chris Jenks, the CCCS’s goal
was to “mobilize the idea of subculture to articulate the unspoken, or perhaps unheard, voices
of a populist proletariat within a critical vision and ... an eye to radical social change” (Jenks,
2005: 5). However, in doing so, the CCCS instead highlighted how despite increased
spending power by working-class youth, their life chances, bound by their class would not
alter. Symbolized by the emergence of style-based, resistant, subcultures, the CCCS “thus
offered a bitter-sweet analysis of subculture, one that celebrated its achievements at the same
time as noting its inevitable limitations” (Bennett and Kahn-Harris, 2004: 6).
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The Transactional Approach
The CCCS’s subcultural theory, at first, seems directly relevant to this study, showing how
economic restructuring affects the socio-cultural experiences of young people – a task which
this study seeks, in part, to undertake. However, despite its prominence in cultural studies
and its commitment to a critical reading of the effects of political-economy, a caveat needs to
be made here concerning the conceptions of deviance used by the CCCS and others. The
theories of deviance outlined above allude to a specific ontology where deviance exists in and
through the individual / group, either as a method of coping with poverty, a lifestyle, or a
mode of resistance to changing cultural politics. This study understands deviance differently.
Following from Howard Becker (1963), deviance here is understood as a socially constructed
relationship, not in the sense that “the causes of deviance are located in the social situation of
the deviant or in “social factors” which prompt his [sic] action” (Becker, 1963: 9), but rather
that:
“Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance and
by applying those rules to particular people and labelling them as outsiders. From this point
of view, deviance is not a quality of the act a person commits, but rather a consequence of the
application by others of rules and sanctions to an ‘offender’. The deviant is one to whom that
label has successfully been applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label” (ibid.
original emphases).
In a similar understanding of the deviance ‘label’, Erikson (1964) states:
“Deviance is not a property inherent in certain forms of behaviour; it is a property conferred
upon these forms by the audiences which directly or indirectly witness them. The critical
variable in the study of deviance, then, is the social audience rather than the individual actor,
since it is the audience which eventually determines whether or not any episode of behaviour
or any class of episodes is labelled deviant” (Erikson, 1964: 11 original emphases).
Thus, deviance does not just come about through the individual. Deviance is constructed
through the relationship between the social audience and the perceived deviant/s. This
particular understanding gave rise to arguably the most well known and most cited work in
contemporary sociological disciplines, itself influencing a huge array of studies (some of
which are demonstrated in section 2.4). Using the premises set out by Becker, Stan Cohen’s
Folk Devils and Moral Panics (first published in 1972) suggests that specific social groups
are constructed as ‘folk devils’ threatening a moral social order, and used to justify reactions
against them. Cohen argues, in this now canonical passage:
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“Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition,
episode, person or groups of persons emerges to be defined as a threat to societal values and
interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the
moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people;
socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions … One of the most
recurrent types of moral panic in Britain since the war has been associated with the emergence
of various forms of youth culture … whose behaviour is deemed deviant or delinquent”
(Cohen, 2002 (3rd Ed.): 1).
Cohen illustrates the process of constructing folk devils and moral panics through an
examination of how the mass media reacted to a series of public disturbances involving
groups of mods and rockers in Clacton in 1964. According to Cohen, despite the disturbances
actually being fairly minor, the media sensationalized, exaggerated and distorted the events
for the purposes of defining appropriate behaviour, to create a scapegoat – in this case a
unique cultural group – on which to blame social ills. As he suggests, groups such as the
mods and rockers “have been distinctive in being identified not just in terms of particular
events (such as demonstrations) or particular disapproved forms of behaviour (such as drug-
taking or violence) but as distinguishable social types” (Cohen, 2002: 1, emphasis added).
And thus, he continues: “In the gallery of types that society erects to show its members
which roles should be avoided and which should be emulated, these groups have occupied a
constant position as folk devils: visible reminders of what we should not be” (ibid. p. 1-2,
emphasis added). Thus, specific groups are not deviant per se but constructed so, used to
outline the normative contours of social life, demarcating boundaries of appropriate and
inappropriate actions.
This perspective is also exemplified by Stuart Hall et al’s (1978) Policing the Crisis, which
adopts a similar theoretical base to that of Becker, Erikson, and Cohen. Hall and his
colleagues were in fact working out of the Birmingham School, yet this particular thesis of
theirs departs radically from the theoretical trajectory of the earlier CCCS work on subculture.
Rather than study the deviant social groups in question (as did the CCCS), Policing the Crisis
addressed the processes through which groups became labelled so. In this way, Hall et al
sought to “interrogate why mugging resulted in a moral panic at a specific historical juncture,
and how this panic came to be profoundly racialized” (Vanderbeck, 2003: 368). Again, for
Hall et al the key determinant in the construction of folk devils and moral panics is the mass
media, which stimulated “public anxiety, producing changes in policing and criminal justice
that became a self-fulfilling spiral of deviancy amplification” (Reiner, 2003: 316).
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For Hall et al, the media are chief arbitrators in the knowledge acquired and utilised by
society, shaping negative perceptions of groups represented as deviant and a threat to the
normative moral order. And this is achieved in various ways. First, we have to recognise that
the media “do not simply and transparently report events which are ‘naturally’ newsworthy in
themselves. ‘News’ is the end-product of a complex process which begins with a systematic
sorting and selecting of events and topics according to a socially constructed set of
categories” (Hall et al, 1978: 53, original emphasis). This can primarily be seen in the
bureaucratic organisation of news institutions, divided into home affairs, political, foreign
affairs etc. but also in the ‘professional ideology’ of the news institution – those news values
which determine what is ‘news’ and how it should be reported. It can also be seen in the
construction of the news story itself, which involves “the presentation of the item to its
assumed audience, in terms which, as far as the presenters of the item can judge, will make it
comprehensible to that audience” (ibid. original emphasis).
Second, by reporting specific events, the media “define for the majority of the population
what significant events are taking place, but, also, they offer powerful interpretations of how
to understand these events” (Hall et al, 1978: 57 original emphases). Third, by calling upon
various sources of information for their stories, the media present a ‘credible’ interpretation of
the event. In representations of crime and deviance, powerful social actors such as the police,
the judiciary, members of parliament etc. validate the issue of concern which ostensibly
reinforces an ‘impartial’ and ‘objective’ reporting rationale, although as Hall et al aver, the
ways in which these voices are represented reflect the institution’s own professional news
ideology – the result being news which is far from objective and unbiased.
In the case of mugging, the media coverage of police spokespeople, judges and politicians, as
well as coverage of mugging events, made the mugging ‘phenomenon’ a real, ‘new’ and valid
issue of the 1970s, despite its wholly unremarkable existence as a street crime long
recognized and established in Britain (Hall et al, 1978; also see Pearson, 1983 for a similar
commentary). Ultimately, Hall et al (1978) argue along the lines of Stan Cohen (1972) by
suggesting that the media helped foster a moral panic through the creation of a black criminal
folk devil. Mugging was represented as a new and unforeseen crime plaguing the streets of
Britain.
But by focussing on mugging, Hall et al were also able to show how crime and deviance are
mobilised in the continuing pursuit of increased discipline and social control (Muncie, 1999).
At this theoretical period, Charles Acland (1995) seeks to demonstrate the similarity between
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Hall et al’s ideas of social control and those of Michel Foucault. Although they do not draw
directly from him, Hall et al and Foucault are argued to have much in common:
“Foucault studies the complexly structured forms of social knowledge power. In his work,
power is multifaceted and cannot be said to be singularly located. It operates in and through
epistemology; the very mechanisms that order our relations to the world in an intelligible
fashion and that make something comprehensible to us are equally relations of power …
When Policing the Crisis is read with this in mind, a Foucauldian sense of the discursive
construction of knowledge, necessarily a power relation as well, encounters a Gramscian
notion of cultural leadership and class alliance to provide a comprehensive analysis of the
articulations of deviance and social power as mediated through and motivated by the mass
media of news reporting” (Acland, 1995: 40).
For Hall et al, representing the world through the news media thus has very real consequences
which redefine and reinstate powerful ideologies, discursively constructing knowledge of
deviant, less powerful groups, in order to create and police boundaries of their normative
social world. The coverage of crime and deviance thus “evokes threats to, but also reaffirms,
the consensual morality of the society: a modern morality play takes place before us in which
the ‘devil’ is both symbolically and physically cast out from the society by its guardians – the
police and the judiciary” (Hall et al, 1978: 66).
Review
In this study, deviance is not understood as an intrinsic feature of the individual, nor the
group, but rather a complex process through which people and persons come to be defined as
deviant according to a previously constructed set of categories demarcated by a prevalent, and
powerful, ideological moral order. Deviance is therefore a representation, a social
construction. And these representations of deviance operate in a variety of ways. They
circulate through society and work at a number of levels. In the case of the mods and rockers,
representations of deviance constructed by the mass media worked to create folk devils and
moral panics (Cohen, 1972), a similar process to that of mugging exemplified by Hall et al
(1978), which, in turn, became used to legitimize more punitive reactions and sanctions
against perceived offenders.
These representations therefore have more material implications in extant political, economic,
social, cultural and most importantly spatial processes. In the post-industrial city, notions of
deviance perhaps work in a similar way to Cohen (1972) and Hall et al’s (1978) folk devils
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and moral panics, where the urban poor and homeless are constructed as deviant by more
powerful public and private institutions. Perceived vis-à-vis contemporary urban culture of
mass middle-class consumption, they are seen as threatening to the putative success of the
entrepreneurial city, acting as a deterrent to those who perform the city in pre-defined,
acceptable ways. This construction process also seeks to legitimate deleterious consequences
for these groups, exemplified by the previous cases of gentrification, ZTP and increasing
surveillance capabilities discussed in section 2.2. As I show in the next section,
representations of deviance are also put to use in the socio-spatial exclusion of young people
from urban public space. Recent representational practices that construct young working-
class men as deviant, delinquent and problematic to society are also entangled in a range of
contemporary exclusionary scenarios, a situation which I also explore next.
2.4 Constructing Troublesome Youth 2: Gender, Class, and the Cultural
Geographies of Young People
Examining recent work in cultural geography and borrowing from the transactional approach
to deviance outlined above, here I illustrate how the construction of deviant identities is also
predicated around the distinct spatialities of particular social groups. First I look briefly at
Tim Cresswell’s work (1996) on notions of place and transgression, before exploring the
specific spatialities of young people and how they are implicated in the construction of
deviance. Many commentators have recently suggested that young people are largely
excluded from full societal participation and that this is reflected in their exclusion from
specific spaces (for example Valentine, 1996, 1997; Matthews et al, 1999; Aitken, 2001;
Collins and Kearns, 2001). Simultaneously, however, it has also been noted how young
people are able to carve out their own spatialities free from adult control, able to resist adult
hegemony and construct their own meaningful cultural existence (for example Cloke and
Jones, 2005; Matthews et al, 2000; Skelton, 2000; Thomas, 2005). Here, in accordance with
the research agenda of this study, I concentrate on the former, showing how young people are
socially and spatially excluded due to their construction as deviant, out of control, and ‘out of
place’.
Second, I investigate the changing nature of troublesome youth, illustrating the most recent
discursive trends through which youth are constructed and understood as troublesome in post-
industrial Britain. Deviance has long been gendered, being strongly associated with young
men, and this has persisted to the present day where they are seen to be especially problematic
to society. Deviance, however, also revolves around specific ideas of class. Again, deviance
40
has always carried specific class connotations to which I alluded in section 2.3, but as the
political economy changes, along with numerous other social transformations, ideas of class
and gender are constantly being reworked. Changes in urban economies have had numerous
effects on the employment opportunities of young working-class men, and recent media and
government representations of this youth group have served to alienate them further. It is
these issues that are the focus of the latter part of this section.
The Spatial Implications of Deviance
As I outlined in section 2.3, deviance is socially constructed; it is a quality conferred upon
groups as they are represented. In the preceding cases examined by sociologists such as Stan
Cohen (1972) and Stuart Hall et al (1978), deviance, by way of folk devils, often shapes
normative reaction through moral panics. Here I trace the theoretical lineage of the
transactional approach to deviance to contemporary work in cultural geography and the
geographies of young people, showing how representing deviance is also contingent upon
spatially-specific ideologies. Tim Cresswell’s work (1996) is an especially useful starting
point. Cresswell investigates the ways in which the normative prescriptions of space are
defined, exploring the “intricate ways in which place and space are deeply embedded within
the cultural ideologies which regulate our everyday lives” (Kitchin, 1998: 60). Using an
innovative methodology, Cresswell shows how commonsense assumptions about the ‘place’
of people, things and behaviour become most evident through spatial transgressions. It is
argued that both people and things occupy distinct normative positions and these are
intrinsically spatial – what Cresswell calls ‘normative geographies’. However, when
something is ‘out of place’ – when a transgression occurs – only then do these normative
geographies become evident: “By looking at the events that upset the balance of common
sense I let the events, themselves, become the questions. The occurrence of “out-of-place”
phenomena leads people to question behaviour and define what is and is not appropriate for a
particular setting” (Cresswell, 1996: 22). Following from Howard Becker (1963), Cresswell
also argues that ‘place’ is a fundamental determinant in the creation of deviance:
“It is my assertion that place plays a significant role in the creation of norms of behaviour and
thus in the creation of deviance ... Howard Becker does not emphasise place in his classic
study of deviance. He does, however, refer to those labelled deviant as “outsiders”. Outsider
is commonly the term used to describe people new to a place or people who do not know the
ways of a place. The term outsider indicates that a person does not properly understand the
behaviour expected of people in a town, region, or nation. Outsiders are often despised and
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suspected of being trouble-makers. They are people “out of place”” (Cresswell, 1996: 26
original emphases).
I raise Cresswell’s theoretical assertions here as they are also evident in the work done on the
geographies of youth, where it is acknowledged that young people occupy a distinct
subordinate and outsider position in both society and space. But whilst youth have often been
understood as a problematic social group in late-capitalism, they have not always been
thought of as troublesome and in need of strict control. As Valentine et al suggest:
“It was not until the fifteenth century that ‘children’ began to be represented in icons as
having a distinct nature and needs, and as separate from the adult world. This
conceptualization of the young was subsequently fostered through the development of formal
education and the belief that children required long periods of schooling before they could
take on adult roles and responsibilities … [L]egislation in the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, and more critically the introduction of mass schooling, popularised the mythical
condition of ‘childhood’ and slowly a universal [although arguably Western] notion of what it
meant to be a child developed” (Valentine et al, 1998: 3).
This conceptual shift brought with it a number of spatial changes, and children “were
gradually removed from adult spaces and provided with environments catering specifically
for ‘children’s’ needs” (Gagen, 2004: 405). Young people began spending more and more of
their lives in institutional contexts containing “normative assumptions about how children
should be” – in particular the home and school (Holloway and Valentine, 2000: 770).
Recognizing these spatial implications, many geographers have turned to examine the ways in
which conceptions of childhood and youth become mobilised in the construction of space,
following from Chris Philo’s (1992) call to study children as individual social actors in their
own right. In reviewing Colin Ward’s work on young people’s experiences of city and
country spaces (Ward 1977, 1990), Philo proposed that geographers should “galvanize
specific attention from cultural geography” (Gagen, 2004: 406; see also Valentine et al,
1998). Since, many human geographers have come to explore the geographies of young
people through a cultural lens, examining their exclusion from “full participation in society’s
activities and spaces by both formal legal frameworks and everyday practices that serve to
naturalize adult authority” (Vanderbeck and Dunkley, 2004: 177).
For many geographers, the study of young people, childhood and youth is greatly influenced
by the sociological and cultural studies disciplines I discussed in the previous section. The
exclusion of young people in post-industrial cities is often precipitated due to a common
belief that they are deviant, problematic and troublesome to society. Similarly to Cohen
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(1972) and Hall et al (1978), some of the time this belief is the result of a reflexive
relationship with the mass media. Gill Valentine (1996) argues that throughout modern
history, childhood and youth have been constructed so as to promote the idea that young
people are inherently innocent but corrupted by society as they age. However, the murder of
Jamie Bulger in 1993 by two ten-year-old boys sparked a debate in both the national press
and central government concerning the essentially deviant nature of childhood and possible
remediation. The coverage of the murder “shattered the dominant contemporary imagining of
children – that they possess a special nature ... and are morally as well as temporally set apart
from adults” (Valentine, 1996: 588) and “gave rise to a particularly intense moral panic, one
that was encouraged by the British Conservative Government in an attempt to win support for
‘crack downs’ on youth crime and truancy, and the retrenchment of welfare benefits” (Collins
and Kearns, 2001: 391). It was used ultimately to declare the end of childhood as the age of
innocence.
Valentine (1996) found that in response to the death of Bulger and the coverage of the event
in the press, a number of parents highlighted concerns for apparently ‘demonic’ children, and
fears for their own children’s safety in public space. Parents argued that “children as young
as 7 or 8, but more commonly teenagers, are a menace to the moral order of neighbourhoods:
threatening not only property through acts of vandalism but also adult’s peace and tranquillity
through being noisy and visually intrusive” (Valentine, 1996: 590). Some also reiterated the
discourses prevalent in the media coverage of the case where children are no longer seen as
innocent. The parents interviewed by Valentine recall partaking in similar activities to
modern-day children like hanging around on the streets and occasionally getting up to
mischief, but that these were harmless behaviours, unlike the teenagers of today who are
purportedly “aggressive, intimidating and out of control in public space” (ibid.). Thus, media
reports of “child violence, such as the Bulger case, were ... repeatedly used by interviewees to
justify their perceptions that contemporary children are more violent than they themselves
were during their own childhoods, and that other children are a threat to the personal safety in
public spaces of their own offspring (who remain the personification of innocence)” (ibid.).
Other events “have also been used to snowball the end-of-innocence argument” including
“everything from joy-riding to bullying ... to the mugging of actress Elizabeth Hurley by a
group of teenage girls” (Valentine, 1996: 588), as well as the Columbine High School
massacre in the US. Stuart Aitken (2001) argues that the media coverage of these events have
helped intensify the disparagement of young people and their behaviour in the Western world.
But despite a continuing focus on specific groups of young people like the mods and rockers
in the 1960s and 1970s, and more recently ‘chavs’ and ‘yobs’ (discussed later), Aitken (2001)
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argues that the perpetuation of moral panics induced by media representation have come to
demonize a whole generation of young people. These reports, coupled with wider social
transformations where changes in familial structure, changes in production and reproduction,
“increasing corporate surveillance of individuals and the commodification of large portions of
the private sphere” (Aitken, 2001: 147) have helped stimulate increased anger at young
people who “cannot or will not fulfil their expected roles” (ibid.). The result is what Aitken
(2001) refers to as a ‘moral assault’ on young people thought incompetent, dangerous and
troublesome, serving to exacerbate the strict regulation of young people’s spatialities.
In another piece of research, Valentine (1997) notes how conceiving young people as “naïve,
immature and innocent and thus in need of protection by (and from) rational, experienced
adults” (p. 82) influences many parents to restrict their children’s spatial activities outside of
the home. Again, this is also partly a response to fears propelled by the media. But in
addition to domestic and parenting frameworks, the restriction of young people in public
space is also administered by legal frameworks such as curfews. With the construction of
public space as predominantly adult space, young people’s spatial freedoms are becoming
increasingly suppressed, much like that of the homeless and other urban undesirables.
Curfews that exclude the young work in a similar way to the legislative reactions explored by
Mitchell (1997), where criminalizing young people and their use of public space is used as
justification for cleansing the city to make way for capital (Coleman, 2005; Collins and
Kearns, 2001). A similar scenario exists in privately-owned spaces. As Valentine argues:
“Efforts to revitalise or ‘aestheticise’ public space as part of attempts to revive (symbolically
and economically) cities in most contemporary western cities are increasingly resulting in the
replacement of ‘public’ spaces with surrogate ‘private’ spaces such as shopping malls and
festival marketplaces. The development of these new privatised spaces ... are serving to
homogenise and domesticate public spaces by reducing and controlling diversity in order to
make these environments safe for the middle classes’ (Valentine, 2004: 84).
Highlighting similar processes at work, David Sibley suggests the reasons for excluding
groups of youths from shopping centres:
“In the shopping centre management’s response to the presence of adolescents, maybe not
consuming very much, in a place dedicated to consumption by the family, there is a
connection between the function and design of the space as determined by commercial
interests and design professionals, architects and planners, and the construction of one group
of the population as ‘deviant’, out of place, and threatening to the projected image of the
development” (Sibley, 1995: xii).
44
Whilst young people have been subject to spatial restrictions for the past few hundred years,
neoliberalism and transforming urban space have therefore engendered new processes of
control and regulation. The result in the post-industrial city is a plethora of exclusionary
processes aimed at restricting young people’s access to and use of urban space. This echoes
Cresswell’s (1996) arguments discussed earlier, where groups find themselves transgressing
appropriate spatial norms. Young people find little freedom in the entrepreneurial city
because they are not seen as lucrative enough consumers, a situation exacerbated by their
construction as simultaneously troublesome and deviant.
The ‘Problem’ of Young Working-Class Men in Contemporary Britain
Specific ideas of gender also play fundamental roles in the creation of troublesome youth.
Recent policy and media reports tend to “construct young men as a ‘problem’ on a number of
fronts”, and promote the idea that “being a young man in the UK today is somehow troubling,
that there is something problematic about the state of young masculinity” (Robb, 2007: 110).
Indeed, it was recently recognised that boys have now become more susceptible to academic
failure than girls, with current concerns directed at how young men are able, or rather unable,
to transition from school to work (McDowell, 2002). Signalling a ‘crisis of masculinity’
(McDowell, 2002), contemporary class relations forged by recent economic restructuring
have also significantly contributed to extant concerns about working-class masculinity. As
Linda McDowell (2003) suggests, masculinity does not simply exist as a socio-cultural
position dichotomous to femininity. In the words of Anna Mehta and Liz Bondi, there “is no
singular femininity or masculinity to identify with; rather there are a variety of femininities
and masculinities, which are discursively and practically produced and maintained” (Mehta
and Bondi, 1999: 69). Instead, then, multiple masculinities are socially practiced – cross-cut
along axes of race and ethnicity, sexual orientation, and class (McDowell, 2003).
Pioneered perhaps by Peter Jackson (1991), the academic literature on the geographies of men
and masculinities now includes theses on young white masculinities and the social exclusion
of young working-class men (McDowell, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007), masculinity and sexuality
(Brown, 2000; Skelton and Valentine, 2005; also Skeggs, 1999), exclusion and youthful
Muslim masculinities (Hopkins, 2004, 2006; also see Hopkins, 2007), and many others. For
the purposes of this study, the interrelation of youth, class and masculinity is of paramount
importance, as recent popular debates concerning youth often revolve around working-class
young men and their problematic masculine identities. As Linda McDowell suggests, these
concerns seem to stem from recent political-economic transformations: “In the context of
economic restructuring that has devastated old industrial communities as manufacturing
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employment declines, job markets increasingly dominated by service employment, and an
emphasis on workfare and other employment-related schemes, the undereducated,
troublesome young men who leave school at 16 with few prospects of secure employment
have become the focus of government concern” (McDowell, 2002: 99).
Of course, men and problematic masculinities have been a common concern for policy-
makers and sociologists over the years, and as I illustrated in section 2.2, the predominance of
young working-class men in studies of subculture became a defining feature of the CCCS’s
work (and indeed, many of the studies by the Chicago School in the early twentieth-century
revolved around delinquent male youth). Around the same time as the proliferation of work
on subculture by the CCCS, sociologist Paul Willis (1977) in his seminal study Learning to
Labour enquired as to how working-class kids get working-class jobs8. However, it is “only
relatively recently that geographers have turned their attention to the social construction of
masculinity, its variants, and their relationship with place and locality” (McDowell, 2002:
97). Furthermore, times have changed rapidly, and the transition to Post-Fordism necessitates
further enquiry into the lives and experiences of young men in Britain. As Anoop Nayak
suggests:
“The post-manufacturing economy has seen an increase in ‘footloose’ industries, service
sector economies, part-time work, fixed-term contracts and more ‘flexible’ patterns of labour.
Rather, we must now ask how working class youth (and in this case boys) are adapting to
insecure times and an expanding post-industrial economy in which the rich reservoir of
labouring jobs has all but evaporated” (Nayak, 2003c: 147-148).
It seems that at the current juncture, working-class young men are socially and economically
fated from very early on. Where in the past a range of employment opportunities for young
working-class men abounded, and where the transition from school to work could be made
without gaining so many qualifications (i.e. through trade apprenticeships, non-skilled
manufacturing jobs etc.), the current labour climate requires a completely different set of
skills and qualifications. Increases in the professional / managerial sphere have opened up
employment opportunities only to those who achieve relevant qualifications in further
education, whilst the burgeoning service sector, although requiring less qualifications,
increasingly seeks a set of ‘feminised’ skills traditionally unfamiliar to working-class young
men. As McDowell suggests:
8 See also Corrigan (1979) for a similar study involving groups of young working-class men.
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“Those older forms of acceptable ‘macho’ behaviour among working-class men that used to
be a key feature of male manual employment are now a positive disadvantage in the labour
market, where self-presentation, punctuality, attitude, and demeanour to customers and
superiors are increasingly important attributes. Deference and docility are highly valued skills
in the bottom-end service sector jobs that may be the only employment options available to
working-class men in former industrial areas, and yet it seems that male socialisation in
schools and in localities continues to emphasise traditional male ways of doing things,
increasingly excluding young men from the only labour-market opportunities that are open to
them” (2002: 104).
The turbulence that marks current school-work transitions and labour masculinities also has
wider ramifications. Exclusion from the labour market through economic restructuring has
facilitated the forging of new gender roles, and masculine identities once unproblematic in
industrial times have now been reconfigured and demonized through class-specific discourses
of academic failure and economic redundancy. In an earlier time work once assured
masculinity, “the world of work was the world of men, and masculinity was almost
synonymous with employment participation. A man’s worth, his very identity as a man, was
inextricably linked to his occupation and social class ... Whether part of the cerebral world of
rational masculinity inhabited by middle class and well-educated men or the rough and
tumble masculine camaraderie of high-risk, embodied manufacturing work, being a man
meant being a worker” (McDowell, 2006: 832). Current labour relations thus have significant
implications for the status of young working-class masculinity in contemporary Britain,
which has effectively been reconstituted alongside wider social and economic
transformations, alienating and socially excluding a large stratum of the population from an
increasingly fragmented and feminised labour market (McDowell, 2002). Rather than a crisis
of masculinity, the present times point to a crisis of working-class masculinity subjugated by
a dominant middle-class version commensurate with the contemporary political-economic
climate. As I show in chapter 4, young working-class masculinities, if not performed through
work and employment, are performed through alternative social spaces – nightlife for
example being an evermore significant space through which to do this (Hollands, 1995;
Nayak, 2003a).
These new gender roles, though, are also forged through the perpetuation of historical
representations of deviance and delinquency. If youth is socially constructed as troublesome
and deviant at the current juncture, working-class male youth is constructed especially so. In
recent periods of civil unrest, media images “were predominantly of young, appreantly
violent men” and were followed by “debates about the problems of youth unemployment ...
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but also about the erosion of parental discipline, the ‘decline’ of the family, and the need for
‘firm’ policing in these areas” (McDowell, 2002: 98). New Labour policy pronouncements
(as I discuss in the next chapter), through discourses of ‘yob culture’, continually reinforce
the idea that young working-class men are out of control, and punitive reactions are shaped to
deal with what seems to be a major national problem, despite rhetorics which dishonestly
conflate “delinquent behaviour with more serious problems of violent crime” (ibid. p. 99).
Class has once again, then, become a central constituent in the creation of troublesome youth,
if it ever went away in the first place. Young working-class masculinity, in the form of “the
problem of boys / yobs” (McDowell, 2007: 276), has “come to dominate the popular
imagination and the policy planning of the New Labour Government in an even more
significant way than in earlier years” (ibid.). And to some degree, this has influenced the
coercion and exclusion of predominantly young working-class men from a multitude of
different socio-spatial contexts. As I show in chapter 3, escalating government and media
fears of a growing yob culture strongly associated with the lower income classes prompted a
series of reprimands in the form of shutting down ‘thug pubs’, proposing new on-the-spot fine
powers for the police, and the introduction of the anti-social behaviour order (Asbo),
exemplifying a “cascading scale of increasingly selective and targeted exclusions” (Cameron,
2007: 3).
Review
Through the recent body of work on the geographies of childhood and youth, it becomes
evident that young people continue to be subjugated and controlled by an adult hegemony of
space. Young people remain subjects problematic to society, culminating in a wide range of
systematic regulations which often result in spatial curtailments and exclusions. It is evident
that young people are understood as a threat to the possibilities of the post-industrial city.
Many are conceived as non-consumers and out of place in consumption-oriented space.
Some are criminalised, and some are punished through exclusionary mechanisms as a result.
Working-class youth seem to be especially vulnerable. What was once a masculinity
unproblematic to urban labour relations has become the object of media and government
concern, and those who at one time were near assured employment after leaving school have
largely been excluded from participating in extant systems of production. This, coupled with
a rising public and state anxiety about yob culture, has precipitated further punitive measures
and spatial restrictions.
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Also, through current constructions of troublesome youth, old fears of deviance and
delinquency have become resurrected, and brought into line with current discourses regarding
a social morality commensurate with neoliberal ideologies. In other words, where once urban
Britain was threatened by the juvenile delinquent subculture, then the teds, the mods and
rockers, and indeed the ubiquitous ‘mugger’, it is now thought to be threatened by violent
working-class boys and those unable to consume properly in the post-industrial city.
Ultimately, then, transforming socio-economic dynamics have changed the way society
understands contemporary troublesome youth groups – the yob, and as I come to show in the
next chapter, the ‘chav’.
2.5 Conclusion: Theoretical Contexts
The literature explored in this chapter has a lengthy span, in terms of both history and
theoretical lineage, so in this concluding section let me first briefly sum up the main tenets,
and second, illustrate how they inform the theoretical context of the study. First, this study is
situated in changing urban forms and how the shift into post-industrialism engenders a range
of exclusionary scenarios. The onset of neoliberal economics, which followed from severe
industrial turbulence as political-economic globalization developed apace, brought with it a
huge number of transformations at various entangled scales. At the city level,
deindustrialization prompted an entrepreneurial shift in governance, where urban states
partnered with private sector institutions actively sought to attract capital back to the city.
With a national neoliberalization of politics and economics came cultural shifts, where
emphasis was placed on consumption and increasingly, aesthetics, and in doing so, much of
the redevelopment that followed focussed on re-aestheticizing the city through a
preoccupation with large-scale gentrification and the building of festival marketplaces and
shopping malls. Contemporary Marxian urban commentators have identified this as the
‘commodification’ or ‘domestication’ of urban space, which, in short, shifts power relations
and cultural norms for the increased benefit of capital, and normalises new class-based
consumer ideologies and practices. Smith (1996a), in the case of New York City, refers to
this as revanchism, and related, Mitchell (1997) – in various cities – as the annihilation of
space. But the central theme of this contemporary urbanism, notwithstanding its various
terminologies, is the power of the state and the private sector to define what, or more
importantly who, is ‘good’ and ‘right’ for a particular place. Of course, notions of good and
right at the current juncture are defined in accordance to late-capitalism, but so are
conceptions of deviance.
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Second, then, this study utilises a specific conception of deviance. It is not understood as an
intrinsic feature of the individual or indeed the group, but rather a complex relationship
through which persons come to be identified as deviant in particular socio-spatial contexts.
Deviance is represented, but only through its operation, and it works at a number of levels. In
the case of the mods and rockers, representations of deviance constructed by the mass media
worked to create folk devils and moral panics (Cohen, 1972), a similar process to that of
mugging demonstrated by Hall et al (1978), which, in turn, became used to legitimize more
punitive reactions and sanctions against the perceived offenders. In the post-industrial era, it
becomes clear that the urban poor, the homeless, and even the working classes are constructed
as deviant through their lack of participation in neoliberal capitalist culture. At the city scale,
these representations of deviance work in similar ways, pointing to the construction of social
groups as deviant vis-à-vis entrepreneurial urbanism. Groups who do not fit in to
contemporary capitalist culture are constructed as out of place within its urban spaces,
seemingly legitimating the deleterious consequences illustrated by gentrification, ZTP and
increasing surveillance capabilities. This reveals a “hyperpunitive” political agenda that
seeks to eradicate any threat to economic development according to neoliberal rule (Herbert
and Brown, 2006).
Third, this study is also concerned with the ways in which young people affect and are
affected by neoliberalized urban space. Through the recent body of literature on the
geographies of youth, it is evident that young people have been subordinated for centuries.
Coupled with fears of troublesome youth over the years, this subjugation has also had a major
bearing upon the spaces in which youth culture is allowed to be performed. Influenced by
work in cultural studies, much of the geographical study of youth illustrates a continual
construction of young people as deviant, which legitimates sensibilities to control and
exclude. In the post-industrial city, exclusions are predicated on the belief that young people,
and especially working-class youth are out of control, threatening, and intimidating. Also
perceived as non-consumers, their spatial freedoms are increasingly curtailed in the surrogate
private spaces that pervade much of the entrepreneurial city. Similar to other urban
undesirables, the presence of young people is regulated so as to ensure the profitability of
urban space. Furthermore, with transformations in class and gender configurations
encouraged through economic restructuring, working-class male youth seem to be especially
vulnerable at the current juncture. What was once a masculinity unproblematic to labour
relations has become the object of media and government concern (even scorn), and those
who at one time were near assured employment after leaving school have largely been
excluded from participating in contemporary systems of production. Coupled with rising
anxieties of ‘yob culture’, this has prompted further punitive measures and spatial
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encumbrances. Not disregarding the problems posed by troublesome youth, this study
incorporates these theories of the geographies of youth to position young people and their
spatialities as regulated according to contemporary youth / class politics and the
neoliberalization of urban space.
And so to the central theoretical framework of the study: that the political-economic
restructuring of the city over the last thirty years or so has reconstituted many social
identities, but particularly ones that revolve around youth and class. Through current
constructions of troublesome youth, older anxieties of crime, deviance, and delinquency are
perpetuated by being brought into line with current discourses of morality commensurate with
consumption-oriented late-capitalism. In other words, where once British urban space was
threatened by the delinquent subculture, the teds, the mods and rockers, and the mugger, it is
now threatened by those unable to both properly produce and consume in the post-industrial
city. Changing socio-economic dynamics have thus changed the way society understands
contemporary troublesome youth, and how to deal with them as a real phenomenon.
From these literatures it is possible to start to see how groups of young people are being
reconstituted as the new delinquent in the current entrepreneurial urban economy and what
effects these new configurations have on young people’s access to various urban spaces. To
deepen this understanding, Chapter 3 investigates further the cultural context of this study,
before illustrating the geographical and temporal context in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
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Contemporary Representations of Troublesome Youth: Cultural
Contexts in Post-Industrial Britain
3.1 Introduction
Here I want to expand upon the previous chapter with a brief discussion of the cultural
context of post-industrial Britain. I begin by documenting some of the characteristics of the
current British government and how these are helping to reconstitute youth identities in
conjunction with contemporary political-economic and social processes. New Labour,
comprised of numerous politico-philosophical ideologies, propagate both an economic
neoliberalism rooted in recent Conservative practice and community-based regeneration
strategies more familiar with the putative liberal ‘left’. However, whilst a new well-used
discursive lexicon of social exclusion and anti-social behaviour has emerged to characterise
those left behind in the wake of economic restructuring, other more denigrating vernaculars of
‘yobs’ and ‘yob culture’ have simultaneously arisen in the mass media, perpetuating long-
standing fears of working-class youth.
Exploring news media coverage of recent events such as the murders of Damilola Taylor and
Phil Carroll, in section 3.2 I first show how young working-class men from deprived
communities are understood as dangerous and as a national problem in a way similar to the
kinds of deviant precedents explored by Geoff Pearson (1983). Second, I show that with the
establishment of New Labour in 1997, particular youth groups remain deviant in relation to
neoliberal economics, entrepreneurial urbanism and their latent marginalising effects. With a
rapidly expanding array of new ‘ameliorative’ strategies that aim to instil respect and civility
while combating anti-social and yobbish behaviour through new assemblages of social and
spatial control, it is evident that some youth groups are becoming increasingly criminalised.
Third, I examine how recent nightlife culture is permeated with ideas of yob culture in both
media and political rhetoric. Increasing recognition of health problems and violence
associated with the consumption of alcohol culminated in a massive attack on government
Alcohol Licensing Reform proposals by the conservative media in 2003 and 2004, with a
significant focus placed upon the criminogenic representation of urban centres at night.
Night-time economies and representations of the night-time city centre as a ‘no-go area’ as a
result of troublesome youth are thus the focus of the final part.
In section 3.3 I expand upon contemporary understandings of youth and class, and how these
have been reworked to form the cultural phenomenon of the ‘chav’. Here I illustrate that the
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chav is a continuation of the underclass discourse made popular in the 1990s, but also how
these discourses have been reconfigured around a locus of consumption rather than
production. Those at the bottom of the social ladder, along with idleness, fecklessness and
promiscuity, are now identified and categorised through a vast array of consumer symbols,
which have, in turn, become symbols of deviance. A contemptuous signifier of contemporary
class relations, the chav has also come to symbolise an increased social, cultural and spatial
separation of the classes.
I conclude this chapter by illustrating how these contemporary representations of troublesome
youth are entangled in the political-economic practices of post-industrial Britain. Whilst the
mass media and the state promote specific socio-economic dynamics, they simultaneously
demarcate the dynamics of delinquent youth, where young people are increasingly
criminalised through economic restructuring and its related cultural politics.
3.2 New Labour and Yob Culture
Whilst neoliberalism has been (and continues to be) a key ideological feature of modern
conservative governments, the latest Labour government has continued to operate the
neoliberal machine. Inaugurated in 1997, Tony Blair’s New Labour gave “prominence to the
transformation away from the Keynesian welfare state to more neoliberal arrangements and
has sought to develop strategies that support the power of capital, adapt the state apparatus to
prioritise capital accumulation, and reconfigure the welfare state” (Fuller and Geddes, 2008:
257). Indeed, as Neil Smith (2005: 888) argues, “Blair was not the answer to Thatcher ... Not
only did he not roll back Thatcher’s travesties but he sought to complete various ambitions of
the Thatcher government in a way that neither the Iron Lady nor her successor John Major
could ever have hoped for”.
New Labour, though, is a curious assemblage of political and philosophical ideologies.
Emanating from a diverse range of traditions, “namely conservatism, social democracy,
socialism and liberalism” (Fuller and Geddes, 2008: 258), both market-biased and
community-based policy experiments have been simultaneously performed by New Labour
since 1997. Their approach to economic and social restructuring is state-sponsored but
market conforming, which has often been heavily negotiated with those in the corporate
sphere; and there is a continued emphasis on the use of the third sector in economic
development and social cohesion (Fyfe, 2005). In typifying this amalgamation of political
philosophies enacted at the urban scale, consider, for example, the New Labour state
programmes Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and New Deal for Communities (NDCs).
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An extant form of entrepreneurial urbanism, LSPs are “a major recent innovation in the
pattern of local governance in England, which bring together at a local level the different
parts of the public sector as well as the private, business, community and voluntary sectors”
(Fuller and Geddes, 2008: 254). Focussing more on neo-communitarianism (Fyfe, 2005), the
NDC programme “involves 39 “community led” neighbourhood-based partnership initiatives
to regenerate deprived areas in the country” (Fuller and Geddes, 2008: 254).
Along with neoliberalizing economics and more social democratic forms of neighbourhood
regeneration, a new state-sponsored lexicon of social cohesion, inclusion, and empowerment
has also emerged, and with it, a new set of exclusionary mechanisms aimed to curb disrespect
and anti-social behaviour, particularly in the young. In this section I concentrate on the latter
of these, examining how state tactics and specific legislation aimed at resolving some of the
problems of socially excluded communities promote specific “principles of ‘respect’ and
‘civility’” (Cameron, 2007: 2). However, these also seem to “enforce particular modes of
civic engagement and participation”, effectively reconstituting youth identities and their
position within contemporary cultural politics (ibid.). First though, I want to briefly map out
the terrain of contestation which demarcates particular youth groups as troublesome,
problematic and deviant, illustrating how contemporary fears are sometimes used as the
justification for control, punishment and spatial curtailment.
Britain, Crime, and ‘Yob Culture’ in the 21st Century
In late 2000, 10-year-old schoolboy Damilola Taylor was found dead in a stairwell in a run-
down housing estate in Peckham, London as a result of being stabbed with a broken bottle by
a group of teenagers. His murder gained widespread attention in the press and the broadcast
media, and also raised much concern within the political sphere. Discussing then current
government law and order proposals, the Daily Mail argued the murder was symptomatic of a
new and pervasive ‘yob culture’ sweeping through Britain. As stated on the 19th January
2001, “A crackdown on ‘yob culture’ – blamed for the death of Damilola Taylor – will be at
the heart of a new law and order Bill published by the government today” (Daily Mail, 2001:
19 Jan). The subsequent public outcry was predicated on both Damilola’s young age and
those of his assailants. It was also, perhaps, due to the nature of the coverage in the media,
which resembled the sensational and fear-inducing reporting styles akin to previous moral
panic episodes such as that instigated by the murder of Jamie Bulger in the early 1990s (see
Valentine, 1996). In the following days, the moral panic surrounding Damilola Taylor’s
murder developed apace. Damilola’s father was quoted in the Daily Mail claiming Britain
was in need of “moral repair” to overcome the “lack of discipline which he believes led to his
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son’s death” (Daily Mail, 2001: 24 Jan). The Daily Telegraph featured similar responses,
highlighting the problematic areas in which social and moral order is purportedly breaking
down: “A breakdown in moral values has taken place in parts of Britain, where children roam
the streets in gangs with knives and dangerous weapons, the father of Damilola Taylor said
yesterday” (Steele, 2001: Daily Telegraph 25 Jan).
Another incident which has gained widespread attention in the past decade was the assault on
48-year-old Phil Carroll in 2005 after he verbally responded to a “gang of youths” who threw
a stone at his car (Daily Mail, 2005: 17 May). The attack, used to illustrate declining social
morality in Britain, was later referenced alongside an incident where another “teenage gang”
smashed the window of a funeral car, and used by the Daily Mail to describe how “yob
culture plumbed new depths” (Rayner and Finney, 2005: Daily Mail 19 May). In another
article it was used to exemplify how Britain may be turning into a “moral wasteland”:
“With sick savagery, teenage tearaways attack a funeral procession in Widnes, smashing the
windscreen of a limousine full of mourners. In Blackpool, a school is daubed with paint that
will take £20,000 to clear up. The vandals responsible are between three and six years old. In
Salford, Phil Carroll fights for life after being assaulted by mindless yobs…These are
snapshots of a moral wasteland. In the words of a top police officer…feral gangs with no
regard for the law and no experience of parental control are reducing whole neighbourhoods to
fear” (Daily Mail, 2005: 19 May, emphasis added).
This idea of a new and pervasive yob culture emerging from the past two decades has become
a powerful articulation of contemporary troublesome youth, where those disaffected by
changing class and gender relations have become postmodern pariahs. Originally thought to
be Victorian slang for boy, yob is now a pejorative term used in the categorisation (and
castigation) of troublesome, and predominantly working-class young men. As Leapman,
writing for the Daily Telegraph explains, “They are the menacing youths who hang about in
gangs, causing trouble. For decades they have been known as “yobs”. It has been rare for
anybody to have a good word to say about them” (Leapman, 2006: Daily Telegraph 30 Sep).
Indeed, in the media the term is used to describe young working-class men variously depicted
as ‘unruly youths’, ‘teenage louts’, ‘youngsters out of control’, ‘drunken hooligans’, ‘lawless
teenagers’, ‘young thugs’ and so on. In one commentary the yob is described as the “scourge
of our times” (Key, 2005: Mirror 27 Jan). In another article the figure is described as
“making our lives a misery” (Prince, 2006: Mirror 20 Nov), and in another, described as
spoiling “the quality of everyday life” (McSmith and Sparrow, 2001: Daily Telegraph 24
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Apr). As media commentator Ros Coward, in her observations of 1990s press rhetoric,
explains:
“‘Yob’, once a slang insult, is now a descriptive category used by tabloid and quality
newspapers alike…yob is a species of young white working class male which if the British
media is to be believed is more common than ever before ... The yob is the bogey of the
Nineties, hated and feared with a startling intensity by the British middle class. Janet Daley
describes such men as ‘drunken Neanderthals’, while Jeremy Kingston, also in the Times,
reckons they are ‘crapulous louts’. Simon Heffer of the Telegraph claims, like Peter Lilly, not
even women of their own social class can tolerate such ghastly specimens: ‘Nobody wants to
marry a yob because he is boorish, lazy and unemployable’’ (Coward 1994, quoted in
McDowell, 2003: 63).
The yob has also become equated with the newly-constructed Labour idiom ‘anti-social
behaviour’ after its political inception in the late 1990s. However, the term is mostly used to
contextualise the more violent of crimes committed by young working-class men. For
example, in April 2005, the Telegraph writes of a man “stabbed after challenging yobs”
(Daily Telegraph, 2005: 29 Apr), and in May 2005, an attack on a middle-aged man outside
his home led to headlines such as Father of four ‘critical’ after confronting yobs in street
(Bunyan, 2005: Daily Telegraph 17 May), and Nail these feral yobs (Disley, 2005: Mirror 18
May). Yobs in this context are portrayed as ““feral” gangs plaguing law-abiding families”,
and carrying out a “reign of terror” (ibid.). Whilst violent crime remains a social problem, of
concern here is how working-class youth are categorised and complexly mixed up within
these debates. The yob is used to represent both insignificant misdemeanours and the most
horrific of violent crimes, conflating a range of offences which consequentially emblematize
the young working class as a dangerous and out of control social stratum (McDowell, 2003).
The term thus generalises the status of young working-class masculinity as problematic in a
number of socio-spatial arenas:
“The yob – generally but not always masculine (the term is merely the reversal of boy) – is the
iconic figure at the centre of media reports and New Labour policy debates, a mindless
disaffected vandal engaging in violence in city centres and on football terraces, in threatening
behaviour in the streets and increasingly in school playgrounds, in need of both guidance and
punishment” (McDowell, 2007: 278).
Generalising the state of young working-class masculinity is also achieved at various scales,
where the yob is used to exemplify the national problem of youth crime and disorder, but
also, how local places are affected. As Carroll (2006: Mirror 4 Oct) argues in the Mirror: “An
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OAP has this week been forced into hiding after shopping to police a gang of youths who
threatened to firebomb her home in Liverpool. If this was an isolated incident it would be
appalling enough. But it’s not. It’s just a microcosm of life on British streets hijacked by
gangs of feral, jobless, violent yobs”. Constructed as wild, uncivilised and violent, working-
class young men caught under the yob canopy are making spaces throughout Britain
dangerous places to occupy. Understood also to be a very local problem, yobs are said to
terrorise localities at the neighbourhood and community level.
These violent crimes by the young, and the apparent pervasiveness of them, have also led to
many in the media arguing for the existence of a rapidly growing fear of crime in Britain,
with older generations afraid to leave their homes (Daily Mail, 2003: 21 May). Most of
Britain is described as “in fear of teenagers” (Daily Telegraph, 2006: 24 Oct), as the Daily
Telegraph explains:
“The Craylands estate in Basildon, a sprawling warren of post-war flats and maisonettes, has
been blighted by crime and vandalism. Graffiti defaces stairwells, and shops are fitted with
heavy steel shutters to stop intruders. Some of its 2,500 residents are so intimidated by gangs
of drunken youths who congregate on street corners that they dare not go out at night”
(Martin, 2005: Daily Telegraph 25 March).
Overcoming this fear, it might seem, is almost certainly made more difficult when key
politicians such as David Blunkett admit that previous crime-reducing policies have been
ineffective, proclaiming that the streets of Britain are “no longer safe” (Clarke, 2002: Daily
Mail 18 Mar)9.
Whilst it would certainly be unfair to suggest that the above kinds of sentiment are
representative of all social, media and state understanding, it nonetheless illustrates that
specific events are used as platforms – by both media and state – to intimate that young
people are threatening, violent, dangerous, without morals or remorse, legitimizing further
controls at a variety of scales. The point here is that the representation of young people,
crime and violence, their appropriation of public space, and the construction of places of fear
as a result, are used to articulate and justify punitive and restrictive reactions such as curfews,
Asbos, and the prohibition of wearing specific items and brands in certain places (as I
subsequently discuss in section 3.3). The cultural context of post-industrial Britain is thus
9 Some have also argued that this fear has contributed to a “walk-on-by society”, with less and less people taking a stance against
unruly and violent behaviour (Slack, 2008: Daily Mail 19 Jun).
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suffused with pervasive representations of troublesome youth that serve as prerequisites for
increasing socio-spatial control.
CRACKDOWN: Curfews, Asbos and the Respect Agenda
“Police are drawing up plans to ban youngsters from part of a town at night in a bid to cut crime and
disorder … It will be the first time an English town has banned youngsters from its streets in an attempt
to control a steadily rising tide of minor criminality and public disorder offences” (Daily Mail, 2002:
26 Mar).
***
“All-night curfews for under-16s could help combat crime in blighted areas, the Prime Minister’s
official spokesman has suggested … The move comes in the wake of the murder of 10-year-old
Damilola Taylor on a London estate … Asked whether they would be extended to under-16s, [Prime
Minister’s official spokesman] said: “We believe it is a very good idea to give the police and
communities the power they need to rebuild communities”” (Daily Mail, 2000: 04 Dec).
***
“[The Asbo] is about the protection of the communities, it is about the witnesses, it is about the
individuals whose lives have been made miserable. It establishes the line that must not be crossed, sets
down the things that the perpetrator cannot do, the harm they cannot repeat and puts the community
back in the driving seat of reasonable aspirations and expectations” (Bill Bitt of the Home Office
quoted in Prince, 2004: Mirror 31 Aug).
***
“A town has become the first place in Britain to impose a curfew on teenagers, banning children under
the age of 15 from the streets between 9pm and 6 am … Police said that a rising tide of juvenile crime
had forced them to act … Insp Garry Forsyth said: “It is about parents having to take more
responsibility for their children’s whereabouts. I don’t suppose Corby is that much worse than
anywhere else but there is a fear of crime out there. This is a quality of life issue”” (Britten, 2002:
Daily Telegraph 26 Mar).
Figure 3.1 Reporting curfews in the press
Revolving around contemporary representations of troublesome youth, then, recent policy
reactions – both speculative and operational – seek to control the movement, mobility and
spatialities of young people. These kinds of state actions, particularly curfews, seek to re-
appropriate or reclaim spaces thought lost in order to reinforce and reproduce an adult
hegemony corresponding to extant cultural norms. They also seek to inculcate specific
practices in parents thought unable to bring up their children in ‘appropriate’ ways (see
Collins and Kearns, 2001). The accounts in Figure 3.1 illustrate the direct relationship
between the regulation of the young through the implementation of curfew policies and
Asbos, and the idea of giving communities back power, a power lost to troublesome youth
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symptomatic of the times and bereft of civic responsibility. But they also show that in those
areas most affected by poverty and deprivation, crime is better prevented through spatial
injunctions, affecting the spatialities of those not necessarily criminal as defined under current
legislation.
Another recent state-conceived apparatus that similarly enlarges the parameters of crime is
the Anti-social behaviour order (Asbo). Introduced in the 1998 Criminal Justice Act, and
described as “the cornerstone of New Labour’s campaign to restore a culture of “respect” to
British society” (Rowland, 2005: 1 quoted in McDowell, 2007: 280), they were to allow
“police forces, local authorities, housing associations and community organisations to tackle
waves of petty or ‘sub’ criminal behaviour by delinquent families, gangs of unruly teenagers,
graffiti ‘taggers’, binge-drinkers, noisy neighbours, fly-posters, ‘nuisance’ beggars, and an
expanding lexicon of the ‘anti-social’” (Cameron, 2007: 2). In other words, the Asbo was
designed so as to allow a form of punishment to people acting disorderly or anti-socially,
without having been convicted of an actual crime. Used also as a putative tool for community
regeneration, discourses surrounding the implementation and use of Asbos, however, are
again strongly associated with impoverished areas. Linking the Asbo to the “spatial
construction of social exclusion as a feature of poor localities”, its restrictions are often placed
upon those categorised as yobs, imposing predominantly spatial curtailments on young people
not necessarily guilty of actual criminal acts (Cameron, 2007: 2). And in their spatial
capacity to punish and control, they can both confine individuals to their home but also
restrict access to parts of their locality:
“ASBOs embody not only assumptions about the association between social behaviour and
certain areas of cities that have a long tradition in dealing with ‘hooligans’ and ‘yobs’ but also
introduce spatially-specific restrictions. Thus, under the orders any individual 10 years of age
or over can be banned not only from carrying out specific acts but also excluded from certain
geographical areas for a minimum period of two years. ASBOs restrict access to specific
areas of a town, a street or an estate” (McDowell, 2007: 280).
These spatially-specific restrictions have been largely embraced by some (especially the right-
wing media) – their curbing abilities described as “innovative and legitimate” for example
(Daily Mail, 2006: 10 Apr). Here, the Asbo is praised when more punitive measures are not
possible, promoting the idea that some punishment is better than none. However, at the same
time they are criticised for not being restrictive enough, and insistent on their failure, the
Daily Mail suggests that Asbos “don’t work because thugs think they’re cool” (Owen, 2006:
Daily Mail 12 Mar). In another article it was reported that:
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“Tony Blair’s ‘respect’ agenda was dealt a hammer blow last night as it emerged that Asbos
are being routinely broken by arrogant thugs … Critics said the figures showed the Anti-social
Behaviour Orders, intended to make the streets safer, were nothing more than a ‘badge of
honour’ for yobs ... Shadow Police Reform Minister Nick Herbert said: “This totally
undermines Tony Blair’s respect agenda, which proposed a further extension of Asbos. It is
further evidence that the agenda is a collection of gimmicks and not a serious attempt to deal
with the causes of crime and anti-social behaviour” … If more were jailed, the number of
breaches would be much lower” (Slack, 2006: Daily Mail 14 Jan).
However, the Asbo remained an integral part of the respect agenda along with parenting
orders and on-the-spot fines. And other recent manoeuvres aiming to tackle the problem of
deviant youth again took on direct control practices, including, for example, the proposed
plans to identify ‘potential criminals’ at a very young age. This came after the Metropolitan
Police announced setting up a secret database of children as young as three who could
potentially grow up to be criminals (Bamber, 2001: Daily Telegraph 24 Nov). The plan
apparently grew out of the Damilola Taylor murder investigation, after police came across
“dozens of wild and unruly children who ... were in danger of becoming criminals” (ibid.).
Persons on the database could then be monitored at school and on the streets by special police
squads and social workers. Later, the same issue cropped up again but instead focussed on
David Blunkett’s similar claims that “teenage criminals can be identified, and intercepted, in
nursery school”, in an effort to prevent teenage crime and delinquency (Johnston, 2002: Daily
Telegraph 19 Apr).
What is of paramount importance here is the conception of ‘respect’ referred to by Blair and
other state members, and the ways in which state-inferred exclusions operate. Linda
McDowell (2007) makes a distinction between ideas of ‘respect’ and ‘deference’, and argues
that Blair’s respect agenda conceives respect as an explicitly “one-way relationship in which
the inferior must obey the injunctions of a superior and includes ... the notion of young people
as vessels to be filled with guidance, advice and hegemonic codes of conduct” (ibid. p. 283).
It is evident that through sanctions such as the Asbo, an increasing rhetoric of delinquency
and the reconstitution of working-class youth identities, the kind of respect sought by the
government is one more of complete deference. Furthermore, processual social exclusion has
become legislatively normalised through the Asbo to encompass and retain the already
socially excluded, unless its subjects modify their behaviour. As Angus Cameron explains:
“The result of policies such as the ASBO is the establishment of a cascading scale of
increasingly selective and targeted exclusions. What began life as a blanket, normative
concept, social exclusion is thus gradually being reified (statized in Painter’s terms) by
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differentiation and incorporation into a series of legal and semi-legal spatial domains in which
behaviour, movement, voice and presence are severely constrained. Breaching an ASBO can
lead to a custodial sentence, thus linking the new series of ‘lesser’ exclusions created by the
ASBO to the state’s ultimate exclusionary power – imprisonment” (Cameron, 2007: 3).
A Night Out in ‘Yob UK’
Another situation which has become the object of state, media, and public concern is young
people’s consumption of alcohol, particularly when located in the burgeoning night-time
economy. Andrea Finney, writing for the Research, Development and Statistics Directorate
of the Home Office, suggests that “Violent behaviour in and around pubs and clubs on
weekend nights presents a significant public health, criminal justice and urban management
problem” (Finney, 2004). Violent behaviour here is associated with young men who have
consumed large amounts of alcohol, particularly situated in areas defined as ‘entertainment
districts’ where pubs and clubs abound, and particularly on weekend evenings and early
mornings. Further concerns are put forward by social scientists who have found similar
problems through various pieces of research. In a study carried out by Colin Thomas and
Rosemary Bromley in Cardiff and Swansea, it was found that the night-time economy, whilst
being restricted to mainly youth groups, has created a sense of fear for personal safety,
particularly for women, the elderly, and the ‘better-off suburbanites’, subsequently deterring
these groups from visiting the city centres at night (Thomas and Bromley, 2000; a similar
argument is put forward by Hobbs et al (2000)). In the media, though, these concerns are
articulated through rather more sensational discourses which use current semantics of
troublesome youth and their intrinsic castigatory potential. Using vivid accounts and often
relying on notions of disgust, youth, violence, drinking and the urban converge into another
contemporary anxiety in need of immediate remediation. In Nottingham:
“They’ll know what to expect tonight, although it will bring little comfort. A city bracing
itself for another weekly onslaught of debauched bedlam as more then 60,000 drinkers hit the
bars and clubs in the UK’s biggest – and most notorious – party town … Not everyone is
enjoying the party, though. Nottinghamshire police are stretched to breaking point. Their
Chief Constable, Steve Green, is fiercely opposed to government plans for 24-hour opening,
and is spearheading a national crackdown on binge-drinking. “I am sick of my officers being
used as punchbags by drunken thugs,” he says. “And I am ashamed of the drink-punch-
smash-vomit culture which has spread like an ugly acne on the face of our once proud towns
and cities”” (Ridley, 2004: Mirror 25 Sep, emphasis added).
And in Newcastle:
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“Young thugs brawl in the street, glasses are hurled at cowering doormen while stag night
revellers vomit nearby. Welcome to yob Britain. It’s just a normal weekend, one that exposes
the grim reality of our drink-fuelled culture. As the country prepares for round-the-clock pub
hours, towns and cities are struggling to cope with binge-drinking’ (Lakeman et al, 2005:
Mirror 31 Jan emphases added).
Reports of ‘crackdowns’ on drink-fuelled violence and misbehaviour also reinforce these
concerns of the problems of alcohol and the night-time economy. A special government-led
clean-up in the summer of 2005 was widely documented in the press and framed in a familiar
language (see Figure 3.2). But concerns for young people, alcohol and crime came under
even more scrutiny by the press and public during the development of government proposals
to reform alcohol licensing laws in 2003 and 2004, culminating in widespread condemnation
of the planned changes. There was fear that licensing changes would generate ‘24-hour
drinking’ and a proliferation of alcohol-induced crime. Initially, however, the reforms were
welcomed, with both Conservative party members and the police (and through their rhetoric,
it seems the Daily Mail too) in favour of changes that would allow greater control of what
was already thought a problematic economy:
“Licensing laws in England and Wales were facing their last orders as new alcohol sales
proposals were due to be unveiled this week. Plans for the new laws – the most radical
overhaul of the licensing system for more than 40 years – were due to be revealed by Home
Office Minister Mike O’Brien this week. The proposals would allow pubs, bars, restaurants
and shops to sell alcohol around the clock in a move likely to prove a hit with voters ahead of
the General Election, widely expected on June 7 … Shadow home secretary Ann
Widdecombe said of the proposals: … “We said at the time we were in favour of the
principles although we have some reservations about the mechanics of allowing local councils
rather than magistrates to police the licensing”. A spokesman for the Association of Chief
Police Officers (ACPO) said the move would help police to control troublemakers. “We
support reform of the licensing hours and we think it will help to avoid so-called binge-
drinking, when people consume large amounts of alcohol and come out onto the streets and
cause problems,” he said” (Daily Mail, 2004: 30 Apr).
And in another article, the reforms were said to be beneficial to the national economy,
promoting more sensible drinking patterns, as well as boosting tourism:
“The announcement was also welcomed by industry group Business in Sport and Leisure and
the All Party Parliamentary Leisure Industry Group. John Brackenbury, chairman of the
former, said: “We see enormous merit in the proposals for a split licensing system and a new
administrative procedure for obtaining a personal and premise license. Individual members
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who own pubs, casinos, bongo clubs, nightclubs, ten-pin bowling, restaurants and sports
centres will be able to reduce their costs substantially. The relaxation in opening hours will be
a huge boost to tourists who cannot understand our antiquated laws”. Labour Brent North MP
Barry Gardiner, chairman of the All Party group, said: “This is a real breakthrough. Flexible
opening hours will stop a lot of the public order problems around the old closing time. The
legislation will create a more friendly family environment in many pubs and most importantly
of all it will give local people a real say in the licensing of pubs in their area”” (Daily Mail,
2001: 02 May).
“Ministers have ordered the Army on the streets to join an all-out summer campaign against anti-social
drunken and violent behaviour by yobs. Military police and ordinary uniformed soldiers will help keep
youths under control in up to 20 towns and cities near military barracks. The strategy comes as police
forces in more than 230 towns and cities begin a clampdown on disorderly behaviour by alcohol-
fuelled youngsters, in response to a Home Office survey showing a disturbing rise in youth crime”
(Bamber, 2005: Daily Telegraph 19 Jun).
***
“Police are preparing for a summer crackdown on drunken yobs today, aimed at halting alcohol-fuelled
violence in pubs and town centres. Officers will target irresponsible drinkers and licensed premises
which encourage binge-drinking and other loutish behaviour under the national campaign, which
begins on July 8” (Daily Mail, 2004: 05 Jul).
***
“Police are launching a blitz on drunken yobs in 77 areas across England and Wales in a bid to reclaim
town centres for decent law-abiding citizens. Police officers said the 77 areas have volunteered to take
part in the Home Office’s crackdown. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) warned that
the eight-week campaign could lead to a rise in violent crime figures as police tackle unruly binge
drinkers who make town and city centres “no go areas” on weekend nights” (Daily Mail, 2004: 08 Jul).
Figure 3.2 Reporting “crackdowns” on night-time consumers in the press
However, coverage of the reform soon turned full circle when other members of the police
and judiciary spoke about concerns of increased disorder in town and city centres, and when
doctors spoke about the potential of escalating health problems:
“Pubs were given the green light for 24-hour opening yesterday despite fears of an explosion
in drinking. Culture Secretary Tessa Jowell defied police chiefs and health experts to signal
the end of the traditional 11pm closing time. Police say there will be an increase in drink-
fuelled fights, robberies, domestic violence and assaults on officers. And doctors warned that
24-hour licenses will lead to round-the-clock drinking, destroying efforts to cut increasing
alcohol problems” (Marsh and Merrick, 2004: Daily Mail 24 Mar).
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Some news institutions, it seemed, waged a moral war with New Labour, claiming they had
given a “license for the yob culture” (Daily Mail, 2004: 09 June), often employing rather
sensational rhetoric as well as citing the growing concerns for ‘binge drinking’ in order to
articulate a social problem that is widely blamed on young people and their activities (see
Eldridge and Roberts, 2008):
“It is a telling comment on how naïve, arrogant and out-of-touch our politicians have become
when it takes a judge to enunciate a truth that eludes the Government but is screamingly
obvious to millions of helpless voters: much of Britain is at the mercy of drink-fuelled ‘urban
savages’ who are turning towns and cities into “revolting and dangerous places at
night”…Nobody who lives in the real world will be remotely surprised by the bleak picture
Judge Harris paints. Not when such sodden, brutal excess can be seen any night of the week;
not when town centres are no-go areas for families and the vulnerable; not when pavements
outside pubs and clubs heave with raucous, intimidating mobs; not when gutters are awash in
blood and vomit…New Labour is alone (apart from the drinks industry) in refusing to
recognise this ugliness – and now with scarcely credible perversity seems determined to make
matters worse. With its plans for 24-hour drinking, which come into force in months, the
binge is about to become an uncontrolled riot of drunkenness” (Daily Mail, 2005: 13 Jan,
emphasis added).
Indeed, as Roberts observed, in “2004 the national press started to publish articles about the
state of British town centres after 9 p.m. at night. In January 2005 this blossomed into a full
blown ‘moral panic’ with the country’s leading popular daily newspaper, the Daily Mail,
mounting a campaign against ‘binge drinking’ Britain” (Roberts, 2006: 334).
3.3 Identifying Class: Youth, Consumption, and the ‘Chav’ Phenomenon
Whilst young people, particularly young working-class men, have been castigated for
centuries, these recent cultural politics point to a reconstitution of their deviance. Those
captured under the yob banner have been re-articulated as contemporary pariahs, subject to
more and more policy interventions, and expressed through current public, government, and
media discourses of anti-social behaviour, social exclusion, and a lack of respect in a
multitude of different spaces. However, other contemporary representations of troublesome
youth revolve around a new visual array of aesthetics shot through with notions of a flawed
consumer ‘underclass’. Whilst the yob – located at the centre of debates concerning violent
and criminal, unrepentant working-class young man – has come to epitomize the increasingly
antagonistic class / youth social relations from the early 1990s, in the 2000s, class
condescension and segregation have become more vividly illustrated through the ‘chav’
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phenomenon, the term gaining popularity in 2004, “coined to describe the spread of the ill-
mannered underclass – a rival to the American trailer trash – which loves shellsuits, bling-
bling jewellery and designer wear, especially the ubiquitous Burberry baseball cap” (Daily
Mail, 2004: 19 Oct). However, this “awful mocking discourse” as McDowell (2006, 2007)
puts it, concerns not just young men of a lower social stature, but also young working-class
women who are also “figured as the constitutive limit – in proximity – to national public
morality” (Skeggs, 2005: 965). As contemporary academic commentators suggest, the rise of
the chav in the early 2000s “is suggestive of a heightened class antagonism that marks a new
episode of class struggle in Britain”, used to distinguish a tasteless, feckless, sub-stratum of
youth (Tyler, 2006: 1). Jemima Lewis, writing for the Daily Telegraph, provides us with a
more detailed and thoughtful definition:
“They are the sullen, pasty-faced youths in hooded tops and spanking-new “prison white”
trainers who loiter listlessly on street corners; the slack-jawed girls with mottled legs, hoop
earrings and heavily-gelled hair who squawk at each other in consonant-free estuary English
and frighten old ladies on buses. They are the non-respectable working classes: the dole-
scroungers, petty criminals, football hooligans and teenage pram-pushers” (Lewis, 2004:
Daily Telegraph 01 Feb emphasis added).
Characterised by ‘bling’ (large gold-coloured jewellery), sports and designer wear, and the
now-infamous Burberry-style check baseball cap, the chav has “become synonymous with
ways of representing social class”, supplanting “representations of the ‘underclass’ that
dominated the late 1980s and early 1990s ... creating a new framework through which to
conceptualize, castigate and revile the white, urban poor” (Johnson, 2008: 66). It is a
continuation, an overlap, where those once categorised as members of the underclass have
been reconstructed as chavs for the same definitive purposes – the creation of a new
underclass through a criminogenic representation as unproductive, over-reproductive,
delinquent youth10.
Chavs have come to epitomize ideas of the “non-respectable working classes”, the “dole
scroungers”, “petty criminals”, and “teenage pram-pushers”, and increasingly demarcated by
10 The term ‘underclass’ was made popular in the late 1980s and early 1990s by the right-wing political scientist Charles Murray
(see Murray, 1996), who was brought to study the UK’s class divide by the Times newspaper. The underclass according to
Murray describes a population stratum with three principle characteristics: first, unemployment and a chronic dependence on
state welfare benefits, although not through failures of the presiding labour market, but, rather, on the choice of the individual
seeking benefits; second, high illegitimate births and fatherless families; and third, increasing crime rates, especially youth crime
rates. These three features, the ‘unholy trinity’ as they have been dubbed, gave rise to Bagguley and Mann’s satirisation of
Murray’s underclass idea as “idle, thieving, bastards” (Bagguley and Mann, 1992 cited in MacDonald, 1997: 9).
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disruptive, feckless, perhaps “anti-social” behaviour. As stipulated in the Mirror, delinquent
behaviour is a key characteristic of ‘chav culture’:
“The rise of “chav” youth culture is disrupting school lessons and encouraging bullying, a
study claimed yesterday. The anti-authoritarian street fashion of Burberry baseball caps,
bling-bling jewellery, tracksuits and trainers or Rockport shoes is about to be celebrated in a
movie ... But researchers said many 15 to 18-year-olds are picked on by chavs for doing well
in exams. Chavs gain credibility for being sent out of class, not attending detention and being
excluded from school” (Armstrong, 2004: Mirror 17 Sep).
However the concept of the underclass vis-à-vis the chav has been reconfigured around the
locus of consumption rather than production (Hayward and Yar, 2006). In addition to
fecklessness, disorderliness, and their lack of labour participation, chavs are defined through
their deviant consumer sensibilities where the Burberry, bling and sportswear have come to
denote this new underclass more significantly than their absence of labour. As Keith
Hayward and Majid Yar put it:
“Where previously the inability or unwillingness to work assured exclusion from social
membership, now the inability or unwillingness to consume furnishes the grounds
marginalisation to the hinterlands of normality. However ... something rather different is
currently occurring in the construction of a new underclass qua ‘pathological’ consumers.
Current popular discussion of the ‘chav’ focuses not on the inability to consume, but on the
excessive participation in forms of market-oriented consumption which are deemed
aesthetically impoverished. The perceived ‘problem’ with this ‘new underclass’ is that they
consume in ways deemed ‘vulgar’ and hence lacking in ‘distinction’ by superordinate classes”
(Hayward and Yar, 2006: 14).
Associations are also drawn between class and the embodied, gendered subject, where a
number of bodily performances are increasingly categorised according to gender and class
statuses in late-capitalism. As Bev Skeggs (2005: 965) suggests, where the single mother was
once the “source of all national evil, we now have the loud, white, excessive, drunk, fat,
vulgar, disgusting, hen-partying woman who exists to embody all the moral obsessions
historically associated with the working class now contained in one body; a body beyond
governance”. Indeed, as McDowell argues, those at the bottom of the social ladder, whether
man or woman, along with fecklessness and impoverished aesthetics are also distinguished by
embodied performances:
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“New markers of class identification, such as weight, skin colour, accents, intonations and
gestures, are used to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable class-specific
performances and to mark working class bodies as increasingly unacceptable in the tanned,
toned world of the new service economy and in commodified forms of consumption and
entertainment” (McDowell, 2006: 836).
Whilst some geography commentators suggest that the body and its movements have become
increasingly important in contemporary social analysis, where performance can illustrate the
non-cognitive and ‘non-representational’ aspects of socio-spatiality (for example Thrift, 1996,
1999, 2003a, 2003b; Thrift and Dewsbury, 2000; Rose, 1999; Rose 2002a, 2002b; Dewsbury
et al 2002) and a sense of place in which “nothing signifies” (Thrift, 1999; 296), the mounting
emphasis of embodiment in extant class relations points, rather, to a series of bodily
performances that are visually sought out and demarcated as deviant and delinquent. In this
way, the embodiment of working-classness is itself a signifier of social deviance, where
representational processes are intrinsic in the “production of ‘correct movement’” (Cresswell,
2006: 56). Therefore, it is not the embodiment of class as a non-representational feature of
socio-spatiality that concerns me here, but the way in which “human bodily mobility is a set
of culturally and socially laden actions that exist within contextual systems of meaning and
power” (ibid.). As I illustrate in chapter 6, the embodiment of a specific class-based
delinquency serves to justify the increased spatial coercion of those who fail to perform
correctly in the night-time economy. As cultural geographers examining spatial inequality,
we therefore need to continue to take embodied subjectivities seriously, and relevantly
incorporate them into such analyses.
Class Identity, Derision, and Exclusion
The cultural terrain in which these signifiers circulate is suffused with growing divisions as
the middle and working classes continue to separate, both socially and spatially based on
renewed class defamation. As Hayward and Yar observe, the word chav has become a “soft
semantic target for those keen to rebadge the underprivileged and socially excluded among us
as a new form of feckless underclass” (Hayward and Yar, 2006: 17). Subsequently enabling
derision, condescension and prejudice, even the ostensible innocence of recent ‘chav comedy’
(‘Vicky Pollard’ from TV show Little Britain, ‘Kappa Slappa’ in the Viz publication etc.) is
laden with normative class-based assumptions. As Imogen Tyler puts it:
“The emergence of the grotesque and comic figure of the chav within a range of contemporary
British media ... has made class differences and antagonisms explicitly visible in contemporary
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Britain. Class-based discrimination and open snobbery is made socially acceptable through
claims that this vicious name-calling has a ‘satirical’ function ... laughter is boundary-forming;
it creates a distance between “them” and “us”, and asserts moral judgments and a higher class
position. Laughter at chavs is a way of managing and authorizing class disgust, contempt, and
anxiety” (Tyler, 2006: para.2 original emphasis).
The representation of the chav as non-productive, over-reproductive, delinquent, criminal,
violent, intimidating, and consuming in ways deemed aesthetically impoverished thus
legitimizes middle-class resentment against those of lower class status. It plays on the visual,
making class, crime and deviance verifiable through an array of consumer symbols which, in
turn, signify the chav as a “particular type of person (potentially or actually criminal,
unintelligent, tasteless in every way) and as a social group (a violent, threatening rabble)”
(Johnson, 2008: 66). And thus the operation of these representations as forms of classism,
signify a more general marginalisation. As Linda McDowell – drawing on Bev Skeggs –
argues: “Middle class disgust and resentment are ... key factors in contemporary forms of
class representations, class struggles and significantly in a new hardening of spatial separation
and segregation of the classes” (McDowell, 2007: 279). As I suggested in the previous
chapter, recent neoliberalization policies have engendered multiple landscapes of exclusion,
where groups such as the working class, the urban poor, and the homeless are continually
being displaced, marginalised and excluded through a variety of redevelopment processes
enacted by both the state and the private sector. Entangled in the cultural context of
neoliberalized space, this exclusionary consciousness pervades the everyday practices through
which working-class spatialities can be regulated and separation achieved. Delinquent
behaviour coupled with notions of a distinct consumer identity and the underclass has thus
given rise to an array of aesthetics which function as “overt symbols of deviance” (Hayward
and Yar, 2006), which have in turn prompted a new, or perhaps developed an existing
assemblage of social control practices, “from town centre pubs and night clubs refusing entry
to individuals wearing certain brands within their premises ... to the recent ‘zero tolerance’
policy imposed on ‘designer hoodies’ and baseball caps by major shopping centres such as
Bluewater in Kent and the Elephant and Castle in South London” (Hayward and Yar, 2006:
22-23). As reported by the Mirror:
“Yobs wearing baseball caps and hooded tops have been banned from one of Britain’s
smartest shopping centres. The crackdown on chav-style clothing which can obscure identity
is part of a zero tolerance policy towards intimidating conduct…Police are backing the
fightback against louts causing trouble at the huge Bluewater retail and leisure complex in
Kent” (Williams, 2005: Mirror 12 May).
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Roy Coleman (2005) found something very similar:
“[I]n cities in the counties of Essex, Hampshire, Cornwall and Devon, police and private
security enforce a policy, soon to be tried nationwide, to ban young people wearing hooded
tops, baseball caps and hats of various descriptions…In Liverpool an initiative of this kind is
called ‘Hats off to beat crime’ because ‘there are connotations when someone is wearing a
hood over their head or has a baseball cap on…As a media-driven symbol and proof of anti-
social behaviour, headgear worn by young people has become problematic in the theatricality
of the surveillance landscape as it aids the disguise of bodily identity” (Coleman, 2005: 139).
However, some of the commodities that have come to characterise the new underclass have
been on the surveillance agenda before such wide recognition was afforded to the chav. In
2003, an article entitled Yobs give Burberry a bad name (Cramb, 2003: Daily Telegraph 11
Nov) details a now-familiar set of exclusions where those wearing a Burberry-style check
were disallowed entry to town and city centre bars and pubs due to perceived links with
violence and disorder. The distinctive check was reported to have been “adopted in the city
by soccer “casuals” – football hooligans in expensive clothes” (Cramb, 2003: Daily Telegraph
11 Nov)11. However, as I show in chapter 6, these exclusions in the night-time economy have
become ever more predicated around the protection of consumers and capital, rather than
concerns about crime and disorder. But as society is provided with mediated imagery,
discourses, and representations of troublesome youth, they are increasingly used in the
identification of crime and deviance. Being able to identify symbols of deviance makes it
easier to exclude those who do not belong because they are deemed threatening, criminal, or
simply defined as the ‘wrong consumer’. As Hayward and Yar (2006: 24) neatly put it:
“Thus we see that the ‘chav’ phenomenon partakes of a social process in which consumption,
identity, marginality and social control converge; consumption practices now serve as the
locus around which exclusion is configured and the excluded are classified, identified and
subjected to (increasingly intense) regimes of management” (Hayward and Yar, 2006: 24).
3.4 Conclusion
At the current juncture, young people are given a lot of attention in the political and media
sphere. If we were to believe some of the media reports, the current British situation has a
very bleak outlook. As some accounts go:
11 In another article the Burberry-style check is described as being “tarnished by ‘chavs’” (Hall, 2004: Daily Telegraph 28 Nov)
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“Our entire social existence is being threatened by a generation of feral youngsters who are
not merely immoral – they are amoral. You can’t reason with such individuals. That is why
we fear them so much – we don’t know what they are capable of. Look into their eyes and
you see something far more terrifying than anger, hatred or evil. You see nothing ... They
have a complete inability to sympathise or empathise with anyone else. They have nothing to
look forward to or aspire to … From Newcastle teenage ASBO neighbour-from-hell Kerry
McLaughlin … to the youngsters who fatally slashed Damilola Taylor with a broken bottle on
a Peckham council estate, these are the children with no souls” (Davies, 2005: Mirror 03 Jun,
emphasis added).
But despite the continued occurrence of violent crime by the young, these are not really new
concerns. As I have already suggested, Geoff Pearson has shown in his seminal text
Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears (1983) that young people have committed violent
crimes throughout modern history, and censure, mostly in the form of moral panics, has been
a frequent feature of the social consciousness since the 1960s. Youth, violence and their
representation by the media and state are thus wholly unremarkable cultural processes.
However, some of the ways in which young people are constructed as troublesome have
changed, made contemporaneous through newer vernaculars and frameworks of
understanding. Society now has ‘new’ folk devils which have come to emblematize
contemporary social problems in Britain – something of which the term yob culture attests.
In this way, the figure of the yob as a contemporary pariah is a continuation of the hooligan in
the social consciousness. Many representational features are similar: both the hooligan and
yob are disorderly, violent, and working-class, and both are represented through a perceived
decline in social morality, a sense that they are ‘new’ problems threatening the moral fabric of
a nation once strong and just in some ‘golden age’ of morality and citizenship (Pearson,
1983). But, conversely, there are also ‘new’ social problems that have become articulated
through newer representations of troublesome youth (Vanderbeck, 2003). As Linda
McDowell argues, the yob has come to symbolise the problem of the Labour-driven idiom
anti-social behaviour. Society thus has new languages and new representations through
which to articulate troublesome youth, and new ways of understanding them in relation to
contemporary social problems.
Whilst the fear-inducing sensational reporting is certainly common in the red-top and right-
wing media, it is not wholly reflective of all popular understanding of youth in late-
capitalism. Indeed, some of the more liberal media omit the defamatory rhetoric towards
youth so prevalent in other newspapers, instead seeking to outline some of the reasons for
contemporary youth culture and its appropriation of public space. For example, the article
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Where the street is a playground for bored youngsters (Chrisafis, 2002: Guardian 09 Dec)
tells of Haslingden, Lancashire, young people who hang around on the street, and the
implications of imposing curfews:
“Haslingden is a beautiful town, but there’s nothing to do there if you’re 12 ... So teenagers go
out into the street at night and talk. They start aged 11 and keep doing it until 18, mostly
congregating in groups of 20 or 30 in the market place, the park, the cemetery, the patch
behind the swimming baths, the car park behind the garage or outside the chip shop. Some
smoke, some drink beer. A few sniff solvents, some smoke joints – but for this they disappear
into smaller groups ... But Insp Cameron does not believe in punishing teenagers for being
bored ... “the police are good at short term, we just move the problem on, but we don’t solve
it. We have to think of the future. Quick-solve measurers like curfews may just be like sticky
plasters” ... The Haslingden teenagers turn ashen at the thought of staying in from dusk at
4:30pm in the winter. “They can stick that idea up their backsides”, said one. “I couldn’t live
like that. I couldn’t be stuck inside with my little sister all night. It would be like being
locked up.”” (ibid.).
However, whilst the issue of troublesome youth in public space in state, media and wider
social imaginaries is not wholly imbricated with a raft of disparaging language, prescriptions
for increasing punitive measures to alleviate problems, nor always articulated through current
semantics of deviance (i.e. the yob, chav, hooligan etc.) which emphasise the moral failings of
young people themselves, there does seem to be a common consensus that young people, and
especially working-class youth are out of control. Representations such as the yob and the
chav have come to define those unable to perform correctly in these neoliberal times,
categorising the working-class as incapable to properly produce, consume and behave. As
Fowler suggests, “categorisation is a discursive basis for practices of discrimination” (1991:
93). He continues: “But although it is the individual person who is at the sharp end of
discriminatory practices, ‘justification’ for such practices, where offered, is given not in terms
of the individual, but in terms of some assumed group to which the person allegedly belongs;
and a stereotype which the culture has conventionally assigned to the ‘group’ is applied
prejudicially to the individual” (ibid.). Therefore, in turn, categorisations and representations
circulate so as to justify increasing control apparatuses, such as the Asbo, which effectively
criminalise those who fall outside current legislative demarcations of crime.
Intrinsic to the reworking of these existing social concerns which dovetail with contemporary
representations of delinquency, are recent processes of economic restructuring and
developments in political governance. As David Harvey argues, neoliberalism has “become
hegemonic as a mode of discourse, and has pervasive effects on ways of thought and
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political-economic practices to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-
sense way we interpret, live in and understand the world” (Harvey, 2006: 145). In this way,
young people, as they mature into full social members, have to fit into the ongoing results of
wider economic shifts – i.e. gain relevant employment and consume at all costs – otherwise
they become constructed as problematic, and castigated as a result. The implication here is
that new gender and class roles are being forged as neoliberalization helps transform not only
economic practices but also cultural networks of normativity. As McDowell observes, the
“shift in Great Britain and the USA, for example, towards a “workfare” model of welfare
provision, in which both men and women are expected to work for wages, supported by what
are euphemistically termed work / life balance policies and new forms of childcare support,
provides a clear example of the new assumptions about gendered responsibilities ... as well as
transforming class divisions” (McDowell, 2008: 23). Thus, as a consumption-oriented middle
class continues to dominate the driving of the economy (and vice versa), those lower down
the social ladder carry on struggling to consume in ways deemed relevant and appropriate,
and in turn this becomes the basis for criminalization. In short, ongoing neoliberal processes
persist in the emphasis of consumption as a means to citizenship, and failure to properly do so
results in the demarcation of deviance. As Imrie et al observed in the 1990s:
“For successive Conservative governments in the UK ... their vision of citizenship is one of
the ‘active consumer’, a purposeful individual taking responsibility for their own lives,
providing for themselves, and exercising choice (their ‘citizenship’) through their purchasing
power. This, though, is a vision of citizenship which fails to recognise the systemic social
inequalities in society, or how the socio-cultural and institutional fabric of society serves to
exclude or to mark particular people out as ‘the other’” (Imrie et al, 1996: 1258).
Such a statement could not be more relevant than now, when the ubiquity of the chav
phenomenon in public discourse as a threatening underclass group of flawed consumers
represents the foundations for new class antagonisms and class-based spatial separation.
73
Chapter 4
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Newcastle and the Night-Time Economy
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I begin to examine the Newcastle city-region from various aspects, outlining
the geographical context of the research. In section 4.2 I start with a brief examination of
Newcastle’s economic history, illustrating how the city and surrounding region once heavily
relied on manufacturing, coal mining and other heavy engineering industries. I explore how
shipbuilding was once an integral part of Newcastle’s economy, and how the Tyne River
played a pivotal logistical role in the early wealth of the area. I then trace the contours of
deindustrialization, illustrating how the eventual collapse of numerous industries in the late
1980s and 1990s severely affected the region’s socio-economic prospects. Subsequently I
look at the way in which Newcastle’s economy has been transformed following
deindustrialization. Newcastle, like many other British cities has since come to embrace a
more entrepreneurial ethic in its economic development practices, and is now characterised by
service-sector, cultural, and post-manufacturing industries.
Physical redevelopments commensurate with economic restructuring have also played a large
part in Newcastle’s transformation into a post-industrial city, with numerous developments
changing the look and feel of various localities. By examining the latest policy documents in
the form of Newcastle City Council’s Going for Growth (1999) and Newcastle in 2021: A
Regeneration Strategy for Newcastle (2006), I argue that recent political-economic agendas in
Newcastle reflect the wider transformations of British urban governance, which, through
entrepreneurialism, aim to attract investment, capital, tourists, and labour through the re-
branding and revitalisation of the city.
Because proliferating night-time economies also play a large part in this recent urban
revitalisation, I then explore the ways in which night-time economies are produced, regulated,
and consumed in the post-industrial era. Focussing particularly on the work done by Paul
Chatterton and Robert Hollands (Chatterton and Hollands, 2002, 2003; Hollands and
Chatterton, 2003 for example), I examine how nightlife is increasingly produced by large-
scale corporate and branded chains as they continue to gain larger segments of night-time
markets, and how night-time economies are regulated by private security and
contemporaneous socio-cultural practices. Access restrictions based on venue admittance
policies, dress codes, corporeality and behaviour help contribute to a fragmented and
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segregated night-time leisure landscape on which a raft of class-oriented normative
assumptions are imposed and enacted by operators and regulators.
In section 4.4 I conclude this chapter with a brief summary, before documenting some initial
characteristics of contemporary urban nightscapes in Newcastle, showing how the night-time
economy is now used as a central component in urban image-building and the attraction of
tourists, but again, how Newcastle’s nightlife may be becoming dominated by large corporate
firms leaving its future uncertain in terms of composition and access.
4.2 Economic Transitions and Urban Transformations
Newcastle’s Industrial Era
The Newcastle city-region was once famed for its resilient industrial prowess. Similar to
other northern British cities such as Glasgow, manufacturing and heavy engineering were
central to the city’s early wealth. Industrialists such as William Armstrong, Richard
Grainger, John Dobson, Charles Palmer, and the Stephenson’s all helped shape both the city’s
economic and physical landscapes. Whilst the Stephenson’s were developing locomotive
engines in the nineteenth century, Dobson and Grainger were rebuilding the city centre, with
many of the city’s present famed and prized locations – such as Grey Street, Grainger Market
and the Theatre Royal – dating from this period (Newcastle City Council, 2004).
Shipbuilding in particular developed into one of the Newcastle-region’s early economic
strengths. The Tyne’s riverbanks were once home to numerous shipyards, from Walker to
Wallsend and North Shields on the north bank, and Jarrow in particular, on the south bank.
The Swan Hunter shipyard is probably the region’s most renowned, producing and launching
ships such as the Mauretania and the Carpathia, used to rescue survivors of the Titanic, the
Dominion Monarch – the largest diesel driven ship in the world when finished in 1939 – and
numerous cargo liners, ferries, icebreakers, frigates, destroyers, supertankers and submarines
over the years (Deighan, 2008: Evening Chronicle, 21 July). Shipbuilding on the Tyne was
so prolific that by the first decade of the 20th century, the total of Tyne shipbuilding amounted
to one quarter of global shipbuilding output (Tomaney et al, 1999).
Coal mining was also an intrinsic feature of the region’s economic base (see Elliott, 1968),
and is argued to be the foundation of the unique Geordie identity of the north-east of England
(see Colls and Lancaster, 1992). The River Tyne again found itself central to the region’s
economy, used in the transport and export of coal mined from the region, with up to 20
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million locally excavated tonnes being exported before the First World War (Elliot, 1968;
also see Nayak, 2003a, 2003c). However, the last remaining pit in Ellington shut down in
1994, and in the previous year, the Swan Hunter shipyard was temporarily closed, signalling
the very end of Newcastle’s industrial success.
Deindustrialisation / Reindustrialisation
These are but two examples of a local economy failing to cope with changing national
economic policy in an increasingly fragmented and competitive global economic culture.
Where in the early 1960s the region employed double the proportion of employees in coal
mining, ship-building and heavy engineering than anywhere else in England, in the 1970s and
1980s, 38% of jobs in the manufacturing sector were lost as deindustrialisation swept away
the region’s traditional economic landscape (Nayak, 2003c). This deindustrialization,
however, was also tied to a “ruthless New Right agenda to shut down pits, quash the old
Labourite NUM [National Union of Miners] and invest in business rather than
manufacturing” (Nayak, 2006: 816). Indeed, as processes of neoliberalization in the 1980s
progressed, the region would also become one of the first Enterprise Zones under Thatcher’s
Conservative Government.
Recognizing the problems of the Keynesian state and mode of regulation, Conservative
politician Sir Geoffrey Howe became one of the first to support the implementation of the
Enterprise Zones initiative, arguing that “the economic difficulties of Britain stemmed from
an over-reliance upon state intervention, which in many ways thwarted the developments it
sought to encourage” (Talbot, 1988: 508). Accordingly, Howe supported the execution of
Enterprise Zones to achieve four objectives: “the alleviation of economic decline and
environmental decay in inner areas, by removing the dead hand of the state which had caused
much of the blight”; “the removal of excessive bureaucracy and taxation, thus freeing private
sector initiative and enterprise”; “demonstrating a model of economic growth suitable for
more widespread application”; and “to provide a practical refutation of the belief that only
large scale state intervention can restore economic prosperity to the inner cities and to the
nation” (ibid.).
Thus, the Tyneside Enterprise Zone – established as one of eleven in the first round in 1981 –
was to facilitate economic restructuring through now-familiar neoliberal practices. A number
of incentives were drawn up to attract new businesses, including “local authority rate
exemption, 100% capital allowances for expenditure on industrial and commercial buildings,
exemption from Development Land Tax, exemption from Industrial Training Board levies,
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simplified and speedier planning regime, reductions in statistical requirements, inward
processing relief on customs facilities, and exemption from Industrial Development
Certificates” (from Talbot, 1988: 508). As Newcastle’s deindustrialization was met with
remediation through the Enterprise Zone package, reindustrialization took form through
service-sector and post-manufacturing economies, with a number of international businesses
and regional SMEs seeking to take advantage of the abundance of cheap skilled and semi-
skilled labour that remained in the wake of local manufacturing shutdown and flight12. As
Anoop Nayak states, “German multinational corporations such as Siemens in North Tyneside
and Far East Asian companies such as Fujitsu near Darlington, Nissan in Washington and
Samsung in Cleveland have come to represent a new moment in the region’s shift to a
‘branch-plant’ economy” (Nayak, 2003c).
However, mounting fiscal maladies and increasing competition forced yet more production
relocation and employment turbulence. Newcastle’s recent economic transitions have
become characterised by the footloose nature of these multinationals, as opposed to the
embedded-ness and fixed natures of the factories, shipyards and collieries that were once
central facets of the working-class communities of the region (Nayak, 2003c). As a result,
where industrialism provided stable growth and assured workers employment – albeit to a
point – the ephemeral disposition and fluidity of recent neoliberal economic movements
continue to negatively affect the employment opportunities of the region’s workers. For
example, both Siemens and Fujitsu left Tyneside in the late 1990s, leading to nearly 2000 job
losses (ibid.; also see Pike, 1999).
Developing Newcastle’s Entrepreneurial Urbanism: Recent Enterprise / Governance
In recent years, local municipal powers have sought to counter relative socio-economic
deprivation through the implementation of a number of policies. Going For Growth
(Newcastle City Council, 1999), written by then Labour-controlled Newcastle City Council
(NCC), sought to establish a long-term (20 year) holistic plan for the economic, social and
spatial development of Newcastle. The strategy linked “economic development, urban
renaissance and the retention and growth of population within the city to the future of
deprived and stigmatised neighbourhoods characterised by population loss and low housing
demand” (Cameron, 2003: 2369). What was distinctive about this proposal, as opposed to
previous development strategies, was the city-wide approach rather than the smaller-scale
12 However, as Talbot suggests in his study of the effectiveness of the Tyneside Enterprise Zone, local firms were “attracted to
the zone primarily because of the attractiveness of sites and premises, rather than because of the attractiveness of the zone
incentives” (Talbot, 1988: 512).
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neighbourhood approach to regeneration. However, the proposed comprehensive
redevelopment of some of the city’s residential areas, particularly those in the West end of
Newcastle’s city centre long associated with poverty and crime, was met with considerable
protest. Concerns were raised as some residents interpreted the plans as clearing already
socially cohesive working-class communities in favour of ‘yuppie villages’. The result was a
march on the Newcastle Civic Centre, and the eventual withdrawal of Lord Richard Rogers,
chair of the Urban Task Force – appointed as consultant on the master planning-process –
from involvement in further planning stages (Cameron, 2003).
Although Going For Growth was abandoned with the inauguration of the Liberal Democrat
council administration a few years later, its replacement Newcastle in 2021: A Regeneration
Strategy for Newcastle (Newcastle City Council, 2006) followed a similar holistic path for the
city’s renewal and developed further the central features of the Going For Growth strategy.
Newcastle in 2021 recognises the unstable and highly competitive nature of the late-modern
global economy, and, through specific regeneration strategies and public-private partnerships
which characterise entrepreneurial urbanism, seeks to position Newcastle within it so as to
assure long-term economic development for the city-region:
“Raising the competitiveness of cities – not just in narrow economic terms but also in quality
of life, social cohesion and diversity – is the key to prosperity in a global economy. Faced
with the emerging economies in an enlarged Europe and beyond, the UK can no longer
compete effectively in many low-cost, lower-skilled industries. In future, the most successful
European cities will be those that are dominated by knowledge industries, are home to a
diverse population, and offer a high quality of life” (Newcastle City Council, 2006: 13).
Newcastle in 2021 thus sets out a number of socio-economic development and regeneration
strategies to fulfil this agenda. These include strengthening the economy, promoting safe,
inclusive and cohesive communities, building the ‘right’ types of houses, improving transport,
improving education and skills, promoting healthy living and reducing socio-cultural
inequalities. Building upon the latest findings from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Territorial Review of Newcastle in the North East, and
TBR Economics (a Newcastle-based firm) Local Economic Analysis Profile of Newcastle,
Newcastle in 2021’s most important target, however, seems to be the economy. Indeed, NCC
stipulate that a “strong economy that creates wealth and attracts investment and talent, as well
as providing employment opportunities to suit a wide range of skills and interests, is the basis
for regeneration in Newcastle” (p. 27, emphasis added). Accordingly, NCC acts as both a
mediator and collaborator in a local / regional entrepreneurial political economy, promoting
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specific industries and locations befitting the city’s contemporary neoliberal fiscal schema.
Newcastle now trades, or at least seeks to trade, in knowledge-based and cultural
commodities, and in the experience of being in the post-industrial north-east – now a city of
science, arts and culture, retail, business services, and nightlife.
In outlining the projects aimed to develop Newcastle’s economy, Newcastle in 2021 heavily
emphasises the role of science and technology-based industries. According to the proposals,
higher education institutions have a great deal of potential in converting scientific research
and design processes into “commercially relevant products and practices” (p. 35). The main
development is the Science City project, partnered by Newcastle University, Newcastle City
Council and One North east13, and is described as a “driver for the regeneration of Newcastle”
(www.newcastlesciencecity.com). However, the planning process of this particular
development has come under increasing attack more recently, with one of the leading
regeneration experts in science and technology industries resigning from his post in the
project. Professor Henry Etzkowitz of Newcastle University worked to bring ideas on how to
“create a science-based workforce and turn the city into a world leader”, emphasising job
creation in science-based commerce (Pearson, 2009: Newcastle Journal, 29 Sep). His
standing down was prompted by superiors in the partnership who allocated funds to physical
infrastructure rather than increasing employment opportunities in a “build it and they will
come” policy, despite not attracting any major research companies to date (ibid.). Whether
the Science City Project will become a success, then, is open to debate.
Also stipulated in Newcastle in 2021 is the potential of Northumbria University as a
successful design institution. The plan is for it to be placed in a ‘design corridor’ which will
provide “a spatial focus for the development of design-oriented business clusters in the urban
core” (Newcastle City Council, 2006: 36). Northumbria University recently completed their
latest built development, opening their new design campus, accessible by a purpose-built
footbridge, to the east of the city centre opposite the Manors Metro station. And Newcastle
University are also in the process of adding to their built form and redeveloping much of their
existing campus.
In addition to science and technology oriented economies, Newcastle in 2021 also seeks to
build upon the strengths of the existing cultural and leisure-based economies of which
Newcastle is famed:
13 One North East is a Regional Development Agency (RDA) comprised of representatives from local authorities, trade unions,
the voluntary sector and the private sector, and aims to encourage entrepreneurs, innovation and business growth in the
Newcastle city-region.
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“NewcastleGateshead has built an international reputation for the visionary use of culture as a
catalyst for change, which has strengthened the city’s already distinctive identity. Seven
Stories (The Centre for the Children’s Book), the new Dance City and regeneration of
Grainger Town have transformed the city’s landscape, complementing the ambition of
Gateshead delivered through such iconic developments at the Sage Gateshead, the Gateshead
Millennium Bridge and BALTIC” (Newcastle City Council, 2006: 37-38).
This latest strategy also seeks to develop the retail potential of Newcastle as a regional
shopping destination. Of particular importance in recent years is the development of the
massive Eldon Square shopping centre (see www.eldon-square.co.uk/transforming_eldon) but
also the developments soon to take place adjacent to East Pilgrim Street. Developments such
as the recently completed Gate complex have also served to attract the leisured consumer,
offering a cinema, casino and a multitude of restaurants and bars. Other recently proposed
and underway developments include rebuilding the City Library, Blandford Square, which
houses the Discovery Museum, and the Stephenson Quarter. As stipulated by NCC:
“[The Stephenson Quarter] of some 3.5ha is located directly behind Central Station. It is rich
in heritage associated with the railway companies and engineers Stephenson and Hawthorn. It
contains a number of listed buildings including 20 South Street, a grade II listed structure that
contains the former drawing offices of Robert Stephenson. However much of the area is in a
disused and dilapidated condition. The developers Silverlink plc acquired the site in 2005 and
are now working closely with the City Council to produce a masterplan leading to the mixed
use redevelopment and regeneration of the area that focuses on the retention and
refurbishment of all the listed buildings in the area. It represents one of the largest proposed
physical redevelopment projects in the City Centre with a development programme likely to
commence in 2010 and finish towards 2015” (www.newcastle.gov.uk/core.nsf/a/cc#bs).
Other developments represent further public-private efforts to regenerate and revitalise
economic activity in the region. These include, Trinity Gardens, a recently completed
development adjacent to the Quayside that has provided office space alongside 58 apartments,
a multi-storey car park, a hotel extension and ground floor retail services and restaurants. The
Grainger Town Project, located in the very heart of Newcastle city centre, also aimed to
attract investment through the public-private partnership during its course:
“Grainger Town is the historic heart of Newcastle upon Tyne, based around classical streets
built by Richard Grainger in the 1830s and 1840s. 40% of buildings in the area are listed as
being of historical and architectural importance. In the 1980s and early 1990s, this once
prosperous area of the city was overtaken by new centres of retail and commercial activity
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which eroded the economic base and left properties to fall into disrepair. Around one million
square feet of floorspace was unoccupied and the area's residential population was falling.
The Grainger Town Project was established in 1997 in partnership with Newcastle City
Council, English Partnership and English Heritage with the aim of reversing this trend. A
£120 million regeneration programme began and continued until the end of March 2003. It
was anticipated that £40 million of public sector investment would be bolstered by a further
£120 million from the private sector, but the latter reached £160 million! Since the start of the
project, great strides were made in regenerating the area, improving the environment and
revitalising business, social and cultural life. On 31st March 2003, the Project closed down,
having achieved and exceeded its objectives”
(www.newcastle.gov.uk/core.nsf/a/cc?opendocument#grtown).
Concomitant with science and technology based industries, and leisure / retail developments,
tourism is also seen as a highly lucrative dimension of Newcastle’s new economy, again
driven by local / regional public-private governance:
“Together with the thriving night-time economy, Newcastle’s cultural renaissance has formed
the basis of a rapidly growing tourism industry. In 2004, tourism expenditure in
NewcastleGateshead was worth over £425m, a five per cent growth on the previous year –
making it one of the city’s fastest-growing industries – and accounted for over 7,750 jobs.
Continuing development – of new hotels and other amenities and of international connections
through Newcastle airport – will strengthen Newcastle’s offer” (Newcastle City Council,
2006: 38).
Recent developments that constitute the regeneration of the Newcastle city-region, then,
exemplify contemporary practices of post-industrial urban entrepreneurialism. Like other
British cities, deindustrialisation severely affected the area, contributing to massive
unemployment levels and related socio-economic deprivation. Instigated at first by the
Enterprise Zones scheme, the management of Newcastle subsequently shifted from urban
government to governance, where public-private partnerships practice in myriad ways to
counter unemployment through the invitation of business, to attract tourists through the
provision and development of leisure and retail-based infrastructure, and to combat social
deprivation, population loss and low housing demand through housing and community
developments. However, despite efforts, the bricks and mortar approach to economic
development does not guarantee an influx of business, exemplified by the Science City
Project. Also, the housing developments proposed by then Labour-Controlled Newcastle City
Council in Going for Growth (1999) in some ways reflected the kind of gentrification
processes examined by Neil Smith in New York City where working-class neighbourhoods
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were planned to be rejuvenated to attract more middle-class residents (1992, 1996a, 1996b).
Whilst these proposals in Newcastle may not have exactly been reflective of a revanchist
urbanism, they nonetheless raise some concerns about the focus for regeneration policies in
Newcastle and how exactly they will meet their objectives in securing a more successful
future for the city’s residents.
For the purposes of this study, Newcastle ultimately continues to be constructed as a cultural,
entertainment and leisure hub. The night-time economy in particular, plays a fundamental
role in attracting people to the city centre, and its success has led to accolades describing
Newcastle as a ‘Party City’ or ‘Party Town’, with the city now renowned, both nationally and
internationally, for its nightlife. The next section begins to explore the role of the night-time
economy in the post-industrial city more generally, then turning to a brief examination of
Newcastle’s night-time economy in the concluding section.
4.3 Constructing Contemporary Nightscapes
“Social and economic restructuring over the last three decades has resulted in the development
of a new urban ‘brand’ which has reshaped many parts of city landscapes into corporate
entertainment and leisure hubs ... While urban areas have always been sites of pleasure-
seeking, a central focus of recent rebranding has been the promotion of the night-time
economy, much of which is characterised by the ritual descent of young adults into city-centre
bars, pubs and clubs, especially during the weekends” (Chatterton and Hollands, 2003: 2).
Alongside recent developments in science and technology, culture, retail, and other service
sector industries, Newcastle – like other cities across the UK – has also experienced a
burgeoning of nightlife activity14. This development is also entangled with the neoliberal /
entrepreneurial agenda. As cities continue to diversify in their commitment to capital, many
urban administrations now position the night-time economy as an accepted form of urban
renewal strategy, partly as a counterbalance to the loss of a manufacturing base. As such it
has become a “central rather than add-on part of urban economic growth and employment”,
and proportionate obligations to urban image-building and identity construction (Chatterton
and Hollands, 2003: 9). As Dick Hobbs et al state:
14 Although the night-time economy encompasses a multitude of premise types – including restaurants and cafes – bars, pubs and
nightclubs (i.e. licensed premises whose sales are typically comprised of alcoholic drinks and what have become known as
vertical drinking establishments) are the focuses here.
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“The construction of centres of leisure consumption to physically replace nineteenth-century
centres of production and their commercial and bureaucratic infrastructures, is a marked
characteristic of late twentieth century British cities ... The velocity of the capital hitting these
old industrial and commercial centres has been quite remarkable, and its trajectory ricochets
around cities built on the rhythms of industrial production as the configuration of the night-
time economy continues to evolve” (Hobbs et al, 2000: 704).
This burgeoning can also be attributed to socio-cultural transformations that have occurred
alongside economic developments. For example, the augmentation of service-sector
industries in the north-east has given rise to entirely new gender and class roles in the labour
market. Once characterised by a male dominated labour force, Newcastle’s economy now
employs nearly as many women as men, and its dominant service-sector, like other UK urban
parallels, value skills such as keyboard proficiency and communication expertise rather than
the traditional masculine qualities associated with manual labour and heavy industry –
qualities once predominant in Newcastle’s male-oriented labour force. Where identities were
once predominantly forged through the industrial production process, they have been
reworked as neoliberalization becomes ever more entrenched in the daily urban fabric
(Nayak, 2003a). Certain groups defined in specific terms of class, race, and gender have
found ways of expressing their social identities outside of production. As a massive
constituent of postmodern hyper-consumerism, nightlife has become an ever more significant
proxy through which to articulate these group memberships and belongings (Hollands, 1995).
For example, as Anoop Nayak (2003a) suggests, many young white working-class men in
Newcastle ritually participate in nightlife and circuit-drinking to enunciate their locally-
specific working-class masculinities once forged through older industrial labour relations.
Other recent expansions in the provision of nightlife can be attributed to structural changes in
the leisure industry. These, coupled with the relaxation of licensing laws have contributed to
a massive rise in licensed premises in city and town centres across the UK. At the same time
(before the most recent economic downturn), the latest Labour government, through an
increase in public spending, had created almost full national employment (compared to
previous years) and thus a population with a higher disposable income, also seen as a driver
of the burgeoning night-time economy (Roberts, 2006)15. Writing several years ago, Dick
Hobbs et al reveal that:
15 Although, as some of the interviewees in this study suggested, the recent global economic downturn has severely affected the
profitability of night-time economies.
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“There are 78,000 pubs and bars in the UK, and in 1997 there were 185 million admissions to
nightclub premises, with consumers spending over two billion pounds in those premises. In
1998 the industry reported 199 million nightclub admissions. This was up from 142 million in
1993, and it is predicted that by 2002 there will be 238 million admissions, generating a
predicted turnover of 2.5 billion pounds” (Hobbs et al, 2000: 704).
However, this increase has halted recently. The economic downturn in the UK in the past two
to three years has reversed previous growths as consumers cut their spending in the leisure
sectors. In July 2009 the British Beer and Pub Association reported that pub closures rose to
52 a week, totalling 2377 pub closures in the 12 months previous to that, equating to £254
million government losses in tax. However, these particular closures are concentrated mainly
in the community pub sector, whilst the large branded pubs and café style bars were actually
increasing in numbers at the rate of 2 per week
(www.beerandpub.com/newsList_detail.aspx?newsId=289).
In March 2009 it was reported that nightclubs were also suffering due to the recent economic
downturn. The chief executive of Luminar Leisure, Britain’s biggest nightclub operator, was
quoted in the Times newspaper saying that 20 to 30 clubs had recently closed, with perhaps
fifty percent more nightclubs potentially going out of business in the next 12 to 18 months.
According to market research group CGA Strategy, of the 2,700 nightclubs in Britain, recent
stagnation could leave only 2,200 open in 2013 (Walsh, 2009: The Times, March 18).
Producing Night-Time Economies
As Hollands and Chatterton (2003) argue, the production of nightlife in UK cities seems to be
increasingly dominated by large national and multinational corporate firms who often roll out
brands to attract potential consumers. Having become a significant characteristic of
contemporary nightlife, it is not just products such as beer that are now branded. Instead,
firms are able to represent nightlife spaces and with it promote wider ‘lifestyle experiences’
through the marketing of images pertaining to different social groups, particularly those with
higher disposable incomes. In Chatterton and Holland’s words:
“While branding involves market differentiation based around certain groupings and may even
involve attempts to brand versions of the ‘traditional pub’ (Scottish & Newcastle’s John
Barras brand and J D Wetherspoon’s ‘just a pub’ philosophy are two examples here), one
clear trend is towards branding upmarket premises, targeting ‘cash rich’ and high disposable
income groups” (Hollands and Chatterton, 2003: 376).
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One of the reasons for this is that premium markets, though smaller, are potentially more
lucrative in terms of profit margins. This is argued to be the result of an increase in middle-
class city dwellers fuelling demand for heavily styled bars and clubs offering premium, more
expensive products and services in order “to re-distinguish themselves from the mass nightlife
market” (Hollands and Chatterton, 2003: 376). Other developments also appear progressive,
“especially in terms of opening the nightlife sector up to different social groups (especially
young women), as well as attempts to ‘design out’ problems of excessive drinking and
violence through the use of mixing food with alcohol, more seated areas and high quality
interiors” (Hollands and Chatterton, 2003: 376).
However, this increased stylisation has produced “a displacement of lower-order activities
and working-class communities by high-order activities aimed as cash-rich groups”
(Chatterton and Hollands, 2003: 10), with “branded and stylised environments [representing]
attempts by national and multinational capital interests to maximise profits for shareholders
by targeting the most lucrative groups of young consumers” (ibid. p. 102-103).
Simultaneously, other groups of young people, not seen as lucrative enough consumers, are
becoming increasingly excluded from these leisure spaces, marginalised to peripheral
community pubs, social clubs and estates (Chatterton and Hollands, 2002, 2003). The
dominance of mainstream nightlife spaces that characterise urban nightscapes thus reflects
contemporary processes of gentrification through the displacement of lower-order nightlife
spaces and their users. As Hollands and Chatterton argue:
“Gentrified nightlife environments, then, consciously sanitize and exclude the poor and
disenfranchised ... They not only reaffirm existing structures in the labour and educational
markets ... but also hide the ‘dirty’ back regions of entertainment production by constructing
the illusion of a wealthy urban oasis – which in terms of nightlife are reinforced through
subtle demarcations based around dress and style codes, interior design, drink prices and entry
requirements’ (Hollands and Chatterton, 2003: 369-370).
It therefore seems that the production of contemporary night-time economies reflects the
broader processes of post-industrial urban change, where particular spaces become
appropriated by the cash-rich and others are marginalised. However, as Hollands and
Chatterton note, within nightlife circles there is no real definitive correspondence between
class, space and consumption, but, there are general trends where the “upper classes,
celebrities and their wannabes continue to colonize the most exclusive and expensive nightlife
destinations” (2003: 368). Whilst the more cash-rich are helping to drive this process of
fragmentation, other less affluent social groups are increasingly denied access to the more
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fashionable nightlife locations. As Hollands and Chatterton suggest, the “unemployed, low
income and welfare dependent groups literally have no space here and instead are objects of
suspicion and surveillance” (Hollands and Chatterton, 2003: 369).
Contemporary night-time economies are thus hierarchical in their fragmentation, loosely
corresponding to the profitability of urban nightlife spaces16. The most profitable are the
branded, trendy, stylised, mainstream clubs and bars which cater for the mid-upper end of the
market and which seem to increasingly dominate current urban nightscapes. Below are
venues with a more ‘niche’ market – i.e. clubs and bars which provide specific types of music
or scenes that differ from the mainstream, including those under the gay and lesbian banner
(although these themselves are argued to be marginalised). And at the very bottom of the
hierarchy are community pubs, social clubs, bars and nightclubs that provide cheaper
products and services for the more underprivileged consumer. Chatterton and Hollands
(2002, 2003; and Hollands and Chatterton, 2003) refer to these as mainstream, alternative,
and residual nightlife spaces respectively. It is the first of these with which this study is most
concerned (although the dichotomy of gentrified / residual nightlife is also of paramount
importance – see Chapters 6 and 7). As I argue in Chapters 6 and 7, the dominance of
mainstream nightlife spaces necessitates a number of exclusionary mechanisms which serve
to exacerbate the fragmentation and segregation of contemporary urban nightscapes.
Regulating Night-Time Economies
Various extant processes of nightlife regulation also reflect and reinforce the ongoing
fragmentation of contemporary nightlife. Regulation takes place through various forms,
beginning with the state and its power to control the actions of the corporations / businesses
that produce and regulate individual venues. As I illustrated in the previous chapter though,
strict licensing laws have become relaxed more recently, with current leisure nightscapes
being marked by a distinct de-regulation vis-à-vis the state (Chatterton and Hollands, 2003).
Initial regulatory practices were traditionally orchestrated so as to control alcohol
consumption by the working classes – particularly working-class young men – as they were
seen as the predominant source of incivility and social decay, but also so as not to disrupt the
function of the working week (Jayne et al, 2006).
16 This is not to say that night-time economies have not always been so, but rather, that the methods through which this hierarchy
has developed have changed according to social / cultural / economic developments within post-industrial change.
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At the current juncture, this de-regulation has transpired as a result of a reversal of previous
understandings of alcohol-related crime and their causes. The temporally-fixed nature of
alcohol-related crime i.e. immediately after closing time, prompted licensing changes that
would allow a more staggered release of consumers after closing and thus potentially
avoiding huge numbers of people onto the streets who would then cause problems for the
police, the surrounding locales and themselves (Tierney, 2006). In giving premises increasing
trading options in terms of opening hours, the licensing reform was also speculated to enable
increased profit. However, its effects, in terms of alcohol-related crime and profit
maximisation seem to be negligible. Despite an increase in choice for the consumer in how
and when they want to drink, a common consensus is that people have only got a certain
amount of money to spend, having no significant impact in profit margins. Alcohol-related
crime has also not significantly altered after the reform. Although research findings have
revealed some changes, violence, sexual assaults and criminal damage for example remain
significant problems of contemporary night-time economies (Newton et al, 2008; Hobbs et al,
2005).
As the proliferation of nightlife continues apace, but with less municipal control, the
regulation of nightlife increasingly takes place at the corporate level, where venues
themselves control consumer access and some incidences of violence (especially if it occurs
in the venue, but also sometimes, in the immediate vicinity). Here, door staff / security or
who are more commonly referred to as ‘bouncers’ are instrumental in the regulation of
admittance. Bouncers act as judges, choosing appropriate clientele, but also act as mediators
of violence and confrontation and are able to eject anybody perceived to threaten the order of
the venue. The key in maximising profit is to guarantee a homogeny between consumers and
the projected image of the establishment. In this way, bouncers are crucial to the venue’s
turnover:
“In the absence of public police officers, bouncers take responsibility for incorporating night-
time visitors into the disciplines and protocols of the late-night leisure market. Within this
specific context of ‘policing beyond government’, bouncers are permitted wide discretion in
their task of imposing commercially, rather than legally or morally justifiable behavioural
codes ... Of the bouncer’s tasks, the vetting of potential customers at the door of the venue is
one of the most important, and only those synonymous with commercially defined imperatives
are judged suitable for access. In making such judgements bouncers become expert at reading
signs of trouble and, with both their own safety and the interests of ‘business’ in mind, are
willing to make decisions which can banish certain individuals to forever wander the night-
time streets as part of the legion of the banned” (Hobbs et al, 2002).
88
Chatterton and Hollands observations correspond in that the “basic job of door staff ...
remains deciding upon the suitability of customers in order to maintain order and the
commercial viability of licensed venues, using both violent and non-violent tactics ... They
are the definitive gatekeepers of the night-time economy, who ensure a connection between
the ambience and clientele” (Chatterton and Hollands, 2003: 57). However, “different types
of nightlife venues have their own set of entry requirements, expectations and subtle forms of
discrimination at the door based on age, appearance, social class, gender, ethnicity and
sexuality” (ibid.). In this way, the regulation of night-time economies from the street level
serves to reinforce the fragmentation and segregation of different nightlifes enacted through
their construction at the corporate level, where the sanitisation of markets through increased
stylisation, branding and upgrading are displacing other residual forms of night-time leisure.
Regulation of consumers through norms, habits, dress, language, style and demeanour by
bouncers appears “to favour the development of urban spaces aimed at the needs of the highly
mobile, cash-rich youth groups such as young professionals, tourists, service workers and
particular sections of the student, gay and female markets, while working against alternative /
oppositional and older, community-based forms of nightlife” (Chatterton and Hollands, 2003:
46). The regulation of nightlife from the street level, then, helps advance the inequitable
nature of the night-time economy as an entrenched feature of post-industrial urbanism.
4.4 Conclusion: Transforming Newcastle – ‘Party Town’
The case of Newcastle typifies the relatively recent urban transformations which I discussed
in chapter 2. Its urban governance has changed from managerialism to entrepreneurialism;
industrial manufacturing gave way to neoliberalized service-sector and post-manufacturing
economies; and the construction of new retail, leisure and consumption space – along with the
gentrification of outdated and dilapidated locales – represent the forging of a new local
identity used to attract capital (investment, business, tourism, labour) back to the city.
Whether or not recent efforts can be claimed as successes, and whilst on the whole
unemployment has undoubtedly fallen, Newcastle nonetheless seems to lag behind other
British cities. The 2001 census data shows that out of a population of nearly 260,000, nearly
9,000 (4.7%) of those remain unemployed, 50,000 have no car (45.2 %), and 28% of the
population live in housing provided by the local authority (O.N.S, 2001 taken from
www.newcastle.gov.uk)17. In the 2004 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD), Newcastle was
ranked 20th most deprived, dropping to 37th in 2007 (www.newcastle.gov.uk). This drop
could be suggestive of improving socio-economic prospects ongoing in the region post-
17 Statistics of unemployment and car ownership here refer to those of working age only.
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millennium, but it is important to note who actually gains and who loses out from specific
developments. As I illustrated in the last chapter, contemporary efforts to revitalise urban
space are often at the behest of market forces which significantly contribute to unequal
landscapes of exclusion through processes of gentrification and the privatisation of space (for
example Smith, 1996; Fyfe and Bannister, 1998). Whether or not this is the case in
Newcastle is subject to debate; however, as Peter Rogers has shown in his study of
skateboarding in Newcastle, there is a growing “gulf between commercial needs and those of
young people” (Rogers, 2006: 121). And as I illustrate in chapters 6 and 7, the proliferation
of nightlife and cultural industries as part of recent entrepreneurial agendas brings with it a
number of exclusionary practices common in contemporary post-industrial urban economies.
In recent years, the night-time economy has become an ever more important source of capital
for post-industrial cities. Whilst the economic rise of the night-time economy is apparent
nationwide, Newcastle stands out as a frequently cited example of this expansion. Its gradual
growth was accompanied by the construction of the ‘party town’ promotional imagery which
amplified its attraction. Policy, too, shapes the nature, and possible expansion of Newcastle’s
nightlife. One of the main aims of the current Liberal Democrat Council is to diversify the
night-time economy – described as the “envy of the rest of the country and a major tourist
attractor” (NCC, 2006: 119). In Newcastle in 2021 (2006) the city council declare that they
will “support this continued role, but also encourage new operators into the market, to make
the city centre an attractive place in the evening for families and others who, at present, don’t
think it’s for them” (NCC, 2006: 119).
In comparison with other UK cities, Newcastle does seem to have a good mix of nightlife
venues catering for different tastes and preferences along various lines, and has a thriving gay
and lesbian nightlife scene. And yet, whilst Newcastle’s nightlife “is a patchwork of activity
reflecting different periods in its economic, social and cultural history ... traditional Geordie
drinking culture tries to find a place amongst the new, glitzy world of corporate theme, style
and chain bars ... the traditional ‘boozer’, community and alternative pubs continue to be
squeezed to the urban fringes” (Chatterton et al, n.d.: 4). And whilst Newcastle seems to
comprise a large proportion of local and regional nightlife operators compared to other UK
parallels – as suggested by the operator of a local firm in the interviews – it may be the case
that in the future, large corporations gaining power in night-time economies continue to take-
over and dominate Newcastle’s contemporary nightscapes. As Chatterton et al (n.d.: 4)
suggest, what Newcastle’s nightlife will look like in the future is open to debate.
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Chapter 5
91
Methodology
5.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the methodology and research techniques employed in this study. I
begin in section 5.2 by outlining the research context in terms of its epistemological approach,
and consider the implications of positionality and situated knowledges. Whilst not a
traditional ethnography, I use the term here in recognition that as the researcher, I am striving
to document and understand the processes of exclusion that are enacted through the regulatory
mechanisms inherent in Newcastle’s night-time economy. In doing so, this approach enables
me to uncover the entrepreneurial practices that drive and rationalize the filtering, channelling
and redistributive processes that govern the spatial characteristics of Newcastle’s nightlife. It
also enables me to uncover the ways in which these processes are articulated through current
value-laden semantics of troublesome youth, and how these reconstitute particular youth
groups as deviant and delinquent. Related to this, I use a case study approach to demonstrate
the wider socio-economic features and spatial practices pertaining to contemporary urban
space under entrepreneurial governance.
In section 5.3 I then discuss how I conducted the research. I open with a discussion on the
interview procedure, beginning with a justification of how I selected participants (i.e.
locations of bars, clubs, pubs, management, owners, operators etc.) before moving on to the
merits of the interview technique itself. I then go on to elaborate on the type of questioning I
used and what this aimed to reveal. In this discussion, I also outline some of my experiences
and some of the limitations I came across. In section 5.4 I talk about the observation
technique I employed. Whilst this was not an initial methodological objective, in some of the
early interviews I was offered the chance to see how some of the regulatory procedures were
practiced by the door staff at various bars and nightclubs. As I illustrate in this section, this
particular work was very useful, helping to clarify a complex set of processes which were
articulated with great difficulty by the interview participants. I then discuss what this data
revealed, the limitations of the technique, and some of my experiences.
Finally, in section 5.5 I provide a brief conclusion, suggesting how ethnographic engagement
through semi-structured interviews and observation techniques enables the answering of the
research questions stipulated in the introduction to this dissertation. I illustrate how this
methodology helps show how groups of young people are being reconstituted as the new
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delinquent in the current entrepreneurial urban economy, and what effects these new
configurations have on young people’s access to urban nightlife.
5.2 Qualitative Methods
This study relies on two main methods: semi-structured interviews and observations (with
some degree of participation as I explain later). I chose these primarily due to the qualitative
nature of the research. Ideally, I would have liked to carry out an in depth ethnography of
nightlife in Newcastle. However, time restraints and lack of sufficient funds did not allow for
the depth required in an ethnographic approach18. Although this study’s perspective is
somewhat ethnographic, in that it “attempts to understand the world as seen through the eyes
of the participants” (Kitchin and Tate, 2000: 212), it is not a traditional ethnography per se.
Therefore, whilst unable to completely immerse myself in Newcastle’s nightlife as a
participant researcher, I used the principle tenets of ethnography in order to uncover the
intricate spatial processes of the night-time economy from the perspective of those who
orchestrate its inner workings (operators, managers, owners, bouncers).
As Steve Herbert (2000) suggests, ethnography in human geography, although remaining
peripheralised as a research approach is a “uniquely useful method for uncovering the
processes and meanings that undergrid sociospatial life”, as humans “create their social and
spatial worlds through processes that are symbolically encoded and thus made meaningful”
(Herbert, 2000: 550 original emphases). The main facets of ethnography therefore seemed
especially useful in that this study is concerned with both process and meaning: the ways in
which entrepreneurial processes – those that shape the form of the night-time economy, which
incorporate exclusionary processes – are symbolically encoded and rationalized through the
meanings bestowed upon those denied participation. Quantitative approaches, such as the
documentation and quantification of expulsions in the night-time economy, could not reveal
the roles of representation and meaning nor explain how youth identities are reconstituted as
delinquent. An ethnographic approach, comprised of interviews and observations, was thus
chosen for its ability to do this.
This approach, however, is not without its criticisms. As Herbert (2000) points out,
ethnographic methodologies have often been critiqued by positivists due to the lack of a ‘true’
scientific foundation, in that an ethnographic approach, which relies heavily on interpretation,
18 An ethnography was also not possible due to intrinsic dangers of participation. Due to legislation and risk assessment I could
not, for example, work as a bouncer.
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cannot provide ‘value-neutral’ and ‘objective’ conclusions. Furthermore, there are limitations
in its ability to produce generalizations:
“Ethnographers typically focus on a single or very small number of cases to understand better
processes and meanings. Ethnography requires an intimate familiarity with the study group(s)
that develops only after sustained exposure. Many ethnographies, further, are filled with
descriptions, perhaps a legacy from anthropologists, whose early ethnographies were the first
catalogs of given peoples and their ways of life. Because of this intensive focus and this
historical emphasis on description, ethnography is sometimes criticized for failing to provide
few, if any, generalizable propositions” (Herbert, 2000: 560).
Indeed, this is supported by feminist geographers who encourage researchers to spell out the
positionality of themselves, their participants, the situatedness of knowledges produced as a
result, and to ultimately deny any claims to objectivity (Rose, 1997; England, 1994; Nast,
1994). Going against the criticisms of positivism and its universalising conclusions through
‘objective science’, knowledge is understood to be positioned and situated, produced “from
specific locations, embodied and particular” (Rose, 1997: 308). As researchers, then, we thus
have to situate our knowledges and limit our conclusions, rather than making grand
generalized claims.
But despite this need to moderate generalizations, the ethnographic approach can take a case
study form, where specific dynamics in one instance are similar in other places and contexts.
This does not mean that case studies are completely representative of specific processes or
meanings, but that they help illustrate similarities in a range of different contexts. As Noel
Castree puts it:
“A case study usually involves investigating one or more phenomena in some depth in one
place, region or country. What makes it an actual or potential ‘case’ is that the phenomena
under investigation (e.g. workfare policies, flexible manufacturing technologies, postmodern
architecture) can be found in other places, regions or countries: the case may thus be unique
but is not singular ... Case study research in human geography thus serves an important
function. It shows the world to be persistently diverse ... Yet it shows that this diversity arises
out of multiscaled relations such that it does not emerge sui generis” (Castree, 2005: 541
original emphases).
In this study, then, Newcastle and the night-time economy act, in part, as a case study. Whilst
the entrepreneurial night-time economy in Newcastle is particular to both the region and the
type of economy (i.e. Newcastle and the night-time leisure economy), such processes also
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occur elsewhere in other night-time economies and other contexts (day-time retail spaces for
example, other cities also). Processes of exclusion, as I illustrated in chapter 2, have become
defining spatial features of post-industrial urbanism as a result of a neoliberalized economy
and the shift toward entrepreneurial governance. So, where David Sibley (1995), Gill
Valentine (2004) and others have presented cases of marginalisation and exclusion in
contemporary leisure spaces as a result of these socio-spatial transformations, this study also
presents an account of exclusionary processes engendered by commercially defined
imperatives. As such, this study, through an ethnographic perspective, enables these practices
to be understood in the wider contexts of the entrepreneurial city and its latent spatial
practices.
Ethnographic approaches raise other concerns though. Again, positionality and situatedness
are essential in understanding these matters. As researchers, we should also be aware of the
positions of ourselves and of our participants in terms of ethics and power relations. As
Herbert suggests, ethnographies have been criticised because they sometimes uphold an
imperialist perspective:
“A power differential typically exists between observer and observed, particularly when the
latter belongs to a marginalized group. Ethnography can thus serve, wittingly or not, as a
handmaiden to broader colonialist projects that inventory oppressed groups as a means of
controlling them ... In both the colonial and ethnographic projects, the argument goes, the
‘natives’ are passive and powerless; the scientist’s gaze is just one manifestation of the wider
skein of dominance relations in which they are enwrapped” (Herbert, 2000: 562).
Peter Jackson makes a similar observation, that “social scientists are often accused of having
a predatory relationship with their objects of study, especially where these ‘objects’ are
relatively powerless, poor people of low status, or members of ethnic minorities” (Jackson,
1983: 42). However, this was less of a concern in this study (although, as I illustrate shortly,
basic ethical considerations remain absolutely necessary). The participants here (venue
operators, bouncers etc.) occupied a much more powerful position and wielded far more
economic and cultural power than myself as the researcher, and the consumers on which they
depend. The major consideration though, as I illustrate later, was confidentiality. That being
said, there are significant issues here in relation to studying elite groups. All except one of
my interviewees were male; all were presumably middle-class in the taxonomic sense (being
in management); most were reasonably young adults; and all except one were white. Their
positionalities as the participants were thus very similar to my positionality as the researcher,
as I myself am a white, middle-class, young adult man. However, in such a context where the
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participants can be construed as a powerful or elite group, I found that I had to constantly
emphasise my capabilities and capacity for understanding as an intellectual researcher, and as
Winchester (1996) puts it, demonstrate and assert my status “by careful choice of dress and
language” (p. 122). The participants I interviewed are also accustomed to having control
and authority over others (England, 2006), and would therefore often guide the interview in
terms of subject, and what they thought was relevant to my study. This meant that some
discussions soon became completely irrelevant. It also often felt as if some questions were
hastily answered in order to speed up the interview, and in some meetings, there was both the
heavy usage of management speak and a distinct patronizing tone which seemed to reinforce
the power relation of myself being an inexperienced graduate researcher and them being
corporate managers who have got better things to do than entertain someone studying for their
PhD. But not all interviews were like this. Indeed, I recall one interview in particular where
a marketing manager, knowing of my position in relation to his (i.e. himself having
significant expertise in the night-time leisure sector and myself having not so much),
explained every issue in great detail, ensuring that I understood all management terminology,
the processes, laws and management practices within the night-time economy, Newcastle’s
city centre, and its recent history as a contemporary urban leisure hub.
5.3 Interviews
I gradually chose a variety of venue operators, managers, and owners as I familiarised myself
with the current form of Newcastle’s night-time economy in the city centre. I avoided other
locations, such as Jesmond Road (another nightlife hotspot), because I felt that this may
complicate the study when analysing the redistributive processes at work. Most venues in the
city centre are within walking distance of each other, whereas Jesmond Road, located a few
miles north of the centre, is usually negotiated by taxi or the Metro system. If processes of
filtering and channelling are operating to fragment Newcastle’s nightlife, it would be more
effective to illustrate if I concentrated on the city centre and the movements within it.
Initially, I began approaching managers of venues which I knew something about from my
previous experience of Newcastle at night: as an undergraduate, I spent three years living in
Newcastle, and in my final year of study I worked as a waiter in two of Newcastle’s most
upmarket establishments. After explaining the main objectives of the research, I eventually
reached agreements with operators of three venues, all in different parts of the city centre and
with completely different environments. One was a large-capacity nightclub on the Bigg
Market, another a trendy bar on what I later found was called the ‘Diamond Strip’, and the
other a high-style bar located within the Gate Complex. I wanted participants to represent a
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diverse set of venues (e.g. high / mid / low market, style bars, ‘charver venues’, middle of the
road etc.), which would hopefully enable me to examine the differences in regulation, which I
suspected would be more intense in the highly stylised bars and clubs, and quite relaxed in the
lower-end venues. The wide scope would also allow me to expose the fragmentation and
segregation which seems to characterise the spatial composition of Newcastle’s night-time
economy.
In looking at these specific issues, along with notions of exclusion, filtering, channelling and
redistributing different groups of consumers, the data I needed to fulfil the research agenda
was available from those in the higher positions. In Kim England’s terms, they are
knowledgeable agents and “experts of their own experiences” (England, 2006: 288). Their
position as informed subjects in the heart of nightlife in Newcastle meant that they possess a
range of knowledges concerning the regulation of the night-time economy, the various
different groups of consumers who ritually participate in it, the formulation of different
admittance policies, groups who are rejected from particular bars, and the commercially-
defined reasons for channelling and redistributing different groups to different spaces within
Newcastle’s contemporary nightscapes. They are also actors in a network which helps
reconstitute social identities. As I illustrate in chapters 6 and 7, class judgements are a
fundamental component in the regulation of admittance, where representations of
contemporary troublesome youth are used to articulate and justify the filtering practices that
mark the spatial characteristics of nightlife in Newcastle.
Some of this data could have been drawn from other people. Owners, shareholders, or
frequent nightlife consumers might also be in a position to know and understand processes of
exclusion and redistribution. However, initially I was doubtful as to the extent of the relevant
knowledge of some owners and shareholders and related bodies involved with the regulation
of nightlife (i.e. would the perspective of the city council allude to the cultural politics of
exclusion in the night-time economy? Probably not). Furthermore, the hedonistic, wild,
boisterous and sometimes unruly nature of Newcastle’s nightlife discouraged me from
requesting participation of consumers. As I show later in this chapter, I had innumerable
informal conversations with consumers at various locations, helping me to gather a deeper
understanding of the city’s night-time culture, but some of these encounters were very
uncomfortable. Perhaps not exactly abusive, some people that I approached were rather
unfriendly when I either asked questions or began explaining my research. In the early stages
of the fieldwork, I came to the conclusion that the more stable and knowledgeable position of
venue operators, managers, door staff etc. would yield better and more consistent data. I was
also able to schedule and conduct the interviews with a relative degree of ease and safety in
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comparison with regular nightlife consumers; all of the interviews took place in the
participants respective venue apart from one, which was scheduled in his other place of work
(a restaurant in the west end). Included in the list below are details of the venues whose
managers / operators I interviewed at some point during the 3 year research period19:
 Operator of mass-market, themed and branded superclub, owned by a national
corporation, Bigg Market
 Manager of branded mid-market style bar, The Gate Entertainment Complex
 Manager of mid-market style bar, Mosley Street (“Diamond Strip”)
 Owner / Executive of leisure and design group, which retains a number (7 at the time
of research) of different, non-branded, locally-operated bars, clubs and restaurants
 Manager of upmarket nightclub, recently refurbished, Quayside
 Operator of mass-market superclub, owned by national corporation, New Bridge
Street West
 Manager of trendy cocktail bar, Pilgrim Street
 Manager of low-market bar and low-market nightclub, (both known locally as
“charver venues”), Bigg Market
 Operator of themed mid-high market bar, recently refurbished and re-branded
(previously a very exclusive style bar), Collingwood Street (“Diamond Strip”)
 Operator of mid-high market style bar (previously a low-market trebles bar ending up
run-down, then empty), Nicholas Street (“Diamond Strip”)
 Operator of mass-market branded superclub, The Gate
 Operator of mass-market branded super-venue (encompasses a bar, VIP lounge, club
and restaurant; also, previously very exclusive), Newgate Street (The Gate)
 Marketing manager of mass-market entertainment-led bar, Newgate Street (The Gate)
I chose the interview as a research technique due to its scope for expansion and its sensitivity
to unravelling “complicated relationships or slowly evolving events” such as processes of
exclusion and the meanings invested within them (Hoggart et al, 2002: 205). Focus groups,
for example, could have generated similar outcomes. However, having already experienced
some complications in interview scheduling (teaching commitments on my behalf and an
incredibly hectic schedule on theirs for example), I decided against this method. With further
consideration, I also thought that a group setting may have been inappropriate because of the
rather ‘touchy’ subject of exclusion in the night-time economy. I was doubtful of the
transparency between different operators at a focus group meeting, having already dedicated
19 The names of these venues are omitted to ensure anonymity promised to the research participants.
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complete confidentiality to the participants. And some operators for example, requested that
their mentioning was refrained in discussions with other participants. Moreover, if I had
employed the focus group technique, the data produced could have been completely different
to the privately-conducted interviews. With many operators in one room, and differing in the
type of venue they manage, they could have withheld some of their opinions for fear of
offence or argument. As I discovered when undertaking the interviews, many participants,
especially those of the higher-market venues, would speak about the lower-market ‘trouble’
venues that cater for the ‘charver groups’. I doubt that this kind of data, invaluable to this
study, would have been revealed during focus group sessions.
Despite some of the problems that I mentioned beforehand, the majority of the interviews
gave me in-depth, focused answers that related directly to the research questions. If the
participants did digress from the subject, I could always go back to a topic and enquire
further. The interview technique also enabled me to cover issues that I had overlooked when
constructing the questioning. In seeking the merits of interview techniques, Hoggart et al
state, “conducted sensitively, intensive interviews can facilitate the explanation of events and
experiences in their complexity, including their potential contradictions ... This can lead to
insight far beyond the initial imagination of the researcher” (2002: 206). And typically, this is
what I experienced. Despite having lived in Newcastle in the past, and knowing the city’s
nightlife reasonably well, there were things brought to light during the interviews that I had
not anticipated, and this would not have been possible if I had employed other methods. Thus
the semi-structured nature of the interviewing technique I used provided me with
opportunities for tangents and digressions that ended up being valuable to the research. And
more specifically, the economic rationale for exclusion only became explicitly evident as I
undertook more and more interviews, leading me to change questions, and enquire deeper into
some of the intricacies of rejection, exclusion, and their relationship with commercially
defined spatial practices.
The research process also allowed me to develop trust and rapport. Initially, gaining interview
participants proved to be rather difficult due to the nature of their employment and working
patterns. This also meant that some of the interviews were briefer than would have been
ideal. There were also complications with gaining consent from some of the larger firms. As
I illustrated in the last chapter, many of Newcastle’s bars and clubs are owned by regional or
national firms, and this meant that I often had to go through head offices for permission to
speak to a particular venue manager. More times than not, head offices did not give me
permission due to fear of negative publicity despite complete anonymity offered to the firm,
the venue, and the manager I requested. For example, the national chain of Revolution vodka
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bars refused to participate for exactly these reasons, and other venues such as Living Room
owned by the national firm Niche Hotels either misplaced my multiple requests or failed to
respond for similar reasons. In all cases though, complete confidentiality was assured to all
participants to fulfil my duty as a researcher and, where appropriate, their needs to meet head
office requirements.
Having three interviews scheduled in the earlier stages of the research, I began piloting the
questions. Initial responses to underdeveloped questions about how media-based
constructions of the yob and chav might be driving door policies yielded little in the way of
successful data. Operators dismissed the mass media as wholly inaccurate and sensational,
especially when accounting for problems in the night-time economy. With experience on
their side, the participants (especially those operating stylised, gentrified and highly exclusive
venues) articulated the situation in a very specific way. It appeared that current
representations of yobs and chavs are entangled in the regulation of the night-time economy
but did not drive their decisions to exclude. Instead, the focus that was becoming increasingly
evident in the interviews was on the economic incentive to exclude. Subsequent questioning
abandoned any leading questions about the representational qualities of youth unless there
was specific reference to them, or until the latter half of the interview. Most of the
interviewees, though, raised the terms chav or charver at their own will, immediately pointing
to the more visual tenets of exclusion. However, if the term had not been discussed by the
end of the interview, I raised it. Investigating the ways in which youth identities have been
reconstructed through these capital processes was indeed very difficult, with slightly different
takes on venues, areas and social groups by the participants, but patterns began to emerge
nonetheless. In some interviews, contemporary semantics of troublesome youth were used
again and again in defining the ‘wrong’ type of consumer. Indeed, in some interviews it was
this language that was used to define door policies and exclusion outright (see chapter 6). But
in others, there was scant mention of problematic social groups, and I had to work these
issues into later questions to tease out the cultural politics that may (or may not) be at play in
the street-level regulation of the respective venue.
My questioning, as it evolved, sought data on the processes and meanings imbued in the
regulation of nightlife and resultant exclusions. The opening questions related to the image of
Newcastle as a city known for its nightlife and how the respective venue fits in with these
images. Subsequently, I enquired into the similarities and differences within Newcastle’s
nightlife, aiming to acquire as much of the operator’s personal knowledge from direct
experience as possible. I also enquired into the business acumen of the venues i.e. how
specific policies work to increase profit. This led me to questions surrounding venue’s
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consumer bases i.e. who, in terms of age, class, gender, behaviour etc. are thought of as
desired customers. Simultaneously, I also enquired into the kinds of people who are not
wanted as customers. Anticipating certain answers here, I had prepared a number of follow-
on questions to maximise the output which related directly to the research questions set out in
the introduction of this dissertation. Here I also questioned the methods through which they
regulate their clientele, how drinks prices and venue images may ‘automatically’ maintain
specific customer bases, and how door policies work to include and exclude.
After gaining a real insight into the latent workings of the night-time economy from these
interviews, a number of related issues became apparent, and for the purposes of this
methodology, are worth elaborating on here. Some of the participants had only been in
Newcastle as operators for a relatively short period of time, but had acquired a sense of recent
history through colleagues, friends, and regular customers. They knew the venue’s recent
past and its place in Newcastle’s nightlife in as intimate a way as those operating in
Newcastle for a significantly lengthier period. But all had an intricate understanding of the
city, other venues and the relationships between them, and on wider issues such as tourism,
urban policy, and associated violence issues, enabling me to cover more ground than
anticipated, and raising important issues that could be collectively incorporated into the
analysis.
I made another distinction however. Through the interviews, I gained a sense of the
participants’ specific position in relation to their level of responsibility in the business. By
this I mean that those who ranked higher, or had been in the business for longer, articulated
responses in a very different way to those who were lower in the corporate structure.
Assistant managers and those with less experience in the operation of venues struggled to
communicate some issues in the interviews, possibly exacerbated by the complexity of the
subject. It is perhaps because of a wider awareness of PR issues that those in higher
management refrained from using potentially derogatory terms like ‘charver’ or ‘chav’. In
one interview with an experienced operator who works for a large corporation, having raised
the term late into the interview, he declared his surprise of its propagation in such a way by
other operators. In interviews with rather more inexperienced operators, regulation was
articulated in very simplistic ways, and with no management speak it was in some of these
interviews where exclusions were immediately articulated through the popular understanding
of the term charver. However, I can recall one specific interview with an executive / owner of
a large local firm where he demarcated this new underclass in rather derogatory ways at his
own behest. Issues such as this need addressing in methodologies. Whilst there were
commonalities between different managers of a similar ilk, there was no concrete relationship
101
between the level of management and the ways in which the regulation of admittance was
articulated, perhaps demonstrating that there is a need for a greater cross section of managers
as participants in studies dealing with such elite groups.
The interviews were then transcribed and categorised in accordance with dominant themes.
Although I had loose categories in mind from the outset, themselves determined to some
degree by the interview questions, the categorisation of the data was finally achieved after
preliminary readings of the transcripts. Sifting through the data, I demarcated four main areas
of analysis corresponding to the research questions. The first and second relate to the
identification of the ‘wrong’ consumer, how this was articulated by the participants, and how
groups of young people are being reconstituted as the new delinquent in Newcastle’s night-
time economy. This involved categorising articulations of material deviant symbols (clothes,
brands etc.) but also embodied symbols of deviance – comportment, demeanour, behaviour
etc. The third main area of inquiry concerns the rationale for exclusion and redistribution,
looking at how the participants articulated the commercial imperatives for channelling
different groups of consumers, and how this influences the spatial composition of the night-
time economy. The fourth analytical category addresses the concept of exclusion itself and
examines more closely the filtering processes that characterise the inequitable nature of
nightlife in Newcastle, how it is fragmented and segregated. It is these categories that
principally determine the structures of chapters 6 and 7 in this dissertation.
5.4 Participation and Observation
The interviews were bolstered by a series of expeditions where I went out and participated in
the night-time economy as a consumer, and an observer of regulation procedure. I chose this
particular method mainly because of the problematic issue of embodiment (comportment,
demeanour, style, behaviour etc. but also specific embodiments of class and gender) during
the interviews, which could only be resolved with a more visual research approach. Most of
the participants had great difficulty in articulating the more performative, kinaesthetic
moments imbued in the identification and exclusion process. Having been put on the question
agenda after the initial interviews, performativity became a central theme in the remaining
sessions. When I enquired into issues of embodiment, some operators became increasingly
frustrated, having difficulty in explaining exactly what kind of bodies they are looking to
reject. Responses often took the form of “you just know who isn’t right for the venue” and “a
lot of the time it comes down to feeling” (see chapter 6 for the full discussion). With
responses such as these, I decided that very little of the performative could be neatly captured
by the interview methodology. Thus, whilst entrepreneurial practices (including business
102
acumen, admittance trends, customer selectivity, service prices etc.) are constructed and
rationalized by the venue operators, through observation methods I could examine how some
of these aspects (i.e. door policies and the visual identification of the ‘wrong consumer’) are
implemented by the door staff. Therefore, the interviews gave me the chance to investigate
how venue operators practice and understand exclusion, and the observation work allowed me
to see how some of these policies are actually enacted by door staff and venue security. It
gave me the chance to witness inclusions and exclusions being performed by both bouncers
and punters.
Whilst in the earlier stages of the research some degree of participant observation was
employed to re-acquaint myself with Newcastle’s nightlife, to see perhaps how it had
changed, and to gain a better sense of what was going on at the time, initially, it was not my
intention to employ this particular technique outright. However, during the very first
interview at a club on the Bigg Market I was offered the chance to stand on the door one
Friday night and observe how the door staff put these policies into practice. After some
deliberation I agreed under the impression that this could only bolster the research and
provide me with the more performative data on admittance practices. Thus, in subsequent
interviews with other operators I asked if I could carry out this observation work on the
respective venue’s door. Due to the contested and somewhat stigmatised nature of the night-
time economy, as well as strict regulations, danger and disorder, many were not keen on the
idea of having an external researcher occupying much needed space at the door of the venue.
However, after being granted permission I was able to briefly and informally interview door
staff and observe their practices at a small number of venues in various locations in the city
centre20. Figure 5.1 stipulates exactly how and when the participation and observation was
undertaken.
In languages of methodology in human geography, this technique is often known as
‘participant observation’, and is regarded to be the main principle of ethnographic research.
However, the role of ‘participant’ here does not really apply, as I did not actively participate
in the regulation of admittance at the door (and hence why this methodology cannot be
conceived as a piece of traditional ethnography). Bar / club door staff are also highly trained
to deal with violence and confrontation. It would have been far too dangerous for me and for
others if I were to participate and work as a bouncer. Indeed, I would have been prevented
from doing so by the risk assessment procedure. Rather, the combination of techniques that I
used is more akin to Peter Jackson’s approach. Jackson argues that the participant
20 Again, with anonymity promised, I cannot stipulate exactly which venues participated in the observation work.
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observation approach actually involves more than one research method, including observation
(to describe events), interviewing (to learn of someone’s norms and perspectives) and
sometimes sampling (to document frequency for example) (Jackson, 1983). As he suggests,
participant observation “should not ... be regarded as a ‘technique’ which can be effectively
employed in isolation from other research procedures, but as an approach with a common
core of appropriate methods inherent in all forms of participant observation” (Jackson, 1983:
40). This was also the case in this study, and by speaking with the door staff in semi-
interview form, I could enquire as to the reasons for and articulations of the exclusions being
performed. Methodologically speaking then, participation was not necessary to observe the
regulatory processes in operation. I could see who was refused entry, the frequency of these
rejections, and then ask the door staff to explain their decisions. I could thus see in practice
some of what I had been told in the interviews.
Invariably, the observation work involved standing with the bouncers and watching them at
work. However, I did have the chance to informally interview them earlier in the nights
before it got too busy so as to distract them from their work. Most of the time I asked similar
questions to those in the interviews, going over the types of groups they look for as suitable
customers, those they choose to reject, how they identify these groups, and the reasons for
rejection. As the nights progressed and the queues lengthened, I stepped back to observe, but
occasionally had a quick chat during lulls. Again, the observation work, in addition to
helping me understand the more performative approach to exclusion through embodied
deviance, also enabled me to investigate the ways in which exclusions are articulated through
contemporary representations of troublesome youth. As I show in chapters 6 and 7,
appearance, dress, comportment and behaviour – as determinants in the exclusion process –
were again enunciated by the bouncers through terms such as chav and charver.
Despite there being limited permissions for doing this kind of work, I could also, as a
consumer of the night-time economy, do some observing more informally. Participating as a
prospective consumer, I spent many nights in Newcastle walking around, standing in queues
waiting for admittance, watching what was going on ahead of me, looking through an
analytical lens at the flow of people, the way in which they were filtered through exclusion,
immersing myself into the choreography of the night and the movement of nightlife. Entry
into countless bars and clubs also gave me the chance to observe the aesthetics of consumers
within venues. With an increasing number of visits to various establishments coupled with
the data from the interviews, it soon became clear which venues catered for which consumers.
Spending time in bars on the Diamond Strip for example, it became obvious that effort in
appearance is very important to admittance (myself included); in order to participate in these
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glitzy and glamorous watering holes, you have to look the part. In the middle-of-the-road
venues, there seemed to be no high expectations of appearance – admittance was predicated
on a trendy yet casual appearance. However, in some bars and clubs, I soon observed the
slacker admittance policies that overlooked the most ubiquitous of class signifiers vis-à-vis
the charver and chav – Burberry caps, tracksuits, bling and most of the other stigmatised
clothing labels (again, for further detail, see Figure 5.1).
Venue /
Area
Type of
Observation
When Total
hours
spent
observing
Location(s) Additional
Notes
Mass-
market,
themed and
branded
superclub,
owned by a
national
corporation,
Bigg Market
Organised and
Formal; as a
researcher;
observation,
formal
interviewing (i.e.
with Dictaphone)
and
conversational
interviewing
Friday,
evening
and late-
night
4 At the door with
security staff;
inside the nightclub
Mixed work of
interviewing
door staff,
observing
admittance of
consumers and
cross
referencing,
observation of
consumers
inside
Upmarket
and
gentrified
bar,
boutique
restaurant by
day, Grey
Street
Organised and
Formal; as a
researcher;
observation and
conversational
interviewing
Saturday,
evening
2 At the door with
security staff;
inside speaking
with bar staff and
duty managers
Mixed work of
interviewing
door staff,
observing
admittance of
consumers and
cross
referencing,
observation of
consumers
inside
Mid-high
market style
bar,
Collingwood
Street
(Diamond
Organised and
Formal; as a
researcher;
observation and
conversational
interviewing
Saturday,
evening
2 At the door with
security staff;
inside speaking
with additional
managers and DJ
Mixed work of
interviewing
door staff,
observing
admittance of
consumers and
105
Strip) cross
referencing,
observation of
consumers
inside
Mid-market
basement
trebles bar,
Grainger
Street
(adjacent to
Bigg
Market)
Organised and
Formal; as a
researcher;
observation and
conversational
interviewing
Saturday,
late-night
2 At the door with
security staff;
inside
Mixed work of
interviewing
door staff,
observing
admittance of
consumers and
cross
referencing,
observation of
consumers
inside
Low-mid
market fun
pub / bar,
Quayside
Organised and
Formal; as a
researcher;
observation and
conversational
interviewing
Saturday,
late-night
2 At the door with
security staff;
inside
Mixed work of
interviewing
door staff,
observing
admittance of
consumers and
cross
referencing,
observation of
consumers
inside
Numerous
bars and
clubs, Bigg
Market
Informal; as a
consumer
Wednesday
(popular
night for
students),
Fridays and
Saturdays;
evenings
and late at
night
10 Outside on the
streets; adjacent to
venue doors; in
queues; inside
venues
Mixed work of
observing
consumers
inside and
outside of the
venues;
observation of
admittance;
informal
conversational
interviewing of
myriad
consumers
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Numerous
bars and
clubs,
Diamond
Strip
Informal; as a
consumer
Wednesday
(popular
night for
students),
Fridays and
Saturdays;
evenings
and late at
night
10 Outside on the
streets; adjacent to
venue doors; in
queues; inside
venues
Mixed work of
observing
consumers
inside and
outside of the
venues;
observation of
admittance;
informal
conversational
interviewing of
myriad
consumers
Numerous
bars and
clubs, The
Gate
Informal; as a
consumer
Wednesday
(popular
night for
students),
Fridays and
Saturdays;
evenings
and late at
night
10 Outside on the
streets; adjacent to
venue doors; in
queues; inside
venues
Mixed work of
observing
consumers
inside and
outside of the
venues;
observation of
admittance;
informal
conversational
interviewing of
myriad
consumers
Numerous
bars and
clubs,
Quayside
Informal; as a
consumer
Wednesday
(popular
night for
students),
Fridays and
Saturdays;
evenings
and late at
night
10 Outside on the
streets; adjacent to
venue doors; in
queues; inside
venues
Mixed work of
observing
consumers
inside and
outside of the
venues;
observation of
admittance;
informal
conversational
interviewing of
myriad
consumers
Figure 5.1 Table documenting the observation and participation methodology
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It is not easy to describe this aspect of the fieldwork in terms of method. In some ways I am a
participant (in that I am acting as a consumer), and in others I am somewhat more an
observer. Hoggart et al (2002) offer the best kind of clarification in what kind of participant
observation I employed here:
“The observer as participant. Here the balance favours observation over participation …
However, it is not unusual to find references in the literature to this kind of work as
‘participant observation’, when it is really observation with some participation … With
information collection commonly taking substantial allocations of time if the researcher
adopts a participant-as-observer stance, many researchers are driven by preference or lack of
time to sample events they observe … or to focus on interpreting activities going on around
them rather than in which they are active agents” (Hoggart et al, 2002: 257 original emphasis).
This observation work coupled with the interviews provided me with enough knowledge to
better understand the composition of Newcastle’s night-time economy; where people go,
where they simultaneously don’t go; how some are excluded; the way in which these
exclusions are articulated and performed as meaningful phenomena; and the justifications for
such actions.
5.5 Conclusion
This methodology, then, is not a traditional ethnography per se, but employs a situated,
ethnographic perspective in order to examine an interrelated set of meanings and processes in
Newcastle’s night-time economy. Despite the knowledge formed through this methodology
being limited, situated, and partial, it is suggestive of wider economic practices and cultural
politics. Through the case study approach, investigating exactly how representations of
contemporary youth are utilised and reworked in economically-driven performances
necessitates such a qualitative methodology.
This methodology also requires specific participants to yield particular data. The managers,
operators and bouncers who orchestrate the regulation of the night-time economy have an
intimate understanding of the city, its nightlife, and its consumers, were therefore necessary
participants. Most have profound experience in the running of venues, the ways in which
image acts to attract and deter different groups of consumers, and the commercial imperatives
entangled in the exclusion, filtering and redistribution of people in Newcastle’s nightlife.
They are also in a more privileged position than regular night-time leisure consumers, and, as
Mike Crang suggests, the “qualitative studies of elites can inform understandings in an
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unequal world” (Crang, 2002: 648). With this study seeking to understand the processes
through which particular youth groups become reconstituted as the new delinquent and
subsequently excluded by those obligated to prevailing capital forces, the participants selected
through this methodology were therefore crucial.
I employed the interview technique due to its sensitivity to complex processes and meanings.
As I suggested previously, other methods would have limited the scope of the study or were
avoided due to their inconvenience. After establishing the importance of the more
performative aspects of identification and exclusion early in the research process, I also
greatly welcomed the potential of observation work courtesy of a number of operators. I
came to realize that the interviews could not yield relevant and easily understood data on the
relationships between representations of troublesome youth, exclusion, and the embodied,
performing consumer. Being able to witness exclusions as they were being executed, and
being able to inquire deeper into the identification process, I could shed further light on a very
complex filtering system which engenders unequal access. Hence, the regulators, managers
and operators of a number of nightlife venues are positioned and situated with the knowledge
of how an entrepreneurial agenda drives the exclusion of those associated with contemporary
representations of troublesome youth; how operators are propagating a term through which
the already socially excluded can be identified and excluded yet again.
109
Chapter 6
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Exclusion in Newcastle’s Night-Time Economy 1: Deviance,
Embodiment, and the Identification of Troublesome Youth
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I begin to present the findings of the research. I begin in section 6.2 with a
brief discussion of the main characteristics of Newcastle’s night-time economy, describing
the different kinds of nightlife I have observed and learnt about in the recent past. I do this to
provide a preamble to the subsequent sections, so that when I discuss specific areas and
markets, they are understood in relation to each other. In setting the scene, I examine the four
main segments comprising Newcastle’s contemporary nightscapes, where specific areas
consist of similar venues offering similar products and services, and visited by similar groups
of people (in terms of class and income, taste and nightlife preferences etc.).
In section 6.3, I discuss a number of issues of deviance and exclusion. I begin by illustrating
the importance of the visualisation of the ‘wrong consumer’, who is defined as incapable of
fulfilling the social and cultural requirements for entry into a number of venues (including the
highly stylised gentrified premises and some of the more mainstream, mid-market
establishments). Here I outline how operators and bouncers articulated notions of the wrong
consumer using the terms ‘chav’ and ‘charver’, and emphasised the ubiquitous symbols of
consumer deviance that characterise this new underclass as constituents in the exclusion
process. Subsequently, however, I discuss how operators and bouncers also seek out and
exclude those who seemingly display a number of problematic embodied performances,
which include demeanour, comportment, behaviour and speech. I then go on to illustrate how
most, if not all of these exclusions are communicated through a masculine bias, pointing to a
reinforcement of contemporary representations of young lower-class masculinity as
delinquent, and posing a greater problem than its feminine counterpart. I close the section
with further observations of exclusion, documenting the ways in which the night-time
economy ‘self-regulates’, and how regulation at the street level has been tightened in recent
years through the increased interaction between bouncers at different venues and the police.
In section 6.4, I conclude this chapter by presenting four main arguments, showing how
consumption and certain commodities, in addition to the embodiment of a number of
stigmatised performances related to the ‘lower’ social classes remain intrinsic to the
reconstitution of delinquent youth. I also illustrate the importance of masculinity in this
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process, and how the normalization of a series of cultural practices reinforces spatial
inequality in contemporary nightscapes.
6.2 Nightlife in Newcastle: Overview
As I suggested earlier in this dissertation, the recapitalisation of urban space since the
economic austerities and social upheavals of 1970s and 1980s Britain has involved the re-
aestheticization of city downtowns through processes of gentrification and the development of
a number of leisure and retail infrastructures through entrepreneurial governance under a
neoliberalized political-economic regime. Night-time economies, comprised of bars, clubs,
pubs, restaurants, cinemas and numerous others, are part of these leisure infrastructures, and
in many cities across the UK their rapid expansion has been permitted – even encouraged –
on the basis of economic development through local and tourist spending. This continues to
be the case in Newcastle, with the night-time economy being supported administratively and
financially by the local authority (see Newcastle City Council, 2006). The burgeoning of
night-time economies in recent years is also attributed to reconfigurations of class and gender-
based identities. As I illustrated in chapter 4, having lost the ability to construct identity
through industrial spheres of production, young working-class men in Newcastle increasingly
attempt to forge a socio-cultural identity through regular consumption in the night-time
economy (Hollands, 1995; Nayak, 2003a).
However, earlier in this thesis I also suggested that urban renaissance, which incorporates the
production of nightlife, has also entailed the reconstitution of specific social identities.
Entrepreneurial urbanism has brought with it multiple landscapes of exclusion which are
principally determined by the need to ensure a spatial capital fix. With certain groups
represented as threatening to commercially defined imperatives – from those of prostitutes,
squeegee cleaners, the working classes and the urban poor (Smith, 1992; 1996a; 1996b), to
homeless people (Mitchell, 1997; also see Coleman, 2005), to children and young people
(Valentine, 2004; and Sibley, 1995) – the entrepreneurial city has become a place permeated
with exclusions. A multitude of socio-spatial regulation mechanisms have been developed by
the state, the private sector, and by other cultural frameworks, that seek to control the
spatialities of those defined as the new delinquents. Under the current political-economic
condition, representations of the yob have replaced older anxieties about hooligans (young,
working-class men) (Pearson, 1983), and contemporary forms of class condescension
manifest in the chav phenomenon have supplanted preceding concerns of a growing
underclass, reinforcing perpetual sensibilities to control and exclude (Hayward and Yar, 2006;
Tyler, 2006; McDowell, 2006; 2007; Johnson, 2008).
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Urban economic growth and its corresponding spatial operations are no less the case within
the local scales of contemporary urban nightlife. The expansion of the night-time economy
commensurate with urban economic restructuring has often relied on national and multi-
national corporations, along with big brands that sanitise and homogenise night-time markets,
quash nightlife diversity, and exclude many groups from actively participating in the newly
refurbished, gentrified and glamorized watering-holes that characterise contemporary urban
nightlife. Chatterton and Hollands (2002, 2003) have observed that many cannot afford to
drink in the establishments which constitute the new dominant scenes, but also, that some are
excluded due to their social and cultural class-based identities (see also Nayak, 2006). This
chapter illustrates similar findings, but also argues that geographers need to think through
exclusion in such micro-scale cases of exclusion. As I show in this and the next chapter,
embodied deviance, along with material commodities, plays a significant role in the
identification of delinquency. But, exclusion in this thesis is not posited as a systemic spatial
sanction, but rather a process where certain groups of people are redistributed and channelled
into different spaces according to predetermined obligations to protect image and maximise
capital. In Newcastle this has helped create a segregated night-time leisure landscape where
specific areas cater for different groups which are loosely demarcated around class, and
exclusion articulated through contemporary representations of delinquent youth.
Nightlife Locales: Separating Consumers
Already recognized for its traditional Geordie drinking culture (Nayak, 2003a; Chatterton and
Hollands, 2003), Newcastle now hosts a variety of drinking venues, ranging from traditional
pubs and social clubs, live music venues, dance music nightclubs, to cocktail bars, theme bars
and clubs, and it also has a thriving gay and lesbian scene located around Times Square.
What I discuss here, however, are those which come under the ‘mainstream’ banner – trendy
bars and clubs that cater for the general population and which do not maintain specialisms in
music or other niche markets such as the gay scene.
Newcastle’s nightlife, like every other city in the UK, is also comprised of a multitude of
different consumers with different tastes, preferences, and incomes. With two major
universities in the city, Newcastle is also a part-time home for many students, in addition to
the plethora of visitors who stay in the city every week, from people on business, tourists, to
stag and hen parties. Much of Newcastle’s success in the night-time economy is attributed to
its reputation as one of the leading party cities in the UK. Banded through a variety of media,
this is also widely recognized by many of the bar and club operators I interviewed: “from the
outside perspective it’s one of the country’s best party cities” (Operator of mass-market,
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themed and branded superclub, Bigg Market); and “people, whenever you mention
Newcastle, have a perception that it’s a real party town” (Operator of mass-market superclub,
New Bridge Street West). What I observed during the research is that Newcastle city centre
has four key mainstream nightlife locales which all maintain specific ‘scenes’ and which
contribute to this party image: The Bigg Market, the Quayside, the Gate complex, and the
area around Collingwood Street that has become known as the Diamond Strip21.
The Bigg Market
The Bigg Market is now known locally and nationally as an unkempt drinking area in the
very centre of Newcastle. From outside the city, its reputation is one of boisterous hedonism
and late-night partying. It is comprised of a number of bars, nightclubs and pubs, and located
at the top is a large, themed superclub owned by a national leisure corporation, with a
capacity of around 2000 people. The club’s consumer base is mostly mid-market and
students. As its operator commented in the interview:
“It’s basically, what we want you to do is come down, get pissed, get laid, and in a safe
environment, and that’s what it’s all about […] 18 to 24 year olds, student based – majority of
it is student based. I’d say that Monday to Thursday, you’re looking at 90-95 percent student
based, Friday and Saturday you’re looking at, I’d say 30-40 percent student based, another 30-
40 percent out-of-towners and the rest are all locals, so it’s very much a student orientated
venue” (Operator of mass-market, themed and branded superclub, Bigg Market).
Other venues – the majority bars – cater for the lower end of the market. They are largely
inexpensive, selling cheap, discounted drinks, and play mostly cheesy pop music from the
1970s to the present. Whilst a mixture of people consume in the Bigg Market area –
including locals, tourists and students – the Bigg Market has otherwise gained quite a
negative reputation, especially locally. It is often described by some locals as “full of
charvers”, and disregarded as a reputable drinking area, thought of as unruly, troublesome,
and sometimes violent22. As one bar operator commented:
21 There are to a lesser degree other nightlife locales: The Jesmond and Haymarket areas were also mentioned by operators on
occasions; and there are numerous other bars, pubs and clubs located around the city centre. However, as a general consensus,
operators, bouncers and consumers seemed to agree that the four areas discussed in this section comprise the dominant nightlife
hotspots in Newcastle’s city centre. For a map detailing the locations of these areas, see Appendix.
22 Although as I illustrate throughout this chapter, the branded superclub at the top end of the Bigg Market is not thought of as a
charver venue, and actively excludes those under this particular banner.
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“The Bigg Market is very sort of blue-collar; you won’t find the footballers and that sort of
crowd in that area. The bars are a bit rougher really, very blue-collar the clientele that drink
there. The standards of the bars and stuff aren’t that high, standards of drinks aren’t that high
and more often than not it’s a lot cheaper. A lot of stag and hen parties go there because a lot
of the nicer bars including ourselves don’t really let people in when they’re dressed up, so
stags and hens – when they go out with condoms attached to their heads and carrying big
cocks around – obviously they go to places like that” (Operator of mid-high market style bar,
Diamond Strip).
Others heavily criticise its role in Newcastle’s night-time leisure landscape due to its
associations with disorder. As one marketing manager elaborated on the subject of charvers:
“Should you walk the city centre for an hour and a half on a Friday night and you will notice,
very clearly where they [charvers] go – one very clear area. A member of Northumbria Police
commented to me the other week that he disliked dealing with the area in the middle of the
Bigg Market, towards the bottom. He commented that he disliked that bit, as a personal
opinion. I wouldn’t say that any one operator is particularly at fault, but a lot don’t like
policing that area” (Marketing manager of mass-market bar, Newgate Street).
This reinforced a viewpoint I discovered previously when speaking to a Northumbria Police
constable patrolling the Bigg Market area. When asked where the more problematic areas are
situated, the police officer replied, “Well, you’re looking at it [Bigg Market], I mean, look –
it’s a shithole. We always get trouble round here”. Many consumers I encountered elsewhere
in the city also stated their caution and distrust of the Bigg Market at night, largely due to its
reputation, but also because of the very real visual and aural aesthetics which characterise the
area: the cheesy 80s and 90s pop / dance music spills out onto the streets, along with
boisterous revellers who are met with a significant police presence. The atmosphere can also,
at times, be quite intimidating. Speaking to consumers who usually frequented bars on the
Diamond Strip, it became evident that certain social groups pertained to different locales,
where Bigg Market consumers would less than likely drink, for instance, on the Diamond
Strip, and vice versa. I discuss the reasons for this later in the chapter.
The Quayside
Another eminent nightlife location is the Quayside. As I outlined in chapter 4, the Quayside
area recently underwent a comprehensive redevelopment programme, and has since become a
major landmark in Newcastle’s contemporary regional promotion imagery. Alongside the
Sage Entertainment Complex, the Millennium Bridge, the Baltic Centre for Contemporary
115
Art, gentrified office and apartment buildings, and other upmarket leisure infrastructure such
as the Malmaison Hotel and Brasserie, redevelopment in this area has also involved the
assembly of numerous bars and clubs, some of which have been refurbished and upgraded,
which led to another burgeoning nightlife locale. Initially quite upmarket and exclusive, the
Quayside has since become much more accessible and now caters predominantly for the
mass-market. However, it is also thought that the Quayside’s nightlife has suffered
economically in recent years, experiencing a decline in local usage and becoming heavily
reliant on visitors to the city. Due to mass mediated imagery, it was argued that tourist’s
exclusively associate nightlife in Newcastle with the Quayside area. As described by one
operator:
“You’ve got the Quayside, which, to be honest, the locals of Newcastle, don’t really go there
anymore; that place purely survives, I would say, on out-of-towners. The quayside, 5 years
ago, when I worked at [Quayside bar] – [Quayside bar] got over 6000 people through the door
in 5 hours – but it’s nothing like that now down there. The only place that gets the nice people
is [Quayside nightclub], and they only really trade on a Saturday – same as most of the bars
down there; nobody really ventures down there from Newcastle, so it is just the out of towners
that drink there, stags, hens, people coming up for weekends, because that’s the only place
they know, that they’ve heard about” (Operator of mid-high market style bar, Diamond Strip).
This stagnation, however, could also be explained by way of venue decline in the area, since
many large-scale venues, such as Baja Beach Club and the Tuxedo Princess (known locally as
‘the Boat’23) in Gateshead have recently ceased trading. Anticipating transformations and
closing venues, consumers have moved elsewhere24. One particular nightclub, however,
remains popular, attracting students in the week and the more affluent of consumers and local
celebrities at weekends. As its manager described:
“Well, [the venue gets] students midweek, you know, some nights we change our policy;
you’ll see some venues that have the same music policy and same door policy every night of
the week. Where we’re situated, we have to try and change that and be a bit more diverse.
We try and get the students in the week, play student party themes and lower drink prices, and
weekends, we try to get the people that are aspiring to be you know, top of the social ladder –
it’s a nice clientele on a Friday night and Saturday – people that will spend a bit more money”
(Manager of upmarket nightclub, Quayside).
23 The Tuxedo Princess was an old ferry liner transformed into a nightclub docked on the Gateshead Quayside directly under the
Tyne Bridge. For many years it was widely recognised as a “charver haunt”.
24 This stagnation could also be explained through the rise in popularity of the Diamond Strip. I discuss this in greater depth in
chapter 7.
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In short, though, most Quayside venues cater much more for the mass market, their appeal
predicated on a broad spectrum of popular music, lack of specialisms and rather inexpensive
products and services, similar to those in the Bigg Market area (although with less stigma
attached in its representation by local consumers and operators).
The Gate Complex
The Gate is another key nightlife locale. The construction of the Gate complex – also
comprised of restaurants, a casino and a multiplex cinema – finished earlier this decade, and
is a recent addition to Newcastle’s contemporary leisure landscape. Although not exclusively
bars, clubs and pubs, the Gate complex and the adjoining Newgate Street is an extremely
popular locale due to the abundance of vertical drinking establishments. Some of these are of
a substantial size, and attract a huge amount of custom on weekends. One such venue plays a
significant role in this locale due to its large size, popularity, and perhaps its brand name (this
particular brand is propagated in most large UK cities, and its venue in London is hugely
popular with current celebrities, the more affluent of urbanites, and their followers25). In the
past, it tended to market for the slightly older social groups with higher incomes, and used to
be highly exclusive. However, over the years its market has broadened, as the manager
depicted:
“Yeah we do have different times, like we have a student night, which for [Gate venue brand],
when they opened up, all they wanted was 25-40 year olds, and all they wanted was that sort
of end of the market, the middle-age bracket with expendable income, no under-25s in, and
I’ve heard of people getting knocked back [refused entry] because they’re 46 or whatever, too
old and not getting in. So they were quite elitist, this is like 6 years ago, and then as the years
went by, as with big venues, they realised that you can’t fill them with that bit of the market.
And I think it had a negative effect on customer perception, so they opened up their doors a bit
more, and then they were never into student nights, but I think they saw a lot of the other
bigger companies – one that I used to work for – saw all the money churning through the
doors from the student nights and then decided to jump on the student bandwagon, and they
were quite successful, and still are. So you’ve got that crowd in during the week, but then
there’s the daytime and the lunch trade, and then the core Saturday night crowd. I would say
we are a multi-entertainment venue, 6 different rooms, different things going on, and we cater
now – which is why we’re popular for stag and hens – for every age group. You can have a
stag and hen party come in that might have an 18 year old in it, it might have a mother or
grandma of the bride, and hopefully there’s something in the building for them, because we’ve
25 Although as I stated in the methodology chapter, I refrain from naming particular brands and venues due to confidentiality
obligations.
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got 70s and 80s music, up to date house music in the club, and we’ve got a cheesy room, so
there’s a bit for everyone. I think we do cater for a big crowd, a big market” (Operator of
mass-market branded super-venue, The Gate).
Alongside, another bar also caters for a broad market. Entertainment-led, it offers similar
products but with a very different image, relying much more on party and hedonistic
signifiers:
“It’s a 1100 capacity, twin level bar, open 7 nights a week, oriented towards students during
the week and locals at a weekend. In contrast to some bars in the city centre, this is
completely entertainment orientated. We don’t do happy hours or discounted drinks, we just
don’t. We have three dancer stages, a resident rodeo bull, 50 grand’s worth of lighting rig,
100 grand’s worth of sound system, 34 big screens, 12 dancers work here; this is a show, a
theatre, this isn’t a boozer” (Marketing manager of mass-market bar, Newgate Street).
A similar market is sought by another nearby venue, which pertains again, to the party
crowds, playing mainstream popular music:
“We’re sort of a hybrid of activities. During the day we open as a bar and restaurant, and then
in the evening we attract the early drinker, and then after 10pm, we turn into a late night bar
with a late license. We are a very large bar so therefore we are general public and mass
market. We have 3 different rooms here and play 3 different styles of music, trying to appeal
a bit to everybody, but we try to stick to the golden rule, which is at weekends we are very
middle of the road – cheesy music – because we tend to find, even if people don’t admit it,
that they like the old cheesy songs while they’re getting in the mood and having a drink, and
we find that some come to us and then go to a different style of nightclub later on (Operator of
mass-market branded superclub, The Gate).
The Diamond Strip
Another major scene in Newcastle is the Diamond Strip, which is located primarily on
Collingwood Street, adjacent to the Central Station area. The term was coined in recent years
due to the gentrified, glamorous, fashionable, and more exclusive of bars located in the area.
One of the first successful style-bars in Newcastle – Apartment Luxebar and Dining Room –
was situated here, and since then a number of other style bars have taken place alongside.
Apartment was ostensibly one of the first of its kind in Newcastle – a London-esque cocktail
and premium-spirits bar that catered exclusively for the highest end of the market, frequented
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by many of the Newcastle United Football Club players, local and national celebrities, and
musicians when they were in town.
In 2008, however, the bar was re-branded as a Miami-style cocktail bar, reduced drinks and
entry prices, and began seeking a slightly wider consumer base due to changes in nightlife
preferences. Diamond Strip venue operators describe their bars in similar ways to each other,
highlighting the similar products and services on offer, but also the kind of consumers that the
venues seek as customers. The Diamond Strip, I argue, is an archetypal gentrified nightlife
enclave. Whilst some have rather inexpensive entry charges (or none at all), drinks prices on
the Diamond Strip are significantly higher than anywhere else in Newcastle (even the re-
branded Miami-style cocktail bar). The styling and décor of the venues themselves are
considerable, and as I show subsequently in this chapter, regulatory practices here are much
stricter, ensuring exclusivity to more affluent consumers and thus maintaining the most
lucrative market. The following accounts are descriptions of Diamond Strip venues by their
respective operators:
“We are sort of seen as an upmarket trendy bar, a place where typical students would come on
weeknights and then when it gets to Friday and Saturday you’ll see a lot of the older crowds,
like 35’s and older. They come in because we don’t do your cheap nasty bottles of VK and
stuff like that; we do flare barmen and cocktails and stuff like that, drinks that take time, and
we serve lots of bottles of wine and like I say, you see cocktails made in front of you and stuff
that not a lot of other places in town can offer, which attracts a lot of other people” (Manager
of mid-market style bar, Diamond Strip).
“We’ve dubbed it a super-micro-mini-club, because the capacity is not in the thousands which
you get in the [national chain venues] or [Gate venue brand], so we’re a super-micro-mini-
club, a “looks club”, if we can be so bold. Our clientele, if you go on ‘youtube’ and look it
up, you’ll see people like Cheryl Tweedy and the Girls Aloud girls kind of endorsing this
place when they were here on New Years Eve; Beverley Knight as well; Ricky Hatton comes
here frequently; we get all the footballers come here frequently, even the older footballers like
Rob Lee, Barton, Shearer; we get the Eagles [Newcastle basketball team], the Vipers
[Newcastle ice hockey team], all the sporting faces coming in. So I would say we get the
upper echelons of Newcastle, the crème de la crème of Newcastle I suppose” (Operator of
mid-high market style bar, Diamond Strip).
“Well, it’s marketed as a Miami Bar in the centre of Newcastle. So we’ve got a terrace
outside which you can go in and smoke, fairly tropical outlook; the drinks that we do are very
different to anything you’ll get elsewhere in Newcastle. We serve drinks in hollowed out
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melons, pineapples, coconuts, stuff like that which is a first for Newcastle. They are all very
fruity based keeping the top end products in them so we don’t use low quality rum or anything
like that, we stick to Mount Gay rum to use in cocktails, but still with very reasonable prices.
We had quite a big price reduction since it was Apartment, just to bring us in line with what
consumers are willing to spend these days” (Operator of themed mid-high market bar,
Diamond Strip).
I argue that these four main nightlife hotspots point to a segregated night-time economy,
which, to some degree, revolves around class (in both the taxonomic sense and – I show in the
coming pages – the cultural sense). These locales are comprised of similar venues with
specific scenes, where similar products, services and environments are on offer but only for
particular social groups. They are also hierarchical in their market scope; where the gentrified
Diamond Strip venues seek those with the higher incomes, the Gate and the Quayside seek
those in the middle, although with a degree of fluidity. The Bigg Market venues tend to seek
the lower markets by way of cheap drinks promotions, and they struggles to attract the higher-
spending consumers because of the area’s related imagery. Whilst it is no great surprise that
there are distinctions between different markets and consumers based on income and nightlife
preferences, the importance here is how the cultural politics of youth and class continue to
influence the spatial forms of the night-time economy, which involve images, reputations,
notions of access, exclusion and segregation. What is evident is that consumers, markets,
images and representations are all thought of and expressed in very specific ways, with
representations of certain groups, including those of contemporary troublesome youth,
playing key roles in how admittance policies, dress codes, rejections and exclusions are
articulated and practiced. It is these issues to which I now turn.
6.3 Consumer Identities and the Embodied Performance of Class: The Cultural
Politics of Exclusion
One of the fundamental elements in the processes of exclusion at work in contemporary
night-time economies is the visual display of class through consumer identities vis-à-vis the
chav. As I illustrated previously, academic commentators have already documented the many
different examples of exclusion that aim to curtail the presence of the chav in the consumer
oriented post-industrial city, where certain commodities have become labels signifying
delinquency through the reworking of the underclass discourse which pervaded 1990s social
rhetoric by the right-wing (Hayward and Yar, 2006; Johnson, 2008; Tyler, 2006). However,
the embodiment of working-classness through comportment, speech, demeanour and
behaviour has also transformed to symbolize economic redundancy, social exclusion and
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disgusting non-respectability (McDowell, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007; Skeggs, 1999, 2005). This
relationship between consumption, embodiment and class has also become an intrinsic part of
the regulation of the night-time economy, where, as I show in this section, symbols of
deviance, in their tangible and non-tangible forms, are yet again sought out in the
identification of the wrong consumer and used to justify rejection from the more fashionable
and gentrified of nightlife spaces in Newcastle.
Visualising Class through Consumer Identity: Exclusion through Appearance
During the research, bouncers and venue operators described different groups of consumers in
different ways. From this I could make out a three tier hierarchy determined by a
combination of class, age, gender and culture-based categories. At the top are those with the
higher incomes, celebrities, and sports-people, variously depicted by the participants as
“champagne charlies”, the “VIP crowd”, the “crème-de-la-crème of Newcastle”, the “upper
echelons of Newcastle”, the “nicer clientele”, “people who want to be seen”, “the beautiful
people” and the “wannabe wags who think they’re going to bag themselves a footballer”. In
the middle are the mass market consumers, students, and those with cash to spend. And at the
bottom are the “blue-collar crowd” (as described in one interview) or, using the most popular
term, ‘charvers’. Corresponding to the segregation of Newcastle’s night-time economy, the
gentrified Diamond Strip venues, and to some degree venues situated in the Gate and on the
Quayside, had this particular group in mind when it came to issues of access and exclusion.
In most interviews, some of the responses to questions about the ‘wrong consumer’ became
all too familiar. As the following quote illustrates, defamatory representations of
contemporary troublesome youth are used by operators to help articulate those to be denied
access:
“We [bar chain] don’t say you can’t come in because you’ve got trainers on or jeans on; I
don’t approve of door policies, or elitism in any way. Anyone who walks to the door is taken
on face value – do you look like a reasonable customer? We won’t let you in if you’re drunk
because were breaking the law by serving you drink, we don’t want a problem customer, so
outside that, you get ‘do you want a group of stags to come in’? Some people would say that
we don’t let stag parties in but we don’t really follow those rules either. You can get a group
of chaps come along and they’ve all got welsh rugby tops on and you just know that in the
daytime they’re all wearing shirts and ties and they’re absolutely fine, and you can try and
enforce a policy on the door saying no sportswear and you know you can’t let people in that
really should have been let in. It’s just about thinking whether that person’s a good customer.
Outside all of that lot there is unfortunately a subculture in this country now, almost a sort of
sub-class person which is the chav, or charver as we call them in Newcastle, and its very
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unlikely on face value that they would get into the bar; you can recognise them because
they’ve got the worn out grey tracksuits on and the sort of drawn cheeks and rat features. You
know the ones I mean, they’re everywhere, not just in Newcastle but all over the country, and
they are a problem. I don’t know where they’re going to go and what’s going to happen to
them, how they’re going to grow up to be anything other than what they are, and I do think, if
you don’t mind me straying off and talking about youth cultures, that’s part of the huge
problem we’ve got in the country […] A chav by very definition is somebody who’s going to
be work-shy, on a methadone programme, have loads of kids on benefit, wear the biggest
hoop earrings they can find, and they look at each other and they admire each other and that’s
it, they’re in that mould and stay there for the rest of their lives. I think that’s a huge problem.
So, if you want me to categorise a group of people who you think are problematic, they are”
(Owner / Executive of leisure and design group).
And of course, the identification of this particular group relies on some of the contemptuous
symbols which signify this new underclass. As I illustrated in chapter 3, extant processes of
exclusion depend on the new markers of deviance which make the new underclass
immediately visible. Recognising that these symbols of deviance remain high on the
regulatory agenda in Newcastle, on one particular night when speaking to door staff at a Bigg
Market club, I began enquiring by taking a similar route to that taken in the interviews with
the operators:
Aidan: What kind of place is this?
Doorman: It’s just your party club you know? Go in and get pissed, be a bit lairy if you want,
but not too lairy mind.
Aidan: So what kind of people are you looking for, clientele wise?
Doorman: Students’, mainly students’, anyone really, as long as they look OK and they act
OK.
I proceeded with the following, anticipating the all too familiar answer that charvers are
denied entry, and identified through certain symbols:
Aidan: So who won’t you let in?
Doorman: People that look under age, or if they haven’t got any I.D., people who look like
they’ve had too much [alcohol] already; no charvers.
Aidan: No charvers?
Doorman: Yeah, basically no charvers; Henry Lloyd, Rockport, Lacoste, all that kind of stuff
doesn’t get in because it looks … it’s got a bad image. It’s just their general appearance
really. We try to keep the place looking nice and not too threatening really.
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There were other markers identified by the door staff as well – Timberland, Burberry and Ben
Sherman were other fashion labels under scrutiny by the doormen. Sometimes people would
be let in if wearing some of these brands, but if their clothing contributed to a general
appearance of a charver, then more than often they would be refused entry. This was made
evident by another doorman working at a bar on the Diamond Strip:
“Well, you’ve just got to take people as they come really. There’s a few things that we look
out for, you know, if they’ve had too much to drink, underage or if they look like they might
be trouble […] I guess we look at appearance and how that might look in the bar you know,
some types of clothes and certain brands we pay attention to, charver kind of wear, that sort of
thing: as long as they don’t look too much like a charver... [they will be granted access]”
(Diamond strip venue doorman, emphasis added).
The “cruel irony” (Hayward and Yar, 2006: 22) here is that these particular brands are not
cheap, yet serve to elucidate social and cultural deviance. As Hayward and Yar (2006) argue,
whilst contemporary non-working-class youth are striving to construct identity through
conspicuous forms of hyper-consumption commensurate with late-capitalist sociality, and
whilst valorising the very commodities they are ‘instructed’ to buy in these neoliberal times,
the excessive and profligate ways in which these are projected have become “tools of
classification and identification by which agencies of social control construct profiles of
potential criminal protagonists” (p. 23). They not only play a part in Newcastle’s night-time
economy, but also in Leicester for example, where local bars, along with the police, are
composing lists of particular brands of clothing that are widely associated with problematic
youth (Hayward and Yar, 2006).
In some respects, the prohibition of these items suggests a dress code at play – itself a wholly
unremarkable method of consumer regulation practised for decades in the night-time
economy. However, whilst dress codes are traditionally thought of as tightly-bound rules
declaring banned or restricted items (such as the previously ubiquitous ‘no trainers’ policy),
the research revealed that the construction and execution of dress codes is a very fluid
process. In one of the earliest interviews, I asked the operator of the Bigg Market superclub if
the venue employs a dress code:
Operator: Yeah, but it’s a fluid one. I famously got quoted in FHM [men’s magazine] saying
‘a student can come down in a scruffy pair of jeans and a t-shirt and trainers and get in, a
charver can come down in a five hundred pound suit and get knocked back’. That’s the kind
of thing we’re looking at, where it’s not just about brands or anything like that, but there are
certain brands that do get labelled with the wrong kind of crowd, which you’ve got to be
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aware of; other than that it is pretty flexible […] I mean image is a certain part of it, and
there’s certain sectors of the community that would never ever get into Blu Bambu, there’s no
denying that, but it’s kind of middle of the road, very much open to everybody really. If you
make the effort to get in then you’ll get in. I mean, if you come down with a Berghaus
[jacket] on, trainers and tracksuit bottoms you’re not going to get in full stop, no matter how
nice a person you are […] It shouldn’t do but a lot of venues, a lot of premises go on brands as
well, there are certain brands that will not get in anywhere, and it’s not the brand’s fault, it’s
just the people who have associated themselves with that brand. You think a kid walking
round with tracksuit bottoms on, black shoes, with a Berghaus on, you’re going to presume
something aren’t you?
Dress codes are thus not as rigid as they first might appear, although it is evident by way of
the above interview extract that symbols of deviance relating to current representations of the
chav are still called upon to verbalize the criteria for rejection and exclusion. Sometimes,
where operators struggle to define a dress code, or aver they simply do not employ one,
deviant youth semantics are used outright to exemplify exclusions. In an interview with the
manager of a branded mid-market style bar in the Gate, I began asking about door policies
and dress codes and how these help filter access according to appearance. Rather than listing
brands or commodities in describing restricted appearances, he simply used representations of
the charver to outline those not wanted as consumers:
Manager: We’re very strict on the door so we don’t let in certain clientele, we don’t let in
certain, well, charvers basically, we don’t let them in, but irrespective of that, if we do have
anybody in here who’s causing trouble we try and eject them as quickly as possible really.
Aidan: So do you have a particular dress code?
Manager: I wouldn’t say it’s a dress code, it’s just more general appearance, and how
intoxicated they are.
Aidan: Is certain clothing banned?
Manager: Stripy tops [laughs]. Charvers...charvers and kickeys, that’s what’s banned
(emphasis added).
The fluid nature of identity seems to be one of the main reasons why operators do not
stipulate a specific dress code, and operators who do set a loose dress code for their venue are
less likely to ban specific items or brands outright. Contra Hayward and Yar (2006), certain
places in Newcastle’s night-time economy are not merely “policing by labels”. This is
because some people may wear ‘chav brands’ without appearing to actually be a chav. The
hesitation to employ a strict dress code as a method for regulating access is thus due to its
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incapability to filter consumers effectively. As one major club operator illustrated in an
interview:
Operator: There is obviously some element as with any major city. You’ve always got your
charvers as they’re called, in any city, but in terms of this particular business, we don’t deal
with that side of the market. Most people know what makes a chav quite distinguishable, the
way they dress, the way they speak, the way they put themselves across; people like that
certainly wouldn’t get into this venue. There are places that cater for that market.
Aidan: So you would say that some people are perceived to be a nuisance or troublesome?
Operator: Yeah absolutely, like I said in every city you’re always going to have the people
who are known trouble makers, and people who just may look drunk or whatever, to be
honest.
Aidan: So the people that might be trouble or a nuisance, how do you identify them? Do you
use these specific terms like chavs or charvers?
Operator: It’s not really as simple as that. A lot of it comes down to gut instinct. At the end
of the day, just because someone’s wearing a certain item of clothing doesn’t necessarily
make them a chav, or a person that might go fighting or whatever. We have certain policies in
place that minimise that – obviously chavs do wear certain brands of clothing – and if you
eliminate them from the dress code, it narrows it down, so the chances of them getting in are
slim. And that’s kind of the way we operate.
Visualising Class through Embodiment: Exclusion through Performance
The aim of regulating access, as I show in the next chapter, is to permit those who appear
cash-rich and who meet admittance criteria, but, as many operators suggested, appearances
through consumer identities alone cannot signify the presence of the wrong consumer who
purportedly discourage the cash-rich. The ways in which potential customers socially
perform are also assessed, and for this, a more interactive approach to regulation is needed.
As one nightclub manager stated, “Our door supervisors are constantly talking to people and
they’ve got to make that judgement whether we let them into the club” (Manager of upmarket
nightclub, Quayside). Following on from the previous interview excerpt, the nightclub
operator elaborated on the methods through which potential consumers are assessed prior to
entry:
Operator: The policy we operate is more about the person and the attitude rather than just
what they’re wearing. So if someone’s coming in with a particular brand that we don’t let into
the club, it could just be a person from out of town and very nice or they’re a student, or just
didn’t know that this was classed as chav-wear if you like, so you take it on each basis, and
the way that I employ the door staff is to interact with all the customers, so they speak to all
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the customers that come in so they can get a feel for what that person’s like, the way they
come across, they’re attitude etcetera; when they’re speaking to the door staff, you can tell a
lot by a person by the way they interact with you.
[…]
Aidan: What kind of criteria do you use in assessing the person then?
Operator: You can only really take people as you find them, because when someone arrives at
the front door, you don’t necessarily know their background, you don’t know what they do
professionally or if they work at all or if they’re students; people dress and act in certain ways
from different genres in life, and you can have an idea of what the person’s like, without
having talked to them it’s a stab in the dark. So that’s why we engage with all the customers
in conversation.
This particular interview was vital in shedding light on the ways in which the regulation of
access operates. As the manager stated, there is more to being a chav than simply the wearing
of symbols of deviance, although these do remain on the exclusion agenda. The point here is
that attitude, behaviour, bodily comportment and social performance are also assessed prior to
admittance in a convergence of methods of identification. Access to various spaces within
Newcastle’s night-time economy, then, is not simply regulated through a set of deviant
commodities associated with the chav as may first appear, but is also predicated on the
visualisation of class through embodied performances. On various observation nights, I paid
attention to the ways in which people approached venue’s front doors. I noted their behaviour
and their appearance, including the style of clothes they were wearing. Some approached in
large groups, and some were rather boisterous, talking and laughing loudly with friends.
Some were turned away and some were granted entry. As I continued to ask door staff why
some were turned away, it became obvious that appearance through dress was actually less of
a concern that the performance of a problematic – and predominantly masculine – class status.
Those who appeared to have a rather machismo attitude, evident through their demeanour and
comportment, were most of the time rejected. It seemed as if specific displays of masculinity
associated with the young working-class are not welcome. “Aggressive attitudes”, “yobby
kind-of attitudes” and “people who think they’re hard” were all expressions used by bouncers
to illustrate the performative ways in which people are perceived as troublesome and unfitting
with certain venue’s images. In this way, performance itself also becomes a signifier of
deviance. As a Bigg Market club operator stated:
“We’re looking at the person and what clothes they’re wearing, and if they’re behaving
themselves and approaching the staff in the correct manner they’ll get let in, but if not, it
doesn’t matter if you’re wearing a five hundred pound suit you can still get knocked back.
[…]
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I mean we can we look at people and how they walk and stuff like that, it’s bizarre but, a kid
who’s a bit of a jack the lad and thinks he’s the man, will strut himself differently from what
me and you would.
[…]
This is how much we analyse customers coming in, if you’re in the queue with your friends
and you’re dicking about in the queue, you’re going to get knocked back, you know? And it’s
this kind of like, that’s how sensitive we get because we don’t want people dicking about
inside the club and, knocking people’s drinks over the nice £50 dress that she’s just bought,
you know?” (Operator of mass-market, themed and branded superclub, Bigg Market).
Anoop Nayak (2006) found something similar in his study of charver youth in Newcastle.
Although not exclusively located in a night-time leisure context, Nayak discovered that
charver lads were “engaged in the body-reflexive technique of ‘hard’ masculinity” where
their walk and talk, and strong associations with crime and disorder came to “symbolize the
stunted evolution of the ‘knuckle-grazing’ Charver youth” (p. 823). Other venues employed
similar frameworks to identify these bodily performances, and bars on the Diamond Strip
seemed even stricter in their regulation practices. For a gentrified high-style bar adjacent to
Collingwood Street, attitude, comportment, as well as consumer appearance are assessed prior
to entry, as this interview excerpt illustrates:
Aidan: So it’s charvers that don’t get in?
Operator of style bar, Diamond Strip: When I say charvers I mean, the likes of anybody
wearing like, Henry Lloyd, Rockport’s, no hair on the sides, the hair on the top gelled down,
maybe a horrible tattoo on their hand, you know? It’s really hard to define. Some charvers
will try and dress nice, but they’ll still be charvers at the end of the day; it’s just the way they
look, the attitude they have when they walk towards the door, the way when you ask them,
“you alright guys, you had a good night, where have you been”, and their response is … you
know, you kind of decide from things like that as well (emphasis added).
But the assessment of performance is extremely difficult to define with there being no real
clear-cut conditions for admittance or rejection. As one manager suggested, ‘feel’ and
‘experience’ play intrinsic roles in the evaluation of potential consumers:
“The bottom line, legally, we challenge everybody for ID if they appear to be under 21, but
over that, I think it’s a question of, do they look right, do they feel right, are they right for the
particular session we’re trying to do? There’s a saying that we have here – you can’t mix
foxes and chickens – so you’ve got to look for the chickens, but if only it was as simple as
that. Seeing a fella with a bushy tail can sometimes be tricky, you’re not always going to get
it right, but again, with everything, it’s all about experience and they [the door staff] can tell
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who’s who and what’s what you know?” (Marketing manager of mass-market bar, Newgate
Street).
And this was reiterated by another club operator:
“When people come to us, we react to them in different ways. Yes, we look at what they’re
wearing, we look at their behaviour or their attitude when they come to the door, and yes, if
they are known – because we have a good pubwatch scheme in Newcastle – if they are
known, they’ll be knocked back immediately. If we feel that they’re trouble then we have
very experienced door staff on and quite a settled team here and they won’t get in” (Operator
of mass-market branded superclub, The Gate).
Visualising the ‘wrong consumer’ through admittance policies, then, is difficult to define, not
only by myself here, but also by venue operators themselves. Admittance policies that are
easy to define are legal obligations: admittances to under-18s and people perceived to be
drunk or intoxicated are strictly prohibited, an infraction of which sometimes resulting in the
loss of an alcohol premise license. But otherwise, regulatory mechanisms that help filter and
exclude are unstable and sometimes contradictory systems. Dress codes are no longer
specific rules and regulations for entry but rather guidelines that are used to help identify
unwanted customers who are most of the time articulated through semantics of yob and chav
culture. Representations are thus used to illustrate undesirable customers, and despite a
hesitance to stipulate which markers are banned outright, the symbols of deviance associated
with the chav, such as specific clothing brands, remain on the operator’s exclusionary agenda.
But as some maintain, the practice of banning specific brands, or perhaps more accurately,
those wearing specific brands, is not absolute. It seems that if these brands contribute to an
overall look of ‘chavness’, say, only then will individuals or groups be denied access.
The embodiment of class is also intrinsic to the regulation of admittance. Those who display
a masculinity deemed problematic through demeanour, comportment, speech, attitude and
social disposition are immediately repudiated as part of an expanding representational
collective of troublesome youth – be it the yob or the chav. And what seems to be the case, is
that issues of embodiment seem to be entirely exclusive to young men. All of the interview
and observation fieldwork excerpts I have presented so far emphasise masculinity in the
identification and exclusion process. In both the interviews and the observation work, there
was no explicit reference to young women in the regulation of access unless I brought it up.
This points, perhaps, to a representational process which only addresses masculinity and class
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in the repudiation of the chav phenomenon, rather than just class, as has been widely argued
by a range of media, social and academic commentators.
Problematic Masculinities
In later interviews, I persisted with questions relating to problematic masculinities because
even though the chav phenomenon – as an emblem of recent class-based cultural politics – is
not purportedly exclusive to masculine youth identities, most of the research participants
seemed to be talking about young working-class men in discussions surrounding the chav and
charver. In some of the interviews, a number of different responses transpired when I
questioned the gender politics at play in the night-time economy. For example, when
speaking to the manager of a number of stigmatised Bigg Market premises, the behavioural
characteristics of young men and women when located in the night-time economy were
perceived to be the same and so not influence the difference in regulation:
Aidan: Would you say there’s a difference between regulating men and women? Would you
refuse entry to more blokes than women?
Manager: Not really … women can be just as bad as the men. Once they’ve had a drink they
can be just as bad. Men might be a bit more violent when they’re drunk and kick off, but the
women I’ve seen, no matter where you go, women are just as bad.
But of course, managers have diverse views, and where some think that women’s behaviour is
as unruly as men’s when out on the town, others think differently:
Aidan: Is there a difference between the admittance of young men and young women? Is the
regulation of young men stricter?
Marketing manager of entertainment-led bar, Newgate Street: I’m going to say no because the
basic criteria for entry would remain the same. If you’re drunk, intoxicated, if you appear to
have done anything dodgy, if you’re unsuitably dressed, and you appear to be an undesirable
element then no. I think it pretty much applies across the board. Generally, the fairer sex tend
to have a little more self-respect, they tend to be better, and don’t get smashed as often, and
maybe that’s a sexist view but you see less of them fighting and causing trouble than you do
chavs, but generally I think it’s about the same.
After struggling with the issue slightly, I took a slightly different line of questioning in further
interviews. In a subsequent meeting, the manager of an upmarket cocktail bar gave a more
elaborate response which brought back in to play the ubiquitous signifiers of the new
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underclass. According to him, young men are easier to distinguish as charvers compared to
young women when located in the night-time economy:
Aidan: Is the charver thing a male issue?
Manager: No not strictly, with regard to the door they’re probably more noticeable; you know
men are probably more distinguishable than their legged counterparts if you like, because the
uniform is much more identifiable, where for the girls it’s a lot less strict … It’s easier to tell
with men, with the male charvers it’s easier to tell, because the image is there. With the girls
they could be a posh rah student wearing a short skirt or they can be a penniless girl from the
west end wearing a very short skirt – it’s so much more difficult to tell. It’s a harder job for
the door staff. Attitude, the way they walk, the way they talk, that’s a different thing that just
comes from experience. There’s no uniform as such.
Aidan: Would you say that you turn more men away in a night than you would women?
Manager: Probably yeah, unintentionally yeah, for whatever reason, for already having had
too much alcohol or not looking the part or being in a big group, yeah.
A similar response was given by a Diamond Strip bar operator. Again, the dialogue seemed
to impart the idea that the consumer symbols which demarcate the chav pertain more to male
youth, making them increasingly stand out in a terrain which values ‘higher’ and more
‘distinguished’ forms of consumption:
Aidan: Is the charver issue more a male issue?
Diamond Strip bar operator: No there’s girl charvers that we knock back, but girl charvers
always kick up more of a stink than guys will; guys will generally accept it and walk away,
you always get the ones that look at themselves and go, “my shoes cost 190 quid” –
Rockport’s do, they’re very expensive, but they’re still hideous.
Aidan: So it’s a case of bad labels?
Operator: Well that’s it, the make’s are really expensive, some of my shoes don’t cost
anywhere near that, and Henry Lloyds and that, they’re not cheap items of clothing by any
means, but, nobody will let them in because they’re associated with a certain type of person.
It thus seems that the signifiers of deviance vis-à-vis the chav – the clothing and embodied
performances etc. – are much more closely tied to young men than young women in the
regulation of the night-time economy. According to the operators, it is easier to identify a
charver if they are male due to both consumer identities and the performance of a
problematic, lower-class masculinity through attitude, demeanour and comportment.
Expressions of a ‘uniform’ also reinforces the demarcation of a problematic social group in
which young men increasingly catch the eye, whilst young charver women, it seems, despite
being continually represented by their lower social class in a range of contexts, are able to
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escape the strictures of an otherwise prohibitive consumer identity associated with the chav
phenomenon.
‘Self-Regulation’ and Extended Networks of Exclusion
Whilst there is an unaccountable occurrence of direct rejection at the door through the
identification of deviant consumer sensibilities, problematic social performances and
delinquent behaviour, exclusion is also achieved through a kind of ‘self-regulation’. Despite
some getting ‘knocked back’ (rejected by bouncers when trying to gain entry into a premise),
certain consumers have become aware of their socio-cultural night-time position and overlook
the more exclusive bars, even locales, knowing of potential rejection. Put simply, they don’t
bother trying to gain entry to the more exclusive, sometimes even mid-market bars and ‘stick
to their own patch’. As one operator put it:
We don’t actively advertise it, but charvers don’t try and get in now. The first 12 months in
[venue’s] history – because of our position, where we are, we’re not exactly in the most
deluxe part of the city, the bottom part of the Bigg Market now is well known to be run-down,
and that’s probably where most of the charvers go out drinking – but in its first two years I
think, on a Saturday night we’d be knocking back up to 2000 people who just weren’t suitable
for the venue. Over the years that’s tapered off and tapered off because in certain levels,
certain people find out that they’re not suitable, but we’ve still got people coming and saying
they’ve been trying to get in for three or four years. We don’t actively advertise it; word of
mouth is the best way of advertising anyway. You know, the people you don’t want in know
they can’t get in, so there’s no point in them trying to go for it you know? (Operator of mass-
market, themed and branded superclub, Bigg Market emphases added).
This was also made evident by a Diamond Strip bar operator:
Operator: Sometimes maybe, the majority of people know if they’ll get into us, or
“Apartment” [old Diamond Strip venue] or places like that, and they’ll know if they won’t get
in so they won’t bother trying.
Aidan: So some places are kind of ‘self-regulating’?
Operator: Yeah, you just know yourself. If you like drinking in certain circles and like
certain products and paying a certain amount of money then you know that you’re not going
to get that in other places.
For other venues, this mode of self-regulation means that venue security can be reduced,
especially at the door. At one particular bar on Grey Street, I was initially surprised at there
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being only one member of venue security. Being a very upmarket and expensive bar, I
approached under the impression that security would be paramount in the protection from
undesirable consumers. As I enquired as to why there is so little security, the reasons were
stipulated thus:
“There’s only certain people that want to come here anyway you know? Mainly because it’s
expensive and only people who earn a bit more money can afford it and those people tend to
be a bit older, so we don’t really get many young people coming in, like students and stuff”
(Grey Street upmarket bar doorman).
However, on the contrary, some perhaps disregard their night-time social status and attempt
entry anywhere. Nights out for most people are significant events in their social calendar and
I was made aware by one operator that a single rejection would not be enough to deter people
from attempting entry elsewhere, no matter what their social status in contemporary
nightscapes. In an interview with the operations manager of a Bigg Market nightclub and bar:
Manager: Yeah, well the people that get refused entry, they’ll try anywhere, whether it be the
Diamond Strip, Jesmond, where ever they can get into next … if it’s me or you and we get
knocked back from one place, we’re going to try another place aren’t we? So, people go
anywhere really.
Aidan: So it’s a case of going to different places until you get in?
Manager: Yeah.
However, sometimes these constant efforts are thwarted due to the potency of regulation and
security in the night-time economy. Where the spatial organisation of the night-time
economy was heavily regulated in the past, the regulation of security was very slack. In
contrast, contemporary nightlife safety measures are heavily controlled. Where bouncers
used to act independently, they are now subject to increasing conformity through security
licenses. At the current juncture, everyone involved in working as venue security must have
specific training and fulfil the obligations of a license granted by the SIA (Security Industry
Authority). This has also led to an increase in cooperation between venue security and the
police. The following interview excerpt outlines this relationship:
“It’s simply not the case that doorman and police are at each other’s throats anymore, which
they might have been for a very long time. A little known fact about Newcastle city centre:
the head doorman of every major club in Newcastle city centre has a police radio. They have
2 radio’s on their belt – one is internal and one is external – and if somebody’s seriously
ejected from a bar or there’s an issue that they think the police should know about, they have
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an external radio; for example, “we’ve knocked back 5 guys in yellow t-shirts who we don’t
think are suitable for the venue, you might want to pass that round to the rest of the premises”.
There is a massive flow of information between the police and the operators now which has
never been before” (Marketing manager of mass-market bar, Newgate Street).
This has also enabled the practice of multiple exclusions, where bouncers at one venue will
advise and update those at another if a group deemed unsuitable are rejected and moved on.
Around the Gate complex area, a number of venues are in contact with each other throughout
the night, as the marketing manager of an entertainment-led bar informed me:
“For example, [Gate bar] is next door to [another Gate Bar]; if they get knocked back from
[Gate bar] they’re not going to get in here – they won’t automatically deny anybody entry but,
if our colleagues down the street are clearly unhappy with them, it’s unlikely we would take
their business. Again, if at [Gate bar] they refuse someone entry or eject somebody it’s
extremely unlikely that we will let them in, and again, the head doorman at [Gate bar] used to
be the head doorman here. Many of our lads are close with the guys at [Gate bar], and down
the street, you can physically see down the street who’s been knocked back” (Marketing
manager of mass-market bar, Newgate Street).
So, if the majority of exclusions are articulated by a repudiation of the charver element, we
can think of Newcastle’s night-time economy as a landscape of multiple exclusions where
those who are deemed charvers are rejected from numerous venues until they are granted
entry somewhere, more often than not, in locales and venues perceived as charver bars, as
these are the only spaces in which ‘lower’ citizens are permitted. As I show in the next
chapter, despite a pervasive occurrence of expulsion within Newcastle’s nightlife, exclusion
should not be understood as a systemic embargo preventing participation in city centre
nightlife completely, but rather a filtering process which helps redistribute different groups to
different segments.
6.4 Conclusion: Reconstituting Delinquent Youth
In this section, I want to present four main conclusions. First, a number of commodities and
consumer identities continue to assist in the demarcation of delinquent youth. Where groups
such as the mods and rockers (Cohen, 1972), the teds and the skinheads (see Hall and
Jefferson, 1976; Hebdige, 1979) are traditional precedents of this process, the ‘chav’ has
become the latest pervasive representation of delinquent youth in Britain to be constructed
through consumerist aesthetics. As I illustrated in chapter 3, in the media the term has been
used to distinguish those who would have previously been enveloped by the underclass
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discourse which dominated 1990s rhetoric on the urban poor – those who are dependant on
state benefits, the promiscuous teenage single mothers, the delinquent and criminal young
men, the feckless, anti-social, and the socially excluded. The underclass phenomenon,
however, has taken on new forms of consumption as its defining characteristics. This is no
less the case within contemporary nightscapes. As the example of Newcastle shows, the
multitude of brands, labels, clothing, and other commodities are used to help identify those
deemed the wrong consumer in the mass market and gentrified venues.
I am sure that by now it is common knowledge that entry into night-time drinking
establishments is nigh on impossible if wearing a Burberry baseball cap, such that the media
(and academic commentators) have overwhelmingly documented and supported examples of
such exclusions (Hayward and Yar, 2006; Coleman, 2005; McDowell, 2006). But as I
illustrated above, regulatory processes revolving around consumer aesthetics in post-
industrial Newcastle are not as clear cut as they first appear. Branded clothing associated
with the chav is not actually prohibited outright, but is used, where necessary, in the
evaluation of a ‘chavvy’ appearance. Put simply, it seems that if there are too many of these
signifiers, rejection is a likely outcome. Furthermore, interview responses where the term
charver was used to describe the rejection agenda outright points to the ubiquity of the term
and its associated signifiers in the contemporary social consciousness.
Second, I argue that embodiment also remains a fundamental aspect in the creation of ‘the
other’, and contributes to the perpetual construction of delinquent youth identities. In
addition to the tangible symbols of social deviance, the identification process in Newcastle’s
nightlife is also reliant on the more performative, kinaesthetic, and embodied signifiers of
deviance, but this is less to do with a policy constructed by operators and more to do with the
discretion of venue door staff and how they perceive the potential of consumers in terms of
their economic viability and cultural applicability to the venue. Of course, in line with the
transactional approach to deviance (Becker, 1963; Cohen, 1972) those who embody particular
class-based signifiers are not deviant per se. Instead, their bodies and the symbols of class
they personify are constructed as deviant by wider society and the operators and bouncers
who regulate their night-time presence. To gain entry into the gentrified nightlife
environments, consumers have to look a certain way (highly styled, brands not associated
with the tasteless, non-respectable working class for instance), act a certain way, have a non-
threatening demeanour, and embody features of the middle class. For the highly stylised
environments, those perceived as charvers are therefore excluded because they are not the
“beautiful people” (to use one of the participant’s phrases); they fail to dress accordingly, and
more importantly, they embody a number of signifiers which do not conform to prescribed
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images of the styled, cash-rich, predominantly middle-class consumers. As Anoop Nayak
found in his research, “Charvers were said to affect a loping stride and exaggerated, rough
‘Geordie’ accents. The Charver walk ‘head down … with an arched back’ was a sign of
acting ‘hard’ and provided evidence of their subhuman, animalistic tendencies” (Nayak, 2003:
315). Embodied deviance is thus represented, in that the “movement of human bodies … is
never separate from consciousness and representation” (Cresswell, 2006: 73).
Third, working-class masculinity continues to be emphasised in contemporary constructions
of delinquency. As this research shows, despite a slight denial that young men are perceived
to be increasingly problematic compared to young women, the participants illustrated a
general bias toward masculinity when describing the chav as the wrong consumer. Although
the chav representation in wider society encompasses both masculine and feminine
delinquency, its operation in contemporary nightscapes seems to only refer to the exclusion of
young men. This raises some fundamental issues, particularly concerning notions of access to
cultural capital. As Nayak has illustrated, a number of young men in Newcastle ritually
participate in nightlife to express their locally-specific working-class masculinities that were
hitherto forged through industrial production (Nayak, 2003a, 2003b). However, young men
of the ‘non-respectable’ working class (or the ‘non-working class’), i.e. charvers, whilst long
restricted from extant systems of production, are also restricted in their capacity to negotiate
their masculinity and sociality through contemporary leisure structures, exacerbating their
social exclusion and cultural disparagement. In this respect, whilst Nayak argues that class
demarcation “is an unflinching whiplash that does not swerve between the deserving and
undeserving, the clean and the filthy, the tasteful and the distasteful, the modest and
excessive, the ‘ruff’ and respectable” (Nayak, 2006: 827-8), the above accounts, I argue,
illustrate that it does. Throughout the research, there were subtle (and most of the time
implicit) demarcations between the respectable working class, and the non-respectable non-
working class, exemplified foremost by the exclusion of those encapsulated by the
masculinised chav representation.
Fourth, and finally, I argue that the spatial processes discussed in this chapter are
symptomatic of a Cresswellian “normative landscape” at work (Cresswell, 1996). Chatterton
and Hollands, through their various pieces of research, came to a similar conclusion:
“Cresswell (1996) discusses the relationship between place and ideology, and
specifically that certain places contain particular meanings and expectations of
behaviour. Mainstream society has its own set of rather overt taken-for-granted
norms and sense of limits, reinforced and circulated by an ever growing media and
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advertising industry. In day-to-day urban life there are few presentations of
alternative possibilities and little questioning of the legitimacy of the dominant social
order. In this way, mainstream nightlife is a ‘normative landscape’ in which
particular actions and behaviours have become pre-inscribed, tolerated and accepted,
while others are not. This is a geography of common sense which renders
unacceptable the other, the different, the dirty. One has to look a certain way … be
expected to pay certain prices … and accept certain codes and regulations’
(Chatterton and Hollands, 2003: 107-108).
In defining deviance and delinquency, be it through the vast array of consumer symbols
relating to the chav, or the performance of non-respectable social class through bodily
movement / demeanour / comportment, the operators and bouncers of Newcastle’s night-time
economy are constructing boundaries of appropriate and inappropriate socio-spatial practice.
These are then reinforced through a continuous system of exclusion that helps keep different
consumers (themselves categorised around ideas of class) in different places. These processes
have become so pervasive that in some respects, nightlife in Newcastle regulates itself. Some
consumers, through repeated rejection, have become conscious of their position in present
nightlife relations, and so discontinue attempts to gain entry to the more fashionable spaces.
In this way, the operation of representations of social class has far-reaching consequences, not
only legitimating individual instances of exclusion, but normalizing a series of cultural
practices across the night-time landscape. Through this it is clear that there are only certain
spaces accessible for certain class-based youth groups, and as Bev Skeggs suggests,
“representations are crucial in understanding how one learns what is accessible to one and
what is not” (Skeggs, 1999: 214).
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Exclusion in Newcastle’s Night-Time Economy 2: Protecting Image
and the Maximisation of Capital
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I expand on the research findings, beginning in section 7.2 by explicating the
rationale for the multitude of exclusions in Newcastle’s night-time economy. I first detail
how exclusions are, to a limited extent, predicated on concerns for crime and disorder;
however, operators and bouncers are not influenced by media representations of deviant youth
and their ostensible criminalities. As I illustrate subsequently, the overarching rationale for
the exclusion of those perceived as delinquent youth is to ensure a homology between
upgraded venue image, upmarket consumers, and commercially defined imperatives. The
exclusion of chavs thus reflects spatial processes common to the post-industrial city, which
revolve around the protection of specific images and reputations that are themselves
preconditions for maximising capital through the most lucrative markets.
However, despite widespread occurrences of exclusion in Newcastle’s night-time economy,
in section 7.3 I argue that ‘exclusion’, as a spatial process, needs to be considered in more
detail. Whilst theories of revanchism, the annihilation of space, increased surveillance, and
methods of policing by labels are suggestive of scathing spatial curtailments aimed at the
urban poor, these particular understandings do not accurately support the findings of this
research. By presenting cases of changing consumer trends in nightlife consumption, as well
as the increased gentrification of particular locales, I suggest that exclusion here be posited as
a redistributive process open to contestation rather than a blanket spatial injunction that
completely denies participation in city centre night-time leisure.
I conclude the chapter in section 7.4 with a brief summary of the research, and by arguing that
whilst exclusion here is far more nuanced and subtle than previously anticipated, it
nevertheless exemplifies landscapes of unequal access, which are reflective of the wider
nature of contemporary urban space.
7.2 Maximising Capital: Rationalizing Exclusion
Whilst exclusion is predominantly rationalized through commercially defined imperatives,
participants also expressed other reasons for rejecting particular individuals. As I stated in the
previous chapter, there are heavy penalties for admitting those who are already intoxicated
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and under-18s; excluding these groups is thus justified by operators to protect licences. But
there are also selected concerns for crime and disorder. As some of the interviewees and
bouncers suggested, venues will regularly ‘knock back’ those they feel will disturb the order
of the venue, and if some individuals are known for their criminality they will also be refused
entry (for example, one interviewee stated that those involved with organised crime, those
who are known to be a nuisance, and those already barred for such actions will be denied
access).
As I declared in the methodology, I initially thought that media representations of youth crime
– including representations of particular youth groups such as the yob and the chav – may
also help shape the legitimisation for specific modes of regulation and exclusion. However,
the sensationalised concerns that abound in the media (such as those I illustrated in chapter 3)
were often dispelled by operators and door staff. When questioning the causative potential of
representations of delinquent youth, interviewees snubbed the idea that they were at all
influenced by these images. Speaking to a doorman one night, I decided to enquire into the
role of these representations of both troublesome youth and nightlife driven by the mass
media:
Aidan: With regard to the media, all these articles about charvers and chavs and yobs, do you
think that that’s influenced you and the management here?
Bigg Market superclub doorman: Not really. We see it differently because we’ve being doing
it for the last however many years. We know what’s charver and what’s not. We know
what’s a nice person in charver clothes and know what isn’t. What’s in the paper’s is hyped
up a lot, to sort of scare people really, more than anything else.
Aidan: So you think that the media influence other people’s perceptions and you’ve got to
regulate it from that?
Doorman: They influence people who don’t come in to city centre’s, or who don’t leave their
communities, and they read it and think, ‘that goes on in the town all the time’, but it’s not
like that at all. Some bars do have that element all the time, and what’s written about in the
media does happen in them places. But in general, we’re not [influenced by media].
From this, and to a certain degree from the interviews, it became evident that venue
management and door staff are wise to some of the negative publicity about nightlife revellers
by the media, and, as I illustrated in the last chapter, argue that appearance does not
necessarily denote behaviour as current representations suggest. Yet, according to many
venue security staff, some consumers do relate appearance with deviance, and the welcome
customers who fit with prescribed venue images apparently feel intimidated by those
perceived as problematic folk devils such as the chav. As another doorman put it:
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“I mean, my old man works for the BBC so I kind of know what the media are like you know?
But yeah, people know what charvers are and don’t like them etcetera and we’ve got to be
aware of that. So yeah, there are probably quite a few bars and clubs around that don’t let in
charvers for those kinds of reasons” (Bigg Market basement bar doorman).
Protecting Image: Exclusion as a Means to Economic Growth
Instead, then, the exclusion of charvers from mid-market and gentrified nightlife spaces is
predicated much more around the protection of image, which is, as I come to illustrate below,
crucial in maintaining the most lucrative markets. Again, the symbols associated with the
chav are fundamental to this approach. In gentrified environments where everything,
including both the space and the desired consumers are heavily styled, chavs seem to become
more visible, as the following interview extracts suggest:
Operator of mid-high market bar on the Diamond Strip: We have standards, so if somebody
turns up and they’re dressed in tracksuit bottoms then they’re not going to get in because
they’re not dressed appropriately, but that’s pretty much where we draw the line.
Aidan: So, is a dress code a major part of regulating your clientele?
Operator: It is when it comes to people dressed in sportswear, because 9 times out of 10
they’re not the clientele we’re looking for. They stand out when they’re actually in the venue.
[…] unless it’s fashionable sportswear – we don’t have a problem with that as long as their
overall appearance fits in with the style of [the venue] and they’re not causing trouble
(emphases added).
Operator of mid-high market nightclub: There are like you say, a real chav comes to the door
and sticks out like a sore thumb so it makes it very easy – they’re not for this venue – but other
venues accommodate them, because that’s the business they deal in, so every venue’s different
in the way they approach their door policies. I like to think of ours as being fairly rigid in
terms of being anti-chav, if you like, because that’s not the business we want to be in. I don’t
know anyone that wants to go to a venue that’s full of these so-called chavs. If you do have
these people in they tend to stand out in a crowd that’s very nicely dressed and there for the
good time (emphases added).
Image, therefore, is of paramount importance. As I illustrated in chapter 2, in the face of
economic transformation by way of neoliberalization and globalization processes, cities have
to do what they can to make themselves attractive in order to attain capital investment. This
has involved a number of government-led incentives, increased corroboration between public
and private sectors, and increasingly, gentrification and the aesthetic improvement of the built
environment (Harvey, 1989a; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Smith, 2002 for example). Whilst the
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night-time economy as a whole has experienced a surge of encouragement from the public
sector to increase the profitability of urban space, what is of particular interest here is the
increasing role of gentrification and image enhancement within certain nightlife
environments. Recent processes of nightlife restructuring, which include gentrification and
branding, are purposeful attempts to help “shape new consumer identities” (Hollands and
Chatterton, 2003: 375). But also, intertwined with this process is the fuelling of demand for
gentrified, branded and themed spaces by the new cash-rich urban and suburban middle
classes. The result of this interdependency is a plethora of design-led, highly-styled,
predominantly vertical drinking establishments which project particular images that appeal to
higher consumer groups, replacing traditional pubs and clubs and their seated layout.
The image of the venue is thus entangled with the projected clientele, where the cash-rich
seek style bars and upmarket nightclubs as they dissociate themselves from traditional forms
of nightlife consumption, and increasingly demand complete exclusivity (Hollands and
Chatterton, 2003). As Chatterton and Hollands (2002) have observed, many young people
desire these upgraded cosmopolitan spaces with “polished floors, minimalist and heavily
stylised décor and a greater selection of designer drinks” to mark out new and more
distinguished forms of consumer identity (p. 110). I uncovered similar consumer wants in
this research; the glitzy and glamorous venues on the Diamond Strip were consistently packed
out, with prospective consumers queuing in great lengths outside, some of whom, in informal
conversation, stating that they wanted to be in the “cool places” with other like-minded,
fashionable people, able to be offered the latest cocktails or fashionable premium drinks,
away from the relative ‘dirty’, rough and rowdy environments of locales such as the Bigg
Market.
This fit between venue image and consumer image was emphasised by some operators during
the research, making it clear that operators – especially those responsible for upmarket venues
– must maintain a certain venue image to perpetuate their desired customer base. Many
operators argued that charvers are rejected because their appearance is incompatible with both
their venue and the general clientele within the venue. This echoes the idea that, to use one of
Hayward and Yar’s (2006) terms, chav style is perceived as ‘aesthetically impoverished’ in a
context which demands ‘higher’ forms of consumption. The image of the clientele within the
venue is vital here, as the presence of undesirables is argued to tarnish the venue’s visual
image, and thus rejection through admittance policies such as loose dress codes are methods
through which to protect that image. As one Diamond Strip bar manager stated:
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Manager of style bar Diamond Strip: Yeah, as I say, dress code and that’s there to protect us
and our image, so when you let one guy in with tracksuit bottoms on and stuff like that, then
how many people are going to see him wearing tracksuit bottoms?
Aidan: So if you did start letting in people who weren’t dressed accordingly then that damages
the image and the revenue?
Manager: Yeah yeah – get rid of the nasty crowd and you end up with the clientele you’re
after, so the other way we’d have to go back to alcopops and stuff like that – drink as much as
you can in half an hour and end up getting your license restricted and stuff like that. I’d prefer
to serve people nicer drinks, and look nicer, rather than people who come out in tracksuit
bottoms and socks pulled up to their knees and stuff like that – they just don’t have the right
image about the place (emphasis added).
The image of the venue, however, is not just protected from ‘pollutants’ such as the chav
through its corporeal visual aesthetics; in other words, the exclusion of chavs is not only
practiced to keep the place looking ‘chav-free’. As one manager suggested, exclusion is a
means to protect the image of the venue in terms of its reputation. He explained this with an
account of his previous role at another nightclub:
Manager of style bar, Diamond Strip: Well, the first club that me and [other manager] worked
in was [club located on New Bridge Street West] and before that it was [called] ‘Ikon’, and
that was basically the place to go if you were a charver and, well, it got shut down because of
several incidents and stuff like that, and me and [other manager] helped open it back up and
stayed there for about a year. Before, it would be so bad that taxi drivers wouldn’t pick up
from there, there was a taxi rank right outside but there’d never be any taxis there because of
the type of clientele that used to go in.
Aidan: What kind of incidences were they?
Manager: It was stuff like stabbings and things like that, that’s how bad it got and then they
shut it down and it was shut for like 4 months or something, and then they spent a couple of
million pound on it and it was total contrast to what it was. People like me and yourself
would go in now and it’s rammed nearly every night of the week. But like, me and [other
manager] would go and give flyers to the shops and they’d say ‘where’s this?’ and you’d say
it was the ‘old Ikon’ and they’d give you them back because they didn’t think that anyone
could do anything with it. And now you see taxis parked outside the front and people walking
round saying ‘I can’t believe what you did with this place’ because people didn’t think it
could get better and get rid of that image (emphases added).
This particular nightclub thus had a reputation as a charver venue, which helped deter the
higher spending consumers. After several incidences of violence it was shut down, but then
reopened and re-branded. The interior design was completely changed, and it was
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subsequently marketed to the higher spending consumers. However, according to the
manager, it was so stigmatised that this remarketing process initially proved to be difficult.
Only with the repeated exclusion of its previous clientele – i.e. the charvers – could the venue
actually attract the more lucrative market. The image of a venue, then, in terms of its
representation within the wider networks of the night-time economy, plays a significant role
in the attraction of different night-time groups. Representations of places as charver venues
therefore have the capacity to repel other groups (i.e. the more affluent classes) due to
associations with crime and disorder, but also due to the kinds of class distancing sensibilities
discussed by scholars such as Bev Skeggs (2005) and Linda McDowell (2006, 2007).
But of course, these kinds of place representations have been operative for a long time, at
least in contexts outside of the night-time economy. As McDowell argues, there is a “long-
standing set of associations between inner city areas and, more recently outer local authority
estates, with the disreputable working class that is a key feature of current relations between
the social classes” (2007: 277). Indeed, as Stuart Cameron (2003) suggests, the stigmatisation
of neighbourhoods in the West end of Newcastle – long connected with the ‘rough’ working
classes – has significantly influenced collapsing private-sector house prices in these areas,
outward movement, and extreme polarisation of house prices in Newcastle as a whole. And
in East Manchester, Kevin Ward (2003) notes a similar scenario, illustrating how the area,
characterised by low housing demand and multiple indexes of deprivation associated with the
lower working class, was argued to have to be ‘civilized’ through intensive policing before it
could attract capital for redevelopment (particularly before and during the bid for the Olympic
Games in 2000, and the Commonwealth Games in 2002). Similarly then, those deemed
charver nightlife establishments are “spaces to be feared and avoided” (McDowell, 2007:
277), and only after a thorough re-imaging – both materially and immaterially – as well as a
thorough ‘clean up’ (or in Ward’s words, ‘civilizing’) through repeated exclusion can they
become profitable through middle-class consumption and other lucrative markets.
So, the post-industrial city relies on certain images to attract and maintain a space for
consumption and capital and to do this, a number of spatial processes must be employed. As I
illustrated in chapter 2, a number of geographers and cultural analysts have commented on
this. Neil Smith discusses gentrification (1992) and zero-tolerance policing in the ‘revenge’
on public space in New York City (1996a; 1996b), as does Gordon MacLeod in Glasgow
(2002); Don Mitchell exemplifies the use of legislation to rid urban space of the homeless in
numerous US cities (1997); Kevin Ward also considers intensive policing in the reclamation
of urban locales in Manchester (2003); Nick Fyfe and Jon Bannister discuss increasingly
intense surveillance through CCTV in Britain (1996; 1998); and Sharon Zukin (1995)
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examines the revitalisation of urban space in New York City through expanding consumption
practices in what she terms ‘domestication by cappuccino’. But what all of these accounts
observe in common, despite the differing national contexts in which they are located, is a
spatial method of marginalisation or exclusion (either overtly / directly or covertly /
indirectly) concomitant with entrepreneurialism, to recapitalise urban space in increasingly
competitive local, regional, national and international economies.
The night-time economy, in Newcastle as everywhere else in the UK, is also hugely
competitive. As the marketing manager of a Gate venue informed me, there are over 400
licensed premises in Newcastle’s city centre and, being businesses, each have to maximise
profit. Thus, venues do what they can to ensure profit perpetuation. The major players
owned by national and trans-national corporations are widely advertised, as are some of the
smaller venues; the abundance of discarded flyers throughout the city centre before being
swept away is testament to this. Drinks prices, discounts, and various forms of entertainment
also point to the night-time economy’s entrepreneurial character; each are utilised to attract
the maximum amount of consumers possible, whatever the market. Moreover, spatial politics
and the construction of ‘meaningful places’ are also used to attract consumers: highly stylised
venues promoted through upmarket images and upgraded ‘lifestyles’ aim to draw the cash-
rich, themselves involved in the ongoing construction of venue image.
But, again, the cultural politics of youth are fundamental in articulating these processes. The
exclusion of those identified as charvers from the highly stylised venues is predicated less
around concerns for crime and disorder, nor do these media-driven representations have any
causative power to influence operators and bouncers to exclude. Yet regulators have been
provided with a language through which to describe these exclusions. What became
increasingly evident as the research progressed is that these representations are negotiated in
order to maintain specific images, which are, in turn, a prerequisite for attaining the higher-
spending consumers seeking highly stylised nightlife environments. Reflective of extant
urban processes aimed at attracting capital, night-time entertainment operators thus practice
various regulatory mechanisms, especially exclusion, to filter access according to
contemporary cultural politics, and to ultimately maximise profit. As one operator suggested,
certain sectors of the market do not want to cohabit leisure space with others, particularly
chavs, so groups such as students and the cash-rich strive to distance themselves from these
lower markets, seeking exclusive spaces:
“There’s certain things that you can identify, certain people, they’re a charver, and it’s a sad
state of affairs because really, you know, everybody’s got the right to dress however but at the
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same time licensees have got the right of admission, that’s ultimately the law [...] A lot of
people don’t understand the rights that people have got and the rights the licensees have got
… you know if you come with a pair of running shoes on, we’ve got the right to turn you
away, it’s private property, you’re the guest of the licensee, it’s not your right to walk in you
know? It also kind of ... you need the right crowd in the venue. If you have a student night
then students are going to be more sensitive to the likes of the charvers or the chavs whatever
you want to call them, because, students like exclusivity on their nights, so, if the wrong crowd
gets in you alienate the students and once the students go, you’ve got no chance at all of
pulling them back because you’ll be deemed as a charver venue and that’s it. There are some
venues in Newcastle that directly market the charvers, there’s some directly market the high-
end customers, where we sit right in the middle, to clients spread over all, and as long as you
dress appropriately, you’ll get in” (Operator of mass-market, themed and branded superclub,
Bigg Market; emphasis added).
This was emphasised by other operators:
Aidan: So there’s a direct economic reason for [interrupted]
Manager of branded mid-market style bar, The Gate: Yeah without a doubt. If I let in too
many of those people [on the subject of charvers], then my other clientele who are willing to
come in and spend money at full price won’t come back again, and therefore, I’d lose that
trade, and then I’d have to lower the prices because the only other option is to get those chavs
in, which I’m not prepared to do.
Aidan: So if you started letting charvers in, that would turn people away?
Operator of mid-high market style bar, Diamond Strip: It would deter the nicer people from
coming I think; it’s just something you don’t want to test in case it does happen, especially
because this bar used to be a “Bigg Market bar”, prior to it being transformed into [what the
bar is now].
Aidan: Do you think that if you started admitting people that looked like charvers it would
turn your existing clientele away?
Marketing manager of mass-market bar, Newgate Street: Yes.
Aidan: Is that one of the reasons the charver element is kept out?
Manager: Yes […] there is an undesirable element which is definitely kept out, and it would
deteriorate very quickly if you let that element in.
As these excerpts illustrate, the admittance of those resembling what people have come to
understand as ‘charvers’ or ‘chavs’ will directly deter the student, mid, and high markets, and
as the operators argue, they will not just deter them temporarily, but permanently. It seems,
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therefore, that those perceived as charvers are constantly excluded from certain venues to
make space ‘safe’ for consumption by more affluent groups. For the superclub in the Bigg
Market area, even students, who do not tend to have that high an income, are sought above
charvers (probably due to the lucrative nature of the student market). As its operator
suggested, “the student pound is a big pound”, and thus deterring students by admitting
charvers would infer a significant loss in profit. A similar situation exists for those operators
that run higher-end venues. The more affluent middle-class consumers that frequent such
venues are an absolute necessity, and again, the admittance of charvers would deter
consumption by the ‘right’ crowd. For the more exclusive, then, this means having to
exclude, but for those who struggle to obtain the cash-rich, or do not even attempt to market
to ‘higher’ groups, nearly anybody is permitted. However, as I illustrate shortly, despite this,
night-time economies are very fluid and consumer trends change frequently, and thus venues
have to be entrepreneurial again when faced with such change.
7.3 Thinking through Exclusion: Redistribution and the Channelling of
Troublesome Youth
Where urban commentators such as those I have discussed previously present particularly
cruel and excessive forms of exclusion, the findings of this study suggest a far more subtle
and nuanced process of channelling and redistribution. As I illustrated in chapter 2, Neil
Smith (1996a; 1996b for example) and others point to the systemic removal of specific groups
from urban space and particular locales within. However, whilst imparting some parallel
spatial processes, forms of revanchism, the “annihilation of space by law” (Mitchell, 1997),
the “militarization of space” (Davis, 1990; 1992) and other extreme methods of
marginalisation do not adequately vindicate the spatial practices observed in this thesis. The
framework which establishes these theories – that spatial processes, including exclusion,
operate at the behest of market forces – is connected here, as I argued in the previous section,
but its outcomes are rather different. Those youth groups under the chav banner are not
completely denied access to Newcastle’s nightlife. Indeed, there are places where chavs are
welcome. As I suggested in the previous chapter, the Bigg Market caters predominantly for
those comprising the lower-markets. As a result, Bigg Market venues are less exclusionary in
terms of dress codes and rejection occurrences, as one Bigg Market club operator commented:
Aidan: Is there any particular clothing that’s banned, or any labels?
Manager of low-market bar and nightclub, Bigg Market: Kind of, tracksuits, trainers. We
can’t stop the stripy jumpers – we’re trying to – but the reason being in the Bigg Market,
that’s what they all wear, stripy jumpers – they’re alright and that, but you know, they’re
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charvers, but the Bigg Market is full of people like that though. They’re not that bad a people
though, when you come to deal with them, they might have a label on them – “charvers” – but
apart from that, most of them are alright.
Instead, they are filtered and coerced into certain spaces in which they are then contained. I
use the word ‘contained’ loosely here because, as I have alluded to already, there is always
some element of resistance to this redistribution process. For instance, those aware of their
otherwise stigmatised social identity can always dress differently to avoid being demarcated
by ubiquitous signifiers of deviance; some repeatedly attempt entry to the more fashionable
venues; and some “kick off” when rejected. I now want to demonstrate this nuance with two
accounts of the variegated nature of nightlife in Newcastle, which again, exemplifies the
relationships between image and consumption practices, the economic imperative to exclude,
but also the ways in which these are transformed through shifting cultural tastes and
preferences, and the spatial shifting of different groups of consumers. I begin by illustrating
the changing nature of nightlife consumption in Newcastle, before moving on to present an
account of the gentrification and growth of the Diamond Strip.
“Opening Doors”: Changes in Nightlife Consumption, Gentrification, and the Diamond
Strip
As consumer tastes change, so does venue favouritism, and those which are frequented by the
more affluent struggle to maintain their position for any prolonged period. Venues sometimes
change their management and ownership, become re-branded, or sometimes collapse
completely. So far I have illustrated the current trends in Newcastle, showing the hierarchical
structure of markets and how these relate to different locales. But it has not always been like
this. As one operator suggested, current drinking circuits have emerged out of more
traditional practices, before Newcastle gained such a reputation as a ‘party town’:
“I think Newcastle’s first drinking circuit, the original one, was the Bigg Market, and that was
about 16 years ago, which was kind of set up by a bloke called Joe Robinson, who opened up
a bar called Bentleys, it’s going back some years now … 16 .. 17 years ago, and this bottom
half down here, this part of the street [referring to the lower end of the Bigg Market], it used to
be the Mecca before it started to bleed its way out. And I think, really, Newcastle is one of the
very first cities where the council authorities really let have a concentrated area of bars, and
also, the innovation of having fun bars and party bars was pretty much born in this city as
well, and I think that’s why it’s kind of right up there. And everything else has been
developed from here [the Bigg Market], and then its exploded all over the city, and where it’s
exploded, it’s left this huge void where the Bigg Market was and now its just full of the lesser
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likelier people who’ll get in anywhere else now, and it’s a bit rough and run down, but that’s
initially where it started and you’re talking about 15 / 20 years ago” (Operator of mass-
market, themed and branded superclub, Bigg Market).
As I outlined in the previous section, one particular nightclub had quite a negative image,
reputed to be full of charvers. It was also a ‘problem’ venue with high incidences of violence.
It was subsequently shut down by the council, but then refurbished, re-branded, and re-
opened, catering for a completely different market. All previous clientele – those
encapsulated by the chav representation – were excluded, and only those perceived as the
more affluent were granted entry, alluding to the processes of nightlife gentrification outlined
in Chapter 4 using Chatterton and Holland’s (2003) work. However, as the research
progressed, a number of operators claimed that this particular venue could not sustain the
initial profit because they could not retain the upmarket crowd, and thus reverted back to its
‘traditional’ clientele by letting “all the charvers back in” (Diamond Strip bar owner).
Because of these consumer shifts, some operators are mindful that venues have to be
adaptable as consumers continue to seek the latest and most upgraded nightlife destinations.
As one operator illustrated, he and his business partner designed and marketed a Quayside bar
knowing that its demographics would eventually change from the high-spending middle-class
wanting exclusivity to the more general mass market seeking the more hedonistic ‘fun pub’
atmosphere:
“The [Quayside bar] is a fun pub, but it’s a luxurious beautiful fun pub. Its like, the idea of
‘fun pub’ brings up all sorts of horrendous thoughts where you spend tuppence ha’penny on a
drink and then try and compensate that by playing cheesy music very loudly with flashing
lights. The [bar], the fit-out cost of that when we did it was in excess of a million pounds and
it was very sophisticated. I worked on that with [business partner], and it was a total
champagne Charlie’s bar when it opened, very expensive, and it sold a lot of champagne and
was very upmarket, but we always realized that one day those people would move somewhere
else, because the champagne Charlie’s, these aren’t the [Grey Street bar] people, the
champagne Charlie people are a bit more flash with their money, and they stay there until the
next thing comes along. You’ve got them for 2 years and then something else happens and
that’s it. Best way to describe them is the Apartment [bar on Collingwood street – Diamond
strip], which is Newcastle’s current champagne Charlie’s bar [26]. But they’re leaving there,
they’re at the [other Diamond Strip bars]; they’re moving around and they leave a void, so
you’ve got to be ready to fill that gap. So [Quayside bar] was designed specifically with that
in mind” (Owner / Executive of leisure and design group).
26 At the time of the interview (before being re-branded).
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As these processes were brought to light, in later interviews I enquired about changing
regulation practices further. As the following excerpt suggests, bars on the Diamond Strip
used to be far more exclusive than they were at the time of the research in 2007 / 2008:
Aidan: So Apartment would only let in a certain crowd that would spend lots of money?
Operator of themed mid-high market bar, Diamond Strip: Yes.
Aidan: Are there any bars like that now?
Operator: [Diamond Strip bar] tried to be like that and then went into administration, and
they’ve now been bought by the guys who own [another Diamond Strip bar], so they’re the
new ownership now but I’m not entirely sure what their policies are now. I think they still
have the high-end range and stuff and the VIP room and the membership scheme, but I don’t
think there’s such a demand for it in Newcastle anymore.
Aidan: Why do you think that is?
Operator: Times change, things which are fashionable one year aren’t going to be fashionable
3 or 4 years later. Everything has a shelf life unfortunately, and in a city as small as
Newcastle, maybe you could have a little bar which is entirely exclusive, but something this
size [referring to the venue that she operates], you need to pack it out and have the atmosphere
going.
This process also influenced the transformation of a Gate venue’s demographics:
“You always get cycles in bars. When you first open you first get all the beautiful people, and
then if you’re a large bar, everybody wants to come and see you. But especially for females,
and young single females, if they’re [charvers] dressed as you say and acting aggressive or
whatever, it’s off putting for the girls, and they will go elsewhere, where they think the other
beautiful people drink. So yeah it can affect your market and you’ve got to judge it, but at the
same time, we get a lot of people in and you think, they’re a bit rough or whatever and they’re
really canny lads, and probably just come out for a quick drink and then do the circuit”
(Operator of mass-market branded superclub, The Gate).
Therefore, as venues “open up their doors”, dress codes and admittance policies are relaxed,
and inclusion rather than exclusion is the result of the same economic imperative to maximise
profit. The entrepreneurial agenda, driven by competition, thus propels various spatial
processes. Initially, the upmarket venues revel in their profit-making abilities; they have
sought the cash-rich consumers which in turn fuel images and trends, which repeat the cycle.
They are the ‘places to be’, and the places that can afford to exclude the most. But as new
bars open or re-brand and cater for the same market, those consumers, wanting the latest
fashionable venues, relocate, influencing other venues to reduce exclusions to gain more
consumers to ensure profit. This speaks of regulation as a process diverting different groups
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in relation to changing markets rather than a process which seeks to maintain a status quo. I
now want to expand upon this understanding with the idea of gentrified nightlife, and the rise
of heavily stylised venues located around Collingwood Street, now known as the Diamond
Strip. I argue that the following case study demonstrates the effects of the gentrification
process, where the highest-spending consumers colonize the most stylish of new venues,
displacing and transforming existing patterns of consumption.
I remain unsure of the exact inception of the term ‘Diamond Strip’. It was coined fairly
recently to encapsulate the area located around Central Station and Collingwood Street in
Newcastle city centre27. By day it is as unremarkable as any of the other nearby streets home
to tertiary sector employment, but at night, as the multitude of bars open, it transforms into a
haven for those dressed to the nines seeking style, décor, and premium drinks and services. A
quick search via Google for Newcastle’s Diamond Strip reveals www.newcastlevip.co.uk as
the first entry – a web log (‘blog’) site written by a Newcastle local dedicated to reviewing
Newcastle’s favourite nightlife scenes28. On the site, the Diamond Strip is described by the
following promotional rhetoric:
“One of the buzz words in Newcastle when talking about nightlife and bars is “The Diamond
Strip“. This is mainly used by bars and promoters to make the area sound cool, chic and
expensive, and it does have all three. The Diamond Strip is the place to go out in Newcastle,
as W1 is the place in London … The kind of people who go here are 20-35yr olds, young,
cool, mature people. The area attracts these kinds of people by selling a range of drinks
including cocktails, bottles, and long drinks. You will not find any girls here drinking pints
with a straw. The layout of all the bars is modern and contemporary, with comfortable places
to sit and talk, private booths are available at most places with or without advance booking.
Prices are expensive in comparison to other areas of Newcastle, for example the Bigg Market.
Some bars in Newcastle try to attract customers by selling cheaper drinks, such as the treble’s
bars ... The bars on The Diamond Strip sell more sophisticated drinks at higher prices … One
of the biggest problems with this area is the label which goes with it, therefore the people it
attracts. The majority are fine, nice people having a good night out. But since this is the ‘upper
class’ area of Newcastle you do get a few pretentious idiots, late 20 – 30yr old men who think
they are better than everyone else, as well as 21yr old girls who think they are Paris Hilton.
Because of this the doormen want to let ‘the cool kids’ in, and if you don’t look like one you
might not get in the place if there is a queue. Wear the wrong thing, look a bit off, and you
will not be getting in if the place is busy” (http://www.newcastlevip.co.uk/the-diamond-strip/).
27 I still had not heard the term when I moved out of Newcastle in 2005, and I worked at what would now be called a Diamond
Strip bar.
28 The Diamond strip has also found its way onto travel sites such as the Wikipedia sister website Wikitravel – see
http://wikitravel.org/en/Newcastle_upon_Tyne
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As I suggested in section 6.2, the locally infamous Apartment luxury bar on Collingwood
Street was probably the first successful style bar in Newcastle, and since, many have followed
suit in the provision of high-style nightlife. The Diamond Strip is now comprised of at least
seven bars, four of which were represented in the interviews (more if bars on adjacent streets
are taken into account) and all provide very similar environments. One of these used to be a
Bigg Market style bar and had a reputation as a charver venue with cheap drinks promotions
and playing cheesy 90s pop music. It became known, however, as a problem venue and
subsequently closed (although I am unsure as to whether it was forced to close). Now it is a
bar that hosts celebrities, the upper classes and the more affluent of the middle classes, and
represents a telling sign of gentrification at work in the contemporary Newcastle night-time
economy.
This rise of these style bars on the Diamond Strip in recent years has helped shift upper class
consumption from other locales. The Gate area was previously very popular; in the
interviews I learnt that at least three of the earliest bars to open in the complex were highly
styled and initially very exclusive. But the growth of the Diamond Strip had shifted the most
lucrative markets. The account that follows is based on an interview with the general
manager of a large branded venue situated in the Gate area of Newcastle. As he took his post
as manager a few years ago, many of the venue’s sought consumers had either relocated or
were in the process of relocating to venues on the Diamond Strip. As the following interview
extracts illustrates, location within contemporary nightlife relations is fundamental in
attracting the higher-spending consumers. As the Diamond Strip grew, attracting more and
more of the upper classes, Gate venues designed for the big spenders (through their products
and services, environments, admission charges etc.) found themselves spatially redundant in a
declining locale which was increasingly gaining a reputation as a ‘lower’ drinking area:
Aidan: Well I guess my next question was going to be what end of the market do you seek
and how does that fit in with the rest of Newcastle?
Operator of mass-market branded super-venue, The Gate: It’s actually quite an interesting
one. We are very much stuck in the middle. The Gate, which we are next door to, is now, it’s
sometimes perceived to be a lower end of the market; you’re nicer crowd, like you said are
now down in the Diamond Strip. [This venue] used to get the VIP crowd, as they’re called,
when it was the new place in town, and to be honest, a lot of that crowd has gone and they
don’t want to come up this end of town. So when I took over as GM, it was a bit of a task for
me because I was trying to open up the doors to a wider market, which in the past would have
probably been knocked back from the venue, and it’s a bit weird because I’ve run clubs
before, and when they’ve been open for 5 or 6 years and they’re not the newest places in
town, you do have to change who you market it to, and it is a natural progression for those
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middle and lower end customers to come in a bit more. But in this city, [this venue] had a bit
of a stigma, and people disliked the venue because they saw it as elitist, and you were kind of
fighting an uphill battle, and we had to say, ‘now hang on, we are laid back, we do want your
custom’. But yeah we’re in a strange location, people always say, you know [Quayside
nightclub], the manager of [Quayside nightclub] comes up to me and says ‘well how are you
doing’, and ‘if you picked up the [Gate venue] brand and plonked it where I am at [Quayside],
you’d be rammed every single night, because you’d be in the right location’, so we’re sort of a
higher end venue in a lower end market.
The Gate area therefore lost much of the upper markets. Nevertheless, they still have to make
as much money as possible. As the operator continued, he suggested that the venue “opened
up its doors”, admitting consumers that would have previously been rejected. He continues:
Operator: We take feedback from our customers, because we want to keep our regulars happy,
and some of my regulars come and chat to me now and they say ‘your crowd’s totally
different than it was two years ago’, and they use these phrases like ‘there’s stripy jumpers
and chains on people in the club’ and ‘lads with tattoos’, and it’s interesting because they’re
perceiving this shift in the venue and the potential to put them off and drive them to another
venue so … yeah, the people I’ve spoke to have, not exactly been put off, but have said ‘the
level of your clientele is dropping’. And like I said with this end of town, I’ve got to make
money and I can’t be elitist, and if I was, in a 2000 capacity club, I’d probably only let in 7 or
8 hundred every Saturday, but even though the clientele is changing, we’re still not a problem
venue and it’s still safe, but yeah, people do want to be in the coolest place – you know,
[Diamond Strip bar] has just opened and everyone wants to be seen [there], it’s all that social
networking crowd right? I suppose it can put customers off if you’re perceived as that kind of
venue.
Aidan: You were saying about how the VIP crowd have left, do think [the growth of the
Diamond Strip] is the reason for it, or is it a mixture of reasons?
Operator: I wouldn’t say which came first, the cart or the horse, because when I got here I had
to start letting in the lower market because I realised the VIP crowd had left; we weren’t going
to make money out of an empty building so we had to start letting a different crowd in. My
area manager was the manager of this venue when it opened and he had a walk round having
not been here for years, and he said that all the figures were the same but the VIP crowd is
lost, and the VIP room when he had it used to take about 8 grand in a night because they’d all
buy champagne etcetera, and that’s what you’ve lost. They’d already gone and maybe, like
you say, maybe they left because this end of town was becoming a lower end market, or
middle market. Maybe it was this end of town that put them off, either that or we’re just an
older venue and they went to a newer place.
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In some respects, then, the consumer is a powerful actor in the night-time economy, at least,
the higher-spending middle-class consumer is. The bulk of the change in Newcastle’s
nightlife is down to this group; they determine which venues are ‘in’ – which are fashionable,
trendy, and the latest ‘place to be’ – and in doing so they determine which places are passé
and which are yesterday’s news. This is a process which is perhaps underplayed in the
expositions by Chatterton and Hollands (2002, 2003 for example) and others (for example
Hobbs et al, 2000) on the subject of the night-time economy and its processual, ephemeral
character. Sometimes, transformations occur so rapidly, that after losing the upmarket
consumers venues suddenly experience a degree of desperation in their commitment to
capital, opening their doors so wide, perhaps, that they become ‘trouble venues’. As the
operator of the branded Gate venue continued:
Operator: The phrase people use is “he’s opened up his doors” or whatever, you hear that
thrown about quite a lot, and a bar’s got a shelf-life of 18 months when it’s the new bar in
town – it might be a popular place up to about 2 and a half years, but after that you’ll hear
people say “they’ve opened up their doors”, they’ve slackened their door policy, and then it is
a slippery slope, and 5 or 6 years down the line, not [this venue] because we hold ourselves
pretty strong, but I’ve seen other venues then be labelled your ‘trouble venues’, and it’s quite
interesting to watch the timeline. There’s a bar not far from here, I won’t name it, but it
opened itself up as a style bar, a VIP bar, and gradually opened up the doors and is now what I
would say the low end of the market doing pound drinks and cheap offers. And it’s not in
such a long space of time either. But they had to adjust to the market because you’ve got to
make money, you’re forced down that path and you just have to go with it.
Whilst at first this account seems contradictory to my argument that night-time economies are
imbued with exclusionary cultural politics, it actually illustrates further the entrepreneurial
rationale for exclusion, and how this helps segregate different nightlifes commensurate with
common understandings of social groups – including those of troublesome youth. The capital
directive remains the same, and whilst some bars broaden their market scope, other bars
maintain their exclusionary agenda; new bars are able to practice intensive rejection, and so it
continues. The basic premise lingers: that entrepreneurial agendas fuel exclusionary systems,
but that these exclusionary systems are fluid, contested and open to change.
7.4 Conclusion: Restricted Access to Nightlife in Newcastle
In this concluding section, I want to recapitulate the three main arguments of this chapter.
First, along with many other geographers, I argue that we have to think about urban
entrepreneurialism and its doppelganger neoliberalism as a set of spatial process as well as a
153
political-economic agenda. To re-phrase a term I used earlier, “neoliberalism is a spatial
project that is spatially projected” (Herod and Aguiar, 2006: 435), in that its political
programme – entrepreneurialism – employs space to attract and fix economic growth. And it
does this in a number of ways. As Harvey (1989a) suggests, urban space has been
reconfigured around place rather than territory, increasingly bringing image and aesthetics
into modes of governance, shifting emphases away from the provision of welfare and
services. With this comes large-scale gentrification and re-aestheticization (Smith, 2002;
Macleod, 2002) that seeks to attract new forms of capital and flexible modes of accumulation.
However, in doing so, a number of other spatial projects are also employed. The 1980s,
1990s, and 2000s have witnessed an increasing cascade of marginalising practices
concomitant with the recent restructuring of urban space. Exclusion, escalating punishment,
more intensive modes of policing, and segregation have become common features of the post-
industrial city, where representations of deviant groups, constructed in opposition to late-
capitalism, serve to justify their removal from the public sphere, as well as a range of
surrogate private spaces.
This particular theoretical trajectory, I argue, is fundamental if we are to better understand the
spatial characteristics of contemporary night-time economies. Representations of deviant
youth do not drive exclusions; excluding chavs is not predicated around their construction as
criminal; and exclusion cannot thus be explained by way of a causal framework. Despite
some concerns over crime and disorder in the night-time economy, it seems that exclusions
are articulated much more around capital needs, and rationalized through the protection of
image intrinsic to the retention of middle-class, high-spending consumers (or in response to
the loss of this market, and the need to throw the net wider). As image has become ever more
significant in seeking an urban spatial fix for capital, it is therefore also hugely important in
Newcastle’s contemporary night-time economy. Maintaining a particular image – especially
for the gentrified, high-style venues – is essential for keeping hold of the most lucrative
markets, and therefore the exclusion of those reconstituted as troublesome at the current
juncture is justified by regulators as a means through which to protect these images.
Admittance to those under the charver banner would deter the more affluent consumers,
resulting in a loss in profit and a widening in consumer base by any means necessary – drinks
promotions, cheaper entry, and even normalizing entry to charvers. Excluding troublesome
youth is hence the result of capital obligations to maximise profit.
My second argument concerns the way in which these exclusionary processes should be
understood in relation to existing theories of exclusion in urban and cultural geography.
Whilst the theoretical context of this thesis derives from the geographies of David Harvey,
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Neil Smith, Don Mitchell, and others studying the recent political-economic transformations
and cultural politics of urban space, exclusion here is not presented as a complete removal of
a particular social group. As the fieldwork illustrates, there is no ‘annihilation’ of those
perceived to be charvers. Rather, groups encapsulated by contemporary representations of
delinquency are filtered, channelled and redistributed; they are excluded from some venues,
as the case of the Diamond Strip suggests, but not all. Indeed, what I discovered through the
interviews and observation is that the Bigg Market typifies what people demarcate as a
charver nightlife area. Moreover, the fact that consumption patterns change and nightlife is in
a constant state of flux points further to the fact that there is no systemic removal of charvers
from the night-time city centre. Instead, exclusion works to redistribute groups according to
their ‘place’ in this normative landscape, which, again, is subject to temporal change.
Processes occurring at a certain time and place are not set in stone forever. Venues change in
ownership, become re-branded, refurbished, and sometimes close altogether, whether due to
irresponsibility, contributing to disorder, or through lack of profit. Transformations are
further impelled by shifts in consumption preferences, where once popular venues lose their
allure, and consumers eventually relocate to other, newer / refurbished, more fashionable
venues. And as these transformations occur, venues have to ‘open up their doors’, relaxing
admittance policies in order to maximise the profit to which they are obliged.
My third and final argument revolves around issues of segregation and unequal access.
Having been exemplified through the development of the Diamond Strip, entrepreneurial
processes which engender exclusion and redistribution contribute to a segregated nightscape
which aims to keep the higher and lower classes of consumers socially and spatially separate.
We can, therefore, think of Newcastle’s nightlife as a fragmented leisure landscape where
specific groups find themselves excluded from a number of locations, but accepted in others.
Newcastle’s current nightscapes impart distinct, although not completely clear-cut segments.
Of course, segregation like this has nearly always occurred, and its existence in late-
capitalism is rather unremarkable; numerous other consumption practices and markets are
separated in similar ways. What is most interesting, though, is that the excluded / segregated
groups are continually articulated through contemporary representations of troublesome
youth. Out of all the linguistic structures, the terms chav and charver are used due to their
capacity to encompass the instantly identifiable markers of deviance – the brand names,
baseball caps, tracksuits, shoes and hoodies – that signify those of which society has been told
to be wary. Performativity and the embodied aesthetics are also used in the identification
process, but are less to do with a policy constructed by operators that define certain unwanted
behaviours, and more to do with the discretion of venue door staff and how they perceive
potential consumers in line with contemporary cultural identities. As I discussed previously,
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bodies and performance have also become ever more important signifiers of class, where
those not conforming to new middle-class attitudes and behaviours are increasingly
marginalised.
As many academic commentators have suggested, then, contemporary urban landscapes
under economic neoliberalism are highly exclusionary, and this is evident in local urban
nightscapes, which also witness the performance of entrepreneurial capitalism and its latent
spatial effects. As Chatterton and Hollands argue, the “emerging mode of regulation
associated with the corporate entertainment city points to intensified social and spatial control
of leisure spaces via formal mechanisms such as increased surveillance and door security
staff, restrictive by-laws and design of the built environment, in conjunction with attempts to
literally ‘sanitise through style’” (2002: 108). It thus reflects the broader processes of post-
industrial change where certain spaces are claimed and colonized by the wealthier of urban
and sub-urbanites and where others, reconstituted alongside political-economic shifts, can be
identified, their spatialities restricted, and participation in certain leisure cultures denied. It
may not be appropriate to allude to Newcastle’s night-time economy as ‘revanchist’, but like
processes of revanchism, nightlife operators are helping to reconfigure the identity of
particular class-based groups through the semantics of troublesome youth and use these
vernaculars in the justification of exclusion. Ultimately, for some venues, the propagation of
contemporary representations is to identify the already socially excluded so that they may be
excluded once again, resulting in unequal access for all social groups.
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Conclusions
Entrepreneurial Urbanism, Exclusion, and the Reconstitution of Troublesome
Youth: The New Delinquent and their Restricted Access to Nightlife in Newcastle
There are several conclusions to take from this thesis, the ramifications of which contributing
to the development of a number of areas of human geographical enquiry. First, this study
opens up the micro-geographies of the night-time economy to a greater degree than before,
showing the more intricate and variegated nature of contemporary urban nightlife, its
regulation, and some of the resultant spatial implications for different groups of consumers.
In this study, the term ‘regulation’ is not used in the traditional economic sense i.e. the
regulation of the economy, but rather, it is deployed to encompass the many varied ways
through which access to different spaces is mediated. Thus, inclusion and exclusion are
practiced through the regulation of admittance, itself a process heavily reliant on deviancy
signifiers, whether it be the contemptuous logos or the embodied cultural digressions from
prescribed and approved performances.
Others have examined the state of the contemporary night-time economy, its producers and its
arbitrators (e.g. Chatterton and Hollands, 2002, 2003; Hobbs et al, 2000, 2002, 2005; Nayak,
2005); this thesis though, examines these issues in more detail at the street level, and as such,
offers further insight into the entrepreneurial city’s inner workings, how these correlate with
the spatial practices of different youth groups but also how they relate to recent articulations
of class and masculinity. Of striking importance is the continued subjugation of the young
lower-class man in extant urban processes. Whilst folk devils have long been operative in the
social consciousness, this study suggests that their form and function continue to transform
with the economic and cultural politics of the city. As I argued previously, the figure of the
yob perpetuates long-standing fears traditionally associated with young working-class men,
and has supplanted, perhaps, the iconic figure of the hooligan. Moreover, the most recent
articulation of troublesome youth – the chav – has come to represent a newer and more
scathing denigration of non-working-class youth, which has effectively replaced fears in the
1990s of a growing urban underclass substratum. What is perhaps most interesting, though, is
that specific commodities, consumer identities and embodied (often masculine) performances
continue to dovetail with representations of class in the demarcation of delinquent youth.
Thus, in addition to idleness, fecklessness and licentiousness, a myriad of consumer symbols
have somehow become signifiers of a class-based delinquency. The resultant discourses of
aesthetic impoverishment and ‘vulgar’ consumption practices, as well as new forms of
158
embodied deviance entangle themselves in other forms of class condescension and prejudice,
seemingly justifying spatial distancing through social and cultural inequality (Hayward and
Yar, 2006; Johnson, 2008; McDowell, 2006; Nayak, 2006; Skeggs, 2005; Tyler, 2006).
The case of Newcastle’s night-time economy therefore illustrates how these current
representations are intertwined in the form and function of the entrepreneurial city, operating
in and alongside the spatial directives of the night-time economy, which are also symptomatic
of current urban landscapes, cultural politics and their class relations. Furthermore, that
masculinity has been made implicit in articulating these representations of delinquent youth in
Newcastle’s night-time economy is a telling sign of the continued apprehension toward the
young man – and especially the non-working-class young man – and his marginalisation
under neoliberal rule. As others have shown before, those already alienated by broader
economic restructuring and accelerating processes of globalization have been further
marginalised through various socio-spatial exclusions at the urban scale. As this thesis
shows, whilst there is no specific discursive attack on young men outright, certain displays of
masculinity seems to make lower class status more visible and verifiable, informing wider
understandings of non-working-classness and its increasingly diminutive place in the
entrepreneurial city.
Second, this study points out the convolution of exclusion at the street level in the micro-
geographies of the night-time economy. As I have suggested throughout this dissertation, the
entrepreneurial city possesses an exclusionary character, but, as this thesis indicates, it is not
always as systemic as some would aver. The recent political-economic change toward
neoliberalism that I noted earlier, characterised at the urban scale through entrepreneurial
governance, has indeed produced a multitude of retrenchments in people’s access to certain
spaces within the city, at the same time as opening up the urban realm to facilitate even
greater capital accumulation. Without reviewing these arguments again here, it is important
to note that this exclusionary disposition is also evident within contemporary spaces of
nightlife, as the case of Newcastle suggests, where those lower in the social structure –
already largely disqualified from participating in numerous cultural spheres – are excluded
from particular nightlife spaces as well as other urban spaces at other times. Whilst the
exclusion of specific youth groups brought to light in this research is not predicated by state
actions or instituted by local government powers, the economic imperative to restrict their
access – to protect place image, reputation and capital – remains, though, and as a result, a
number of fluid and contested exclusions are practiced.
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However, as I outlined in the previous chapter, there remain spaces in which those branded
socially delinquent can still occupy, to which the Bigg Market testifies, just as there remain
run-down sink estates to house the socially excluded. That these kinds of spaces exist should
therefore prompt geographers to examine the more nuanced, subtle and contested nature of
exclusion. Contrary to revanchism and the annihilation of space, then, this thesis posits
exclusion as a redistributive and filtering process rather than a blanket spatial injunction. As
Chatterton and Hollands (2003) argue, residual, run-down spaces such as these are being
peripheralised or slowly replaced with more homogenous, sanitised, corporate nightlife
spaces in which only the more affluent are allowed to consume. It is entirely possible that in
the future, if the potential for profit increases even further in Newcastle’s night-time
economy, areas such as the Bigg Market will change, become branded, sanitized, and even
gentrified, further marginalising residual nightlife spaces and those on which they depend.
Third, notwithstanding the fluidity of exclusion, that there is restricted access to the more
profitable spaces in Newcastle at night exemplifies an urban landscape devoid of equal
access, and specifically one that includes / excludes on class grounds – a telling sign of class-
based segregation at work. As Linda McDowell argued recently, “contacts between the
classes are becoming increasingly rare as the middle classes construct a cordon sanitaire
around their lives through strategies of spatial distancing, such as gated communities and the
declining use of public transport” (2006: 838). This thesis follows along such lines and
proposes that the normalization of specific regulatory cultures based on class representations
in the night-time economy can only exacerbate this separation, contributing to a normative
landscape in which certain groups increasingly experience these spatial restrictions. Whilst
some have shown that city space is not always exclusionary and unequal, that can be
‘emancipatory’ (Lees, 2004) and subject to resistance (see for example Pile and Keith, 1997;
Sharp et al, 2000), this research shows contrary that representations of the new delinquent
continue to pervade a range of constraints on peoples access to urban space at various times.
Fourth, and finally, this thesis presents a ‘down link’ from the level of the entrepreneurial city
to that of the micro-geographies of regulation and exclusion inside the city, but also to the
bodies of those that are excluded. In tackling exclusion more deeply at the street level, this
thesis shows how urban entrepreneurialism – manifested by the function of the night-time
economy – representations of delinquent youth, class and masculinity converge to
disseminate a series of multi-scalar relationships which represent the inner workings of
contemporary urbanism. From this thesis it is clear to see exactly what effects
entrepreneurialism has on the non-working-class, stigmatised, largely male body, which is
sought out and marginalised to the peripheral hinterlands of the glamorous centre, whilst
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those who consume and perform in conjunction with late-capitalist culture continue to
dominate economically, culturally and most importantly, spatially.
In conclusion, I want to make two brief points that should be of continued interest for
contemporary urban and cultural geographers. First, that class should remain high on the
geographical agenda, and second, that unequal access to urban space for all social groups
should be of continued academic importance, particularly where young men are concerned.
As David Harvey and other urban commentators argue, cities primarily function for the
circulation of capital. In doing so, however, the trenchant economic performances which act
to maximise capital also “point to clear winners and losers in the urban realm” (Zukin, 2006:
103). The winners are those who have embraced the onset of neoliberalism – the new middle
classes, the mass consumers, the entrepreneurial stakeholders, and those who comply with the
development of post-industrial urban culture. The losers remain the working and lower
classes – the urban poor, the homeless, the underclass – those who have been reconstituted as
deviant to the putative success of neoliberalism whilst they have simultaneously become
disenfranchised from its development. These reconfigurations of class commensurate with
the advancement of neoliberalism and entrepreneurial urbanism serve to exacerbate social and
spatial exclusion, reconstructing ideas of publicness and citizenship to an abstraction
recognized only by late-capitalist culture. In the words of Alison Stenning (2008: 11):
“Why are working class geographies important? As a number of geographers have recently
argued, our neoliberal times are remaking class relations every day in all corners of the world
... The continuing presence, and perhaps exacerbation, of class inequalities globally, nationally
and locally demands that we pay close attention to these processes”.
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Appendix
Map of Newcastle City Centre
The locations of the four principle mainstream nightlife locales. From North West to South
East: 1) The Gate complex; 2) Bigg Market; 3) the Diamond Strip; and 4) the Quayside
